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Abstract
In this dissertation, I analyze investment decisions and consumer behavior
related to energy efficiency and conservation. This research is motivated by
evidence that the benefits from energy savings can extend well beyond private
monetary gains to consumers. By providing insight on these topics, I con-
tribute to a broad literature on environmental economics. This dissertation
is constituted of three chapters as follows.
For the first chapter, I introduce a methodological contribution for sta-
tistical evaluation of the impact of policy changes, interventions, or general
“treatments.” Specifically, I focus on estimating treatment effect heterogene-
ity in event studies with staggered adoption: panel data settings where ob-
servational units experience treatment at different points in time. I propose
using highly flexible machine learning algorithms to predict counterfactuals
(unobserved outcomes in absence of treatment) in those settings. With sim-
ulations, I show that my proposed method can recover nuanced effects with
more accuracy and with better statistical efficiency than traditional econo-
metric models (such as fixed effects regressions). I conclude that chapter
with an application of the ML approach to real data from the Weatheriza-
tion Assistance Program (WAP), which is one of the largest residential energy
efficiency programs in the US. I identify how energy savings differ substan-
tially depending on housing structure and on which types of upgrades were
performed. For example, I document how complete furnace replacements are
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associated with significantly higher savings than furnace repairs. Also, I show
that measures related to wall, attic, and foundation insulation are among the
strongest contributors to energy savings. Finally, I assess measure-specific
cost-effectiveness. Those results are informative for efforts to improve the
allocation of program funds.
The second chapter of this dissertation consists of a randomized control
trial (RCT) to assess if behavioral nudges can promote energy conservation in
absence of direct monetary incentives. The RCT was conducted in a campus
residence hall with students that payed a fixed fee for energy at the beginning
of each term. In that setting, behavioral factors such as social norms and
moral suasion are the main incentives for conservation, since the marginal
monetary costs/savings for energy are zero. The RCT consisted of sending
“home energy reports” to randomly selected students, revealing their heat-
ing/cooling energy consumption. The energy usage of their neighbors was
also displayed. Results from analyzing high-frequency thermostat data sug-
gest that those reports were not effective for changing students’ consumption
patterns during the regular semester. On the other hand, nudges sent prior
to school breaks resulted in significantly lower thermostats (thus lower energy
consumption). That second finding suggests that the null effects during the
regular semester are unlikely to be driven by students’ inattention or by lack
of understanding on how to operate thermostats. Rather, students were more
willing to lower setpoints before leaving for breaks, given that they would not
be facing associated thermal discomfort in that case. Collectively, those re-
sults suggest that behavioral nudges alone may not be sufficient to promote
energy conservation in settings were monetary incentives are lacking.
For the last chapter of this dissertation, I investigate how and why rented
dwellings are less likely to have energy efficient appliances. I use data from
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a representative sample of residences across the continental US. I document
that, on average, dwellings are more efficient when landlords are responsible
for paying energy bills, and in states with high energy prices. Those results
are consistent with a well-documented problem of split incentives in resi-
dential markets: the “landlord-tenant problem.” When tenants pay utility
bills, landlords may have little incentive to invest in efficiency, especially if
those investments do not translate into higher rents. That could happen due
to information asymmetries that limit prospective tenants’ abilities to fully
compare rental units across the market. By analyzing the effects of tenancy
duration on the adoption of efficient technologies, I find evidence that invest-
ments in owner-occupied homes are more likely to occur closer to move-in
dates. On the other hand, investments in rented homes are more likely to
occur at later periods of tenancy, when relations between landlords and ten-
ants might be better established. Those results are suggestive of a sorting
process in residential markets, where homeowners have a stronger preference
for energy-efficient dwellings and may have smaller discount rates. Findings
from this chapter reinforce that energy efficiency policies in rental markets
should differ from those targeted at homeowners.
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CHAPTER 1
PREDICTIVE COUNTERFACTUALS FOR
TREATMENT EFFECT
HETEROGENEITY IN EVENT STUDIES
WITH STAGGERED ADOPTION
Abstract: This paper contributes to a growing literature on
machine learning applications for causal inference. I focus on
estimation of treatment effect heterogeneity, specifically for event
studies with time-varying treatment/exposure dates (i.e. staggered
adoption). Recent econometric literature shows that traditional
impact evaluation methods (such as fixed effects regressions) can
be near-term biased in those settings. I introduce an approach that
does not suffer from such bias, and that can recover heterogeneity
more efficiently than standard fixed effects models. The first step
of the approach is to accurately predict a distribution of counter-
factuals, by applying flexible machine learning algorithms to pre-
treatment data only. Then, by comparing counterfactual and true
outcomes, it is possible to estimate a distribution of treatment
effects. Those effects can be summarized for different portions
of the sample, thus recovering heterogeneity. With simulations,
I demonstrate how that approach can be accurate and efficient,
even in the presence of dynamic (time-varying) treatment effects.
I conclude with an application to real data from a large residen-
tial energy efficiency program in the US. While prior literature is
restricted to estimating average program effects, I identify which
types of upgrades are associated with higher energy savings. Those
results provide insight about which upgrades to target to improve
the program’s cost-effectiveness.
1
1.1 Introduction
The recent surge in data availability across multiple fields is associated with
both challenges and opportunities in modern research (Jin et al., 2015; Agar-
wal and Dhar, 2014). Scientists now face increasingly large volumes of com-
plex information. On one hand, as the quantity of observations and variables
increases, so does processing time and computing memory required for anal-
yses. On the other hand, more information can lead to a more nuanced
understanding of the topics being researched. For that purpose, novel sta-
tistical methods, such as machine learning (ML), are becoming more popu-
lar. New applications in economics and other social sciences, for example,
demonstrate that those tools can be helpful to evaluate the effects of policy
changes, field experiments, welfare assistance, weather shocks, and others
(for reviews, see: Storm, Baylis, and Heckelei, 2019; Weersink et al., 2018;
Coble et al., 2018). In this paper, I demonstrate how machine learning can
be applied to recover heterogeneous effects, specifically for event studies with
staggered adoption: settings with many observational units that are eventu-
ally exposed to a treatment/policy change, and when treatment dates can
vary across units. With simulations, I contrast machine learning results with
more traditional estimators, such as two-way fixed effects (or generalized
difference-in-differences).
I introduce a method that builds on recent advances in machine learn-
ing algorithms, and that exploits temporal overlap between not-yet-treated
and treated units to accurately predict counterfactuals (i.e. the unobserved
outcomes of treated subjects in case they had not been exposed to treat-
ment). I show that, compared to standard two-way fixed effects, the ma-
chine learning approach recovers heterogeneity more efficiently and is less
likely to suffer from near-term biases. With simulations, I confirm findings
from recent econometric articles that reveal how two-way fixed effects can be
biased, especially when treatment effects vary across time.1 My simulations
and real-data application are performed within the context of a large energy
efficiency program in the US. Nevertheless, the method that I propose can
potentially be applied to other contexts. Staggered adoption designs have be-
1See, for example Borusyak and Jaravel (2017) Athey and Imbens (2018), de
Chaisemartin and D’Haultfoeuille (2018), Callaway and Sant’Anna (2018), Goodman-
Bacon (2018), Strezhnev (2018), Abraham and Sun (2019).
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come widespread for analyses in economics (Athey and Imbens, 2018). For
example, a few papers recently published in a top economics’ journal also ex-
ploit that design: staggered arrival of fast internet across different regions of
Africa (Hjort and Poulsen, 2019); variation of corporate tax incidence across
German firms (Fuest, Peichl, and Siegloch, 2018); and the effects of shale gas
expansion on water quality in Pennsylvania (Hill and Ma, 2017).
Those types of settings are often analyzed with panel data regressions.
To estimate the effect of a policy change/treatment on a given outcome, one
standard approach would be to regress that outcome on a treatment indicator
variable (equal to one for unit-by-time observations exposed to treatment),
plus unit fixed effects (indicators for each unit in the sample) and time fixed
effects (indicators for each time period in the sample). From that, it is
possible to obtain a two-way fixed effects estimator (from here on denoted
TWFE), which is the coefficient associated with the treatment indicator. The
interpretation of TWFE is clear in settings with only two units (treated and
control) and two time periods (before and after): it will represent the average
effect of the treatment for the treated unit in the sample. For that effect to be
valid, a necessary assumption is that outcomes for treated and control groups
would have followed a same path (parallel trends) in absence of treatment
(Angrist and Pischke, 2008). Nonetheless, even when that assumption holds,
recent literature finds that the interpretation of TWFE may not be trivial
for panel data settings with more than two units and more than two time pe-
riods, especially in the presence of time-varying (dynamic) treatment effects
(Kropko and Kubinec, 2020; Imai and Kim, 2019; Goodman-Bacon, 2018;
Borusyak and Jaravel, 2017).
Borusyak and Jaravel (2017) are among the first to show how the coeffi-
cient obtained from a “static” TWFE will be a weighted average of effects
over time. Further, some of the weights (especially for time periods towards
the end of the panel) can be negative, such that the estimator can be biased
towards near-term effects. Borusyak and Jaravel (2017) also argue that those
negative weights may arise even when unit-specific time trends are included
in the regression equation. Goodman-Bacon (2018) extends those results
and provides a framework to decompose which time periods and groups of
units (e.g. untreated, early, mid, or late adopters) contribute most to the
estimate. Goodman-Bacon (2018) finds that estimation weights depend not
only on the size of each of those groups, but also on the variance of treat-
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ment assignments. A typical regression approach will assign more weights
to portions of the sample with higher treatment variance (i.e. portions with
substantial overlap between treatment and control units). The implication is
that such regressions can be near-term biased. Further, for event studies with
staggered adoption, observations in the middle of the panel (mid-adopters)
will receive more weight.2
Taking those issues into account, some corrections to simple TWFE specifi-
cations have been presented by, for example, Callaway and Sant’Anna (2018),
de Chaisemartin and D’Haultfoeuille (2018), Goodman-Bacon (2018), Strezh-
nev (2018), and Abraham and Sun (2019). That literature relies on estima-
tion of sampling probabilities or (treatment) propensity scores to re-weight
the unit/time-varying effects, and thus to obtain a valid average effect. I
propose an alternative method, which inherently takes heterogeneity into ac-
count, and does not require re-weighting or estimation of auxiliary propensity
scores. The method can be summarized as follows: first, flexibly predict a full
distribution of counterfactual outcomes;3 second, subtract observed (true)
post-treatment outcomes from the predicted counterfactuals to obtain a full
distribution of treatment effects; third, summarize the treatment effects with
(sub)sample averages, or by projecting them onto available covariates.
In this paper, I also conceptually define a few parameters that may be of
interest, based on the Neyman-Rubin potential outcomes framework (Ney-
man, 1923; Rubin, 1974). I introduce identifying assumptions and formalize
my approach to recover each of those causal parameters. I demonstrate
the approach with data from a large energy efficiency program in the US
(Weatherization Assistance Program), for which effects are expected to sig-
nificantly vary across subjects and across time. With simulations, I show
that both TWFE and the machine learning method are unbiased for cases
with “static” (time-invariant) treatment effects, even for simulations where
effects vary across groups of units. On the other hand, when effects vary
across time, I find that the machine learning approach is more accurate and
efficient than standard regression models.4 One implication is that, even
2Note that for event studies with staggered adoption both the beginning and the end
of the panel have low treatment variance because: the beginning of the panel contains few
treated units; conversely, the end of the panel contains few control units.
3A formal definition of “counterfactuals” is presented in Section 1.2.
4I employ bootstrapping for inference with the machine learning learning approach.
Details about the bootstrap algorithm can be found in Appendix A.2.
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when points estimates from TWFE are accurate, they may be dismissed due
to wide confidence intervals. That issue is accentuated if the researcher is
interested in heterogeneity across subsamples. In those cases, I argue in favor
of the ML method, which exhibits improved efficiency.
Also with simulations, I demonstrate how the ML approach can be used to
recover unit-specific treatment effects. I find that simply aggregating unit-by-
time estimates will lead to a poor ranking of most versus least affected units.
That may be attributed to unobservable factors that change simultaneously
with treatment, which is a violation of a standard event study assumption.
That can be a problem especially when working with with micro-level data:
as the number of observed units increases, the probability that some units
violate event study assumptions may also increase. For example, in the con-
text of residential energy efficiency, a few homes in the study sample may
have unobservably less occupants after treatment, compared to before. In
that case, those homes may have mechanically lower post-treatment energy
consumption, due to factors unrelated to treatment. Conversely, if new oc-
cupants move into homes simultaneously with treatment, then consumption
may be higher after treatment, such that treatment effects may be under-
estimated. Nevertheless, if those types of violations are as good as random
(in either direction), then large sample theory dictates that true effects can
be approximated with sample means. Based on that, I propose projecting
machine learning savings predictions onto available covariates, to recover nu-
anced parameters associated with treatment. Those parameters can then be
used to produce parsimonious predictions of energy savings for each home
in the sample. Simulations show that that approach can lead to a good
approximation of the “ground truth” distribution of savings.
Identification depends on the accuracy and unbiasedness of the predictions
of counterfactuals. I introduce some tests that aim to check the validity of
the ML predictions. With simulated data, it was possible to directly compare
ground truth versus predicted counterfactuals. I show that prediction errors
for those can be small (less than 10%) in the context of this paper, given
that the machine learning algorithms include adequate covariates and are
tuned correctly. Outside simulated settings, however, true counterfactuals
can never be observed, such that it is impossible to directly assess counter-
factual prediction errors. In that case, I propose analyzing cross-validated
(out-of-sample) errors, which are shown to have similar properties as the true
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errors.
I conclude with an application of the machine learning method to real
data from the Weatherization Assistance Program (WAP). While previous
evaluations focus on average effects (Fowlie, Greenstone, and Wolfram, 2018;
Allcott and Greenstone, 2017; Zivin and Novan, 2016), I am able to identify
several dimensions along which Program energy savings are significantly het-
erogeneous. Namely, insulation measures, as well as furnace replacements,
seem to be the most important drivers of reduced energy consumption. I also
report measure-specific cost-benefit analyses. Those results may help guide
future efforts for targeting high-performance measures or homes, in order to
improve the cost-effectiveness of the program. The method proposed in this
paper is also applied in Christensen et al. (2020), to decompose the main fac-
tors that contribute to a gap between ex-ante projected and ex-post realized
savings from the Program. The efficiency of the machine learning approach
made it possible to identify that the gap is affected by upgrade-specific biases
in ex-ante projections, contractor performance, and household behavior.
This paper contributes to the growing literature on counterfactual pre-
dictions for causal inference, such as g-computation (Robins, 1986; Yu and
van der Laan, 2002), doubly-robust estimation (Abadie, 2005; Chernozhukov
et al., 2017), targeted maximum likelihood estimation (van der Laan and
Rubin, 2006; Balzer, Petersen, and van der Laan, 2016), synthetic control
(Abadie, Diamond, and Hainmueller, 2010), and causal trees (Wager and
Athey, 2018; Athey and Imbens, 2016). That body of work and recent ap-
plications (e.g. Burlig et al., 2017; Poulos, 2019; O’Neill and Weeks, 2019;
Prest, 2020) have highlighted some advantages, compared to standard impact
evaluation, of those novel methods: more efficient estimation, which allows
for recovering more nuanced treatment effects; potential bias reduction from
explicit modelling of propensity of treatment; construction of robust com-
parison groups in settings where data for “pure controls” are not available.5
The method I introduce is not only applicable to the setting described in
this paper. Rather, it can be applied generally to event studies with stag-
gered adoption, as long as data availability allows for robust prediction of
counterfactuals.
5Varian (2016) also introduces some settings in which machine learning tools might be
useful for causal inference.
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1.2 Conceptual Framework and Identifying
Assumptions
1.2.1 Parameters of Interest
I build on the Neyman-Rubin potential outcomes framework to clearly define
parameters or causal effects to be estimated throughout this paper (Ney-
man, 1923; Rubin, 1974). Consider a panel data setting, with i = 1, ..., I
units (e.g. homes, individuals, plots of land etc.) observed over time periods
t = 1, ..., T . Let Yit denote an outcome of interest, which can be classified
into two potential states: treated, Yit(1), in case unit i in time t has been ex-
posed to some “treatment” (policy change, program, drug, experiment etc.);
or untreated, Yit(0), in absence of exposure. The effect of treatment for unit
i at time t can then be defined as the difference between the outcomes at
both potential states: Yit(1)− Yit(0).
In a given point in time, a unit is either treated or untreated, such that, in
practice, researchers can only observe outcomes at one of those two potential
states. For the remainder of this paper, I use the term “counterfactuals”
to refer to the outcomes at their alternative, unobservable state. The un-
observability of counterfactuals leads to the “fundamental problem in causal
inference,” which implies that the true treatment effects are also never ob-
served, although they may be estimated. Note that in this paper I focus
on event-studies with staggered adoption, with the following features: there
is an identifiable point in time after which units are considered exposed to
treatment; treatment dates can vary by unit; treatment is irreversible; and
all units are expected to be exposed to treatment at some point in time.
Assuming that treatment is binary and that all units’ treatment regimes are
observable, it is possible to construct a variable Dit, equal to one for all home
by time observations that have been exposed to treatment, and zero other-
wise. Potential outcomes can then be expressed as: observed Yit(0, Dit = 0)
and Yit(1, Dit = 1); counterfactuals Yit(0, Dit = 1) and Yit(1, Dit = 0). Dif-
ferent causal parameters can be defined depending on how those four ele-
ments are combined. The methods presented in this paper aim to recover
Yit(1, Dit = 1) − Yit(0, Dit = 1), which are often referred to as treatment
effects on the treated. Because of the impossibility of consistent estimation
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of all unit by time treatment effects, studies usually aim to estimate them
at an aggregated level, such as an average, which calls for an expected value
framework. The average treatment effect on the treated (ATT) can then be
defined as:
ATT = E[Y (1)|D = 1]− E[Y (0)|D = 1]
Adding some structure to this framework, one can assume that researchers
also have knowledge about covariates Xit, which can vary by individual and
by time, and which may affect the outcome of interest.6 Let ti be the “treat-
ment date” for unit i, after which Dit is equal to one, and never reverts back
to zero. Then the ATT becomes:
ATT = E[Y (1)|X, D = 1]− E[Y (0)|X, D = 1]
=
∑I
i=1
∑T
t=ti
[Yit(1|Xit, Dit = 1)− Yit(0|Xit, Dit = 1)]∑I
i=1(T − ti)
(1.1)
It is also useful to get a sense of treatment effects for different observable
subgroups or subsamples of the population. Let c denote a set of conditions
or rules on the observable covariates, which in turn define a subgroup of units
C. Then a conditional average treatment effect on the treated (CATT) can
be defined as:
CATT = E[Y (1)|X = c,D = 1]− E[Y (0)|X = c,D = 1]
=
∑I
i∈C
∑T
t=ti
[Yit(1|Xit = c,Dit = 1)− Yit(0|Xit = c,Dit = 1)]∑I
i∈C(T − ti)
(1.2)
Finally, one may want to recover unit-specific treatment effects on the
treated (UTT), which can be defined as averages over time for each unit:
UTTi = E
t
[Yi(1)|Xi, Di = 1]− E
t
[Yi(0)|Xi, Di = 1]
=
∑T
t=ti
[Yit(1|Xit, Dit = 1)− Yit(0|Xit, Dit = 1)]
(T − ti)
(1.3)
Causal effects are often presented as percentages (relative to the counter-
factuals), which modifies the above definitions to:
6For ease of notation, throughout this paper I use bold print to indicate vectors such
that, for example, Xit = [X1,it, ..., XK,it] represents K distinct covariates.
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%ATT =
∑I
i=1
∑T
t=ti
[Yit(1|Xit, Dit = 1)− Yit(0|Xit, Dit = 1)]∑I
i=1
∑T
t=ti
Yit(0|Xit, Dit = 1)
(1.4)
%CATT =
∑I
i∈C
∑T
t=ti
[Yit(1|Xit = c,Dit = 1)− Yit(0|Xit = c,Dit = 1)]∑I
i∈C
∑T
t=ti
Yit(0|Xit = c,Dit = 1)
(1.5)
%UTTi =
∑T
t=ti
[Yit(1|Xit, Dit = 1)− Yit(0|Xit, Dit = 1)]∑T
t=ti
Yit(0|Xit, Dit = 1)
(1.6)
1.2.2 Assumptions
Here I present the identifying assumptions necessary for the estimator to be
described in section 1.3. Note that event studies with staggered adoption can
be analyzed within a difference-in-differences (DID) framework. Therefore,
the assumptions presented in this paper are similar to those necessary for
DID. For this section, I build on insight from Borusyak and Jaravel (2017)
and Abraham and Sun (2019). Athey and Imbens (2018) provide further
details about the staggered adoption framework. One key difference of my
proposed method is that it does not require treatment effects to be constant
across time or across units. The necessary assumptions are as follows.
Assumption 1.1: Parallel Trends.
For difference-in-differences settings, researchers rely on the “parallel trends”
assumption: after conditioning on all relevant factors, the (transformed) out-
come difference between treated and control units would have remained con-
stant across time, in absence of treatment.7 If that assumption holds, then
the control group can be used to obtain a good approximation for the coun-
terfactuals of the treated group. For the context of this paper, control units
must therefore serve to accurately predict counterfactuals for the treated
7Alternatively, the parallel trends assumption can be stated as: outcomes of treated
and control groups, conditional on all relevant factors, would have followed a same path
in absence of treatment.
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units. That statement gives rise to a variation of parallel trends for the
context of this paper.
Let the counterfactual predictions Yˆit be modelled with error εit, such that:
Yˆit(0|Xit,Uit, Dit = 1) − Yit(0|Xit,Uit, Dit = 1) = εit .
A strict version of parallel trends would require the prediction errors εit to
be equal to zero for all unit-by-time observations. However, that may be an
unrealistic assumption. Further, models that are too accurate are prone to
overfitting (i.e. valid only for the subset of data on which the models were
developed). I relax the strict requirement by assuming that it need only to
hold on expectations, such that (after simplifying notation):
E[Yˆit(0|Dit = 1) − Yit(0|Dit = 1)] = E[εit] ,
E[εit] = 0 ,
−→ E[Yˆit(0|Dit = 1)] − Yit(0|Dit = 1)] = 0 ,
such that the counterfactual prediction errors should be equal to zero in ex-
pectation. When analyzing real data, that assumption is untestable because
true counterfactuals Yit(0) are unobservable. However, in Section 1.3 I pro-
pose using cross-validated (out-of-sample) errors as a proxy for assessing true
counterfactual errors. That is in the same vein as the common practice of
analyzing pre-treatment trends in standard DID settings.
I present auxiliary assumptions below. Assumption 1.2 (No Spillovers), is
common for many treatment effect estimators. Assumptions 1.3-1.5 may be
considered a subset of parallel trends, however I present each separately to
highlight their importance.
Assumption 1.2: No Spillovers.
A variation of the standard Stable Unit Treatment Value Assumption
(SUTVA) can be presented as:
Dit ⊥ Djt; Dit ⊥ Yjt; Yit ⊥ Yjt ∀ i 6= j and ∀ t ,
which means that treatment assignment or potential outcomes for a given
unit i are independent from assignments and outcomes from any of the other
units j. Note here that I relax standard SUTVA, such that the impact
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of treatment is not required to be the same across units. That allows the
researcher to identify CATT or UTTi. Even with varying treatment inten-
sity/dosage, it is possible to identify treatment effects, as long as intensity is
observable. The researcher can then recover CATT , for example, by condi-
tioning on units with higher or lower treatment intensity.
Assumption 1.3: Conditionally Random Treatment Date.
Depending on the context, this is potentially the strongest assumption
required for identification. Note that I relax the assumption of completely
random treatment dates, which is often unrealistic in social sciences. How-
ever, conditional randomness is defensible when analyses are restricted to
subpopulations of interest. For example, one can evaluate a subpopulation
of individuals that qualify for a program with limited budget/resources, such
that not all individuals can be treated at the same time. In that case, pro-
gram managers may employ a (quasi)-random number generator to determine
the quantity and/or ordering of individuals to be treated. Alternatively, one
can argue that order of treatment is determined by factors that are com-
pletely unrelated (orthogonal) to target individuals’ characteristics:
ti ⊥ Xit ∀ i .
Budgetary or bureaucratic delays/constraints are often credible sources of
quasi-randomness in event study settings. I note here that not all treatment
dates need to be within the analyzed study period. An individual may be
considered either treated or untreated throughout all available dates (i.e.
Dit = 0 ∀ t or Dit = 1 ∀ t).
Assumption 1.4: No Anticipatory Behavior.
It is necessary that soon-to-be-treated individuals do not change their be-
havior in anticipation of treatment. That can be formalized as:
Yit(0) ⊥ E
t
[Dit] ∀ i ,
which implies that units’ expectations about treatment do not affect pre-
treatment outcomes.
Assumption 1.5: No Unobservable Confounders.
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Let Uit be a set of covariates that are unobservable to the researcher,
and that affect the outcomes of interest (such that Uit 6⊥ Yit). Absence of
unobservable confounders can then be defined as:
Uit(Dit = 0) = Uit(Dit = 1) ∀ i ,
such that the unobservable covariates do not change simultaneously with
treatment. This is another strong assumption and is untestable. Violations
of this assumption imply that unrelated changes in Uit, which in turn lead to
outcome changes, can be misattributed to the treatment effects. For settings
with many units, it is unlikely that Assumption 1.5 will hold for every unit
in the sample. However, if variations in Uit are as good as random random,
then the assumption should hold in expectation:
E[Uit(Dit = 0)] = E[Uit(Dit = 1)] .
1.2.3 Sample Restrictions
Here I introduce sample restrictions that are common for research in applied
economics. I reiterate that these are not assumptions required for the validity
of the method that I propose. On the other hand, these restrictions allow
researchers to focus on subpopulations for which the identifying assumptions
are potentially more likely to hold.
Restriction 1.1: No Missingness.
For this paper, I restrict the sample to observations for which outcomes Yit
and covariates Xit are always jointly observable. That is necessary for the
algebra of regression analyses: the number of rows of the outcomes’ vector
must be equal to the number of rows of the covariates’ matrix. Researchers
typically impose that by dropping rows with missing observations for a few
key variables, which is the strategy that I also employ.8 However, doing so
can imply significant loss in sample size or loss of external validity. One
implicit assumption is that observations are missing at random, such that
missingness is orthogonal to treatment and other relevant factors.
8Alternatively, a researcher may consider an imputation strategy. However, imputed
data have statistical properties that are very different from observed data (Schafer, 1997).
The implications of imputing data are out of the scope of this paper.
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Restriction 1.2: Temporal Overlap Across Control and Treated Observa-
tions.
Let S0 and S1 denote the full samples or data available for pre-treatment
and post-treatment observations, respectively, such that:
S0 = [Yit(0|Dit = 0),Xit(Dit = 0)] ∀ t < ti
S1 = [Yit(1|Dit = 1),Xit(Dit = 1)] ∀ t > ti
I can then define temporal overlap as:
t ∈ S0 ∀ t ∈ S1 ,
such that for all post-treatment observations there should exist at least one
temporally overlapping pre-treatment observation. This restriction aims to
exploit the staggered adoption design for identification, such that Assump-
tion 1.1 (parallel trends) might be more likely to hold. I note here that such
restriction does not have to be imposed for the predictive phase of my pro-
posed method. Rather, non-overlapping samples can be dropped at a later
stage, after predictive models have already been built. Also note that this is
a necessary restriction for standard difference-in-differences estimators .
Corollary Restriction 1.2.1: Temporal Overlap in Outcomes.
Yjt(0|Dit = 0) ∈ S0 ∀ Yit(1|Dit = 1) ∈ S1 and ∀ i 6= j ,
such that for every post-treatment outcome from a given unit there should
exist at least one temporally overlapping pre-treatment outcome from a an-
other unit.
Corollary Restriction 1.2.2: Temporal Overlap in Covariates.
Xjt(Dit = 0) ∈ S0 ∀ Xit(Dit = 1) ∈ S1 and ∀ i 6= j ,
such that for all post-treatment covariates for a given unit there should also
be available temporally overlapping pre-treatment covariates from another
unit.
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1.3 Proposed Method
1.3.1 Step 1: Building the Predictive Model
Given the assumptions and data structure described in Section 1.2, it may be
possible to build a model to accurately predict counterfactuals Yit(0|Dit = 1).
For this step, the researcher should only use the pre-treatment sample S0.
Without loss of generality, an empirical model should be built to establish
relations between Yit(0|Dit = 0) and Xit(Dit = 0), such that:
Yit(0|Dit = 0) = M(Xit(Dit = 0)) ,
where M() is a generic model or function. In economics, linear regressions
are often the method of choice. However, those require functional form and
linearity assumptions, which may not be ideal for prediction accuracy. For a
more agnostic and flexible approach, I propose tree-based methods for this
step, although other flexible predictive algorithms, such as ensembles, deep
learners or neural networks may also be considered. One key attribute of the
chosen predictive algorithm is that it should maximize out-of-sample fit or
accuracy.
Out-of-sample accuracy is crucial because the goal of this first step is to
predict counterfactuals Yit(0|Dit = 1), which are in essence unobservable
and not present in the sample. A model that is optimized for in-sample
predictions (i.e. outcomes in S0) is likely to lead to overfitting in this context,
such that it will be unreliable for estimating outcomes in S1. This is related
to the bias-variance tradeoff, common for predictive tasks. For machine
learning, hyprparameter tuning and cross-validation should be employed in
order to avoid overfitting.
Once the model is built, it is possible to assess its (cross-validated) pre-
diction accuracy (i.e. model fit) with measures such as mean absolute error
(MAE), root-mean-square error (RMSE), R-squared, or others. Further, if
heterogeneous treatment effects are of interest, then accuracy should be as-
sessed across subsamples for which heterogeneity is expected. Essentially,
the researcher should be able to show that prediction errors are uncorrelated
with the available covariates Xit. Appendix A.1 presents both in-sample and
cross-validated prediction errors for models trained for this paper. Also, in
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the context of the real data application, I show how those errors are not
significantly correlated with any of the predictors.
1.3.2 Step 2: Subtract Counterfactuals From True Outcomes
For this second step, the researcher should use the model from step one
to predict outcomes in the post-treatment sample S1. Recall that those
predictions are based on a model built with pre-treatment observations only,
such that they can be viewed as counterfactual predictions Yˆit(0|Dit = 1).
If step one was performed correctly, then it is possible to obtain the full
distribution of Yˆit(0|Dit = 1) (i.e. for all units and for all post-treatment
periods).
Unit-by-time treatment effects can then be estimated by:
bˆit(Dit = 1) = Yit(1|Dit = 1)− Yˆit(0|Dit = 1) ,
which gives us the full distribution of treatment effects. bit are the building
blocks necessary to estimate the parameters described in Section 1.2. The
next step is to summarize those treatment effects for different portions of the
sample, depending on the researcher’s objective.
1.3.3 Step 3: Summarizing the Treatment Effects
The most prominent parameter of interest, especially in economics, is the
average treatment effect on the treated (ATT), which can be estimated in
this setting as:
ÂTT =
∑I
i=1
∑T
t=ti
bˆit(Dit = 1)∑I
i=1(T − ti)
,
which is a sample average of all bˆit obtained in step 2. Alternatively, ATTs
can be summarized as percentages, dividing by the sample average predicted
counterfactual:
%ÂTT = ÂTT
/ ∑I
i=1
∑T
t=ti
Yˆit(0|Dit = 1)∑I
i=1(T − ti)
,
where, again, all elements necessary for the above parameter have already
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been obtained from steps 1 and 2.
For describing heterogeneity in effects, it can be useful to calculate the
above average parameters for different subsamples. For example, a researcher
might hypothesize that a certain subpopulation experiences treatment effects
that are different than the full population average. If there are differences in
covariates that allow that subpopulation to be identified, then the researcher
can estimate:
ĈATT =
∑I
i=1
∑T
t=ti
bˆit(Dit = 1,Xit = c)∑I
i=1(T − ti)
,
where c denotes a set of conditions on Xit that identify a subpopulation of
interest. The %ĈATT can also easily be obtained by imposing conditions
on %ÂTT . Note that these are simply conditional averages of the treatment
effects.
If the researcher believes that treatment effects exhibit a more complex
structure, then a linear regression can be considered:
bˆit(Dit = 1) = βXit(Dit = 1) + εit , (1.7)
where εit is an idiosyncratic error term; and β captures the relationship
between treatment effects and covariates of interest. The flexibility of that
relationship will depend on the functional forms and interactions of Xit. Note
here that a linear regression is used simply as a means of obtaining condi-
tional averages, and alternative methods may also be considered. Further,
causal identification still relies accuracy of the predictive step, as well as the
assumptions described in Section 1.2.
Finally, for unit-specific treatment effects one may choose to estimate:
ÛTT i =
∑T
t=ti
bˆit(Dit = 1)
(T − ti) , (1.8)
However, simulations from the following Section 1.4 reveal that such esti-
mator may not perform well. It is shown that ÛTT i is more likely to recover
treatment effects that are biased due to violations of event study assump-
tions, specifically Assumption 1.5, of no unobserved confounders. Intuitively,
the probability that a given unit violates Assumption 1.5 increases as the to-
tal number of sample units I increases. Simply put, it is unreasonable to
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expect that event study assumptions will hold for all units in the sample.
On the other hand, the increase in sample size also represents an opportu-
nity to exploit large sample theory, such that average treatment effects will
converge to the truth. A parsimonious approach for unit-specific treatment
effects therefore arises from an assumption that β from equation (1.7) are
unbiased, and that εit has mean zero and picks up any random deviations
from the true treatment effects. Then, new unit-by-time estimates can be
obtained by predicting:
ˆˆ
bit(Dit = 1) = βXit(Dit = 1) , (1.9)
which constitutes a form of doubly-robust estimation. Finally, unit specific
effects can then be aggregated as:
ÛTT i =
∑T
t=ti
ˆˆ
bit(Dit = 1)
(T − ti) , (1.10)
which is free of any random deviations in treatment effects. Simulations show
that ÛTT i outperform ÛTT i.
To construct confidence intervals for each of the estimators described above,
I propose bootstrapping. Details about the bootstrap algorithm employed in
this paper can be found in Appendix A.2.
1.4 Simulations
I use simulations to show that the method presented in Section 1.3 is able
to accurately recover average treatment effects, as well as heterogeneous
treatment effects. These simulations are conducted within the setting of
the Weatherization Assistance Program (WAP) in Illinois. WAP is a large
federally-funded energy-efficiency program in the US. It targets low-income
families and provides full subsidies for improving the conditions of their
HVAC (heating, ventilating and air conditioning) systems, and related home
characteristics, such as windows, air sealing, and wall insulation. Some key
features of the program and data availability are as follows: an evaluation of
WAP can be considered an event study with staggered adoption, since there
are several homes that are served by the program at different points in time;
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treatment effects can be expected to vary over time, depending mostly on the
time of the year that a home is treated; treatment effects are also expected to
vary across units, which receive different amounts of program spending, and
which may inherently need different types of upgrades. Summary statistics of
the outcome of interest (monthly natural gas usage) and available covariates
can be found in Appendix A.3.
Simulations are performed using a sample of not-yet-treated WAP-eligible
homes. Thus, throughout this Section 1.4, no observations of actual post-
treated homes are used. Using that data, the first step of the simulations is
to assign random proxy treatment dates to each home. Then, depending on
the illustrative intent from each simulation, I impose a simulated treatment
effect by changing the outcome (natural gas usage consumption, measured
in MMBtu) for the proxy post-treatment dates. For those dates, I subtract a
given percentage of natural gas usage, thus simulating lower energy consump-
tion after treatment. With this setup, I observe both simulated treatment
effects and “ground truth” counterfactuals that can be used to assess perfor-
mance of different estimation techniques.
I then proceed by applying the estimation method outlined in Section 1.3.
For the predictive step, I train my model only with observations prior to the
proxy treatment dates, since the main objective is to predict counterfactu-
als (outcomes in absence of treatment). To accomplish that, the algorithm
of choice was XGBoost, which is a computationally efficient and fast imple-
mentation of gradient boosted trees (Chen and Guestrin, 2016). XGBoost
exhibits high cross-validated (out-of-sample) prediction accuracy in this set-
ting.9 As discussed in Section 1.3, cross-validation is essential for this step,
given that I aim to predict counterfactuals which are unobservable by defi-
nition. In Appendix A.1 I present performance metrics for XGBoost. I show
that the algorithm of choice is able to accurately predict counterfactuals, with
cross-validated errors that are generally less than 1 MMBtu (10%). Further,
I show that cross-validated errors are not correlated with relevant covariates.
The predictive step described above remains the same for all simulations
presented in this paper. However, I summarize the treatment effects differ-
ently, depending on the objectives of each simulation. The following sub-
sections focus on comparing performance of my proposed machine learning
9I use root-mean squared error (RMSE) as a measure of prediction accuracy. However,
other metrics, such as R-squared or mean absolute error (MAE), may also be considered.
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method versus two-way fixed effects, in terms of recovering the simulated
treatment effects.
1.4.1 Treatment Effect Variation Across Time
For these simulations, I impose effects that are either increasing or decreasing
over time. The rationale is to test if my method can be robust dynamic treat-
ment effects, in contrast to two-way-fixed effects which are not (as shown in
prior literature, such as Goodman-Bacon (2018)). For these analyses, first
I restrict the sample such that each home will have no more than 2 years
(24 months) of data before and after treatment. Then I impose simulated
treatment effects by reducing post-treatment energy consumption by a given
percentage. To simulate effects that increase over time, I assume that nat-
ural gas savings for the first month after treatment will be 3.5%, increasing
monthly by 0.5 percentage points up to the 24th month, for which the effect
will be 16%. I also randomly split the sample into 5 groups of homes. Those
sample splits are only relevant for later simulations, but are kept here for
completeness. I test if the machine learning method is able to accurately re-
cover conditional average treatment effects (CATT) for each of the 5 groups.
I compare the ML estimates with the “ground truth” simulated effects, as
well as with two-way fixed effects (TWFE) specifications such as:
Yit =
5∑
g=1
βg[Gi = g]×Dit + αi + αt + εit , (1.11)
where Dit is equal to one if home i has been treated in month of sample t,
zero otherwise; [Gi = g] indicates one of 5 random groups to which home i
belongs; βg captures the treatment effect for each of the groups; αi and αt
are home and month of sample fixed effects, respectively; and εit is the error
term. I also try variations of the above TWFE specification by interacting
home and calendar month fixed effects, and also by including month of sample
by county fixed effects.
Results for all specifications are presented in Table 1.1. Compared to the
ground truth, machine learning estimates are accurate for all 5 groups of
homes. Note also that the effects do not differ substantially across groups.
That is expected, as those groups were randomly assigned. On the other
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hand, the coefficients obtained from TWFE underestimate the true savings
by about 6 percentage points (which translates to three quarters of the true
effects). Adding finer-scale fixed effects does not seem to improve the accu-
racy of TWFE specifications. Consistent with Borusyak and Jaravel (2017),
that implies that TWFE are near-term biased (recall that these simulations
imposed smaller near-term effects). The machine learning estimates, on the
other hand, are not biased and have an added benefit of being more statisti-
cally efficient.
For another simulation, I repeat an exercise similar to that from Table
1.1, but now with effects that decrease over time. In the context of en-
ergy efficiency upgrades, that can be viewed as a simulation of appliance
depreciation which can potentially reduce energy savings over time. I im-
pose that the treatment effect for the first month after treatment is 15%,
decreasing monthly by 0.5 percentage points, down to 2.5% for the 24th
month. Estimates according to different specifications are presented in Table
and 1.2. I find more evidence that TWFE are near-term biased, now with
the estimated effects being higher than the ground truth. Machine learning
estimates therefore outperform TWFE in terms of accuracy and efficiency,
and do not seem to exhibit any significant bias. Results from this section
also hold with regressions in energy space (rather than percent), presented
in Appendix A.4.
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Table 1.1: Simulated Conditional Average Treatment Effects on the
Treated - Effects Increasing Over Time - Outcome in Percent
Outcome: Percent Energy Savings Simulated Estimated
Specification: “Ground Truth” Machine Learning TWFE 1 TWFE 2 TWFE 3
Group 1 -0.0838∗∗∗ -0.0818∗∗∗ -0.0187∗∗∗ -0.0238∗∗∗ -0.0219∗∗∗
(0.0001) (0.0027) (0.0040) (0.0038) (0.0038)
Group 2 -0.0841∗∗∗ -0.0827∗∗∗ -0.0186∗∗∗ -0.0203∗∗∗ -0.0181∗∗∗
(0.0001) (0.0027) (0.0041) (0.0039) (0.0039)
Group 3 -0.0840∗∗∗ -0.0861∗∗∗ -0.0249∗∗∗ -0.0287∗∗∗ -0.0249∗∗∗
(0.0001) (0.0024) (0.0041) (0.0038) (0.0038)
Group 4 -0.0841∗∗∗ -0.0829∗∗∗ -0.0212∗∗∗ -0.0222∗∗∗ -0.0197∗∗∗
(0.0001) (0.0027) (0.0041) (0.0038) (0.0038)
Group 5 -0.0838∗∗∗ -0.0841∗∗∗ -0.0208∗∗∗ -0.0229∗∗∗ -0.0199∗∗∗
(0.0001) (0.0029) (0.0040) (0.0038) (0.0037)
Observations 301,685† 301,685† 608,420 608,420 608,420
Controls:
Home FE NA NA Yes No No
Month of Sample FE NA NA Yes Yes No
Home by Calendar Month FE NA NA No Yes Yes
Month of Sample by County FE NA NA No No Yes
Heating and Cooling Degree Days NA NA Yes Yes Yes
Note: This table presents simulated CATT on natural gas usage. The coefficients should be interpreted as
simulated monthly percent energy savings attributed to treatment. For these simulations, the effect in the first
month is assumed to be 3.5%, increasing monthly by 0.5 percentage points, up to 16% for the 24th month. No
controls are used for the machine learning CATT, which is identified from predicted counterfactuals. For the
machine learning estimates, standard errors (in parentheses) are bootstrapped (200 iterations). For two-way
fixed effects, standard errors are clustered by household. Significance at 1% is indicated by ∗∗∗. The number of
observations for ground truth and machine learning estimates, indicated by †, are smaller because they use the
post-treatment sample only, although the pre-treatment sample was used for building a predictive model.
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Table 1.2: Simulated Conditional Average Treatment Effects on the
Treated - Effects Decreasing Over Time - Outcome in Percent
Outcome: Percent Energy Savings Simulated Estimated
Specification: “Ground Truth” Machine Learning TWFE 1 TWFE 2 TWFE 3
Group 1 -0.1012∗∗∗ -0.0986∗∗∗ -0.1725∗∗∗ -0.1781∗∗∗ -0.1755∗∗∗
(0.0001) (0.0027) (0.0040) (0.0038) (0.0038)
Group 2 -0.1009∗∗∗ -0.0987∗∗∗ -0.1727∗∗∗ -0.1746∗∗∗ -0.1718∗∗∗
(0.0001) (0.0026) (0.0041) (0.0039) (0.0039)
Group 3 -0.1010∗∗∗ -0.1024∗∗∗ -0.1786∗∗∗ -0.1827∗∗∗ -0.1784∗∗∗
(0.0001) (0.0024) (0.0041) (0.0038) (0.0038)
Group 4 -0.1009∗∗∗ -0.0992∗∗∗ -0.1742∗∗∗ -0.1757∗∗∗ -0.1727∗∗∗
(0.0001) (0.0027) (0.0041) (0.0038) (0.0038)
Group 5 -0.1012∗∗∗ -0.1002∗∗∗ -0.1738∗∗∗ -0.1764∗∗∗ -0.1727∗∗∗
(0.0001) (0.0028) (0.0040) (0.0038) (0.0038)
Observations 301,685† 301,685† 608,420 608,420 608,420
Controls:
Home FE NA NA Yes No No
Month of Sample FE NA NA Yes Yes No
Home by Calendar Month FE NA NA No Yes Yes
Month of Sample by County FE NA NA No No Yes
Heating and Cooling Degree Days NA NA Yes Yes Yes
Note: This table presents simulated CATT on natural gas usage. The coefficients should be interpreted as
simulated monthly percent energy savings attributed to treatment. For these simulations, the effect in the first
month is assumed to be 15%, decreasing monthly by 0.5 percentage points, down to 2.5% for the 24th month.
No controls are used for the machine learning CATT, which is identified from predicted counterfactuals. For
the machine learning estimates, standard errors (in parentheses) are bootstrapped (200 iterations). For two-way
fixed effects, standard errors are clustered by household. Significance at 1% is indicated by ∗∗∗. The number of
observations for ground truth and machine learning estimates, indicated by †, are smaller because they use the
post-treatment sample only, although the pre-treatment sample was used for building a predictive model.
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1.4.2 Treatment Effect Variation by Random Groups
Here I test if my method is able to accurately recover treatment effect het-
erogeneity by groups of homes in the sample. I start by randomly assigning
homes to 5 different groups, each of which has a different simulated treat-
ment effect. Group 1’s effect is a 6% reduction in natural gas usage, while
Group 2’s effect is an 8% reduction, and so on, up to Group 5’s effect of a
14% reduction. I then employ the machine learning approach and two-way
fixed effects to recover conditional average treatment effects.
Table 1.3 present results from this simulation. It can be noted that both
machine learning and TWFE accurately recover the simulated effects. Those
results are consistent with Borusyak and Jaravel (2017), who argue that
TWFE are more likely to be problematic when treatment effects vary over
time. Compared to TWFE, the machine learning estimates are more efficient,
which reduces the probability of Type I error (rejecting a true treatment
effect). Results hold for parameters estimated in energy space (rather than
percent), which are presented in Appendix A.4.
Table 1.3: Simulated Conditional Average Treatment Effects on the
Treated - 5 Random Groups - Outcome in Percent
Outcome: Percent Energy Savings Simulated Estimated
Specification: “Ground Truth” Machine Learning TWFE 1 TWFE 2 TWFE 3
Group 1 -0.0600∗∗∗ -0.0588∗∗∗ -0.0567∗∗∗ -0.0619∗∗∗ -0.0598∗∗∗
(0.0000) (0.0028) (0.0039) (0.0036) (0.0036)
Group 2 -0.0800∗∗∗ -0.0795∗∗∗ -0.0767∗∗∗ -0.0789∗∗∗ -0.0768∗∗∗
(0.0000) (0.0027) (0.0038) (0.0036) (0.0036)
Group 3 -0.1000∗∗∗ -0.1030∗∗∗ -0.1018∗∗∗ -0.1055∗∗∗ -0.1019∗∗∗
(0.0000) (0.0024) (0.0038) (0.0036) (0.0036)
Group 4 -0.1200∗∗∗ -0.1203∗∗∗ -0.1173∗∗∗ -0.1192∗∗∗ -0.1169∗∗∗
(0.0000) (0.0026) (0.0037) (0.0034) (0.0034)
Group 5 -0.1400∗∗∗ -0.1404∗∗∗ -0.1386∗∗∗ -0.1407∗∗∗ -0.1380∗∗∗
(0.0000) (0.0027) (0.0035) (0.0032) (0.0032)
Observations 304,522† 304,427† 616,112 615,150 615,115
Controls:
Home FE NA NA Yes No No
Month of Sample FE NA NA Yes Yes No
Home by Calendar Month FE NA NA No Yes Yes
Month of Sample by County FE NA NA No No Yes
Heating and Cooling Degree Days NA NA Yes Yes Yes
Note: This table presents simulated CATT estimates of the effect of WAP on natural gas usage. The coefficients
should be interpreted as simulated monthly energy savings (measured in percent) attributable to treatment.
Here, simulated treatment effects were assumed to vary across 5 random subgroups of the population (with
effects as shown in the “Simulations” column). No controls are used for the machine learning CATT, which is
identified from predicted counterfactuals. For the machine learning estimates, standard errors (in parentheses) are
bootstrapped (200 iterations). For two-way fixed effects, standard errors are clustered by household. Significance
at 1% is indicated by ∗∗∗. The number of observations for ground truth and machine learning estimates, indicated
by †, are smaller because they use the post-treatment sample only, although the pre-treatment sample was used
for building a predictive model.
23
1.4.3 Unit-Specific Treatment Effects
For this simulation, I consider a more complex treatment structure, for which
effects vary both across time and depending on how much was spent on
specific weatherization measures. This is so that the analyses in this section
mimic the real data applications in section 1.5, for which I expect significant
variation in treatment effects across homes. Here I impose that WAP is
associated with a “base” treatment effect of 15%. Energy savings are then
assumed to increase with more spending on wall insulation and furnaces.
There is also a strong discontinuous increase in savings when a furnace is
replaced, rather than only repaired. Also, effects decrease over time, to
simulate depreciation of the upgrades. The full set of simulated parameters
can be found in Appendix A.5. To recover those simulated effects, I use my
machine learning approach, and then parameterize the savings with equation
1.7. Parameter estimates are also in Appendix A.5. In this subsection, I focus
on demonstrating how to recover unit-specific treatment effects by using those
parameters.
It is essential to parameterize the energy savings for unit-specific treatment
effects. Figure 1.1 provides insight about why. It presents the monthly energy
savings that would be obtained if a researcher only performs steps 1 and 2 of
my method, which entail predicting counterfactuals, then subtracting those
from true post-treatment usage to obtain treatment effects. Specifically, 1.1
presents the distribution of estimated savings for observations that have a
simulated “base” treatment effect of 15%. Note that, on average, those esti-
mates are close to the ground truth effect (13.9% versus 15%). However, the
range of estimates around that average is significant (approximately −80%
to +80%). That could be attributed to errors in the predictive step, because
of several factors, such as violations of Assumption 1.5 (no unobservable
confounders). For more parsimonius estimates it is therefore necessary to
apply Step 3 of the proposed ML method, to parameterize the energy sav-
ings. With those parameters in hand, I obtain new predictions of savings for
all observations in the sample, according to equation 1.9.
I aggregate savings predictions for each home, according to equation (1.10).
The same aggregation technique is used to obtain the simulated (ground
truth) treatment effects. Figure 1.2 compares the ground truth (a) with
machine learning (b) estimated effects. It ranks homes from lowest to high-
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est percent energy. The distribution of per-home savings according to the
machine learning estimates is strikingly similar to the ground truth distri-
bution. That suggests that the machine learning approach can accurately
recover unit-specific effects.
Further, Figure 1.3 presents prediction errors for the per-home estimates,
again ranked from lowest to highest savings. Errors are generally smaller
than 1.5 percentage point, on average. The ML approach seems to be over-
estimating the savings from low-performers, and underestimating the savings
of high-performers.
Finally, Figure 1.4 presents further evidence that simply aggregating the
unit-by-time savings from Step 2 will produce incorrect home-specific savings.
Note that, even though average savings are close to the ground truth, the dis-
tribution of the estimates according to this incorrect method has significantly
longer tails (for example, some homes at the lower end are estimated to be
using 50% more energy after treatment). That can lead to erroneous inter-
pretation of treatment effect heterogeneity in the program. It could be that
some homes mechanically appear to be using more energy after treatment,
due to unobserved factors, such as new residents moving in. Conversely, if
residents move out, then reduced energy usage may be erroneously attributed
high energy savings by the program.
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Figure 1.1: ML Step 2 Estimates for Observations With Simulated Savings
of 15%
Notes: Figure 1.1 presents the distribution of monthly estimated savings for observations
that have a simulated “base” treatment effect of 15%, according to Step 2 of the proposed
method. The estimate of average savings is close to the ground truth. However, the
estimates are significantly inaccurate for some months. Step 3 of the proposed method
aims to correct for that.
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a. “Ground Truth”
b. Machine Learning Estimates
Figure 1.2: Simulated (Groud Truth) Versus Estimated Home-Specific
Savings
Notes: Figure 1.2 compares the “ground truth” distribution of unit-specific treatment
effects versus estimates form the machine learning approach. The blue dots from panel (a)
represent the ground truth, while the green dots from panel (b) represent machine learning
estimates. 95% Confidence intervals (shaded green area) were obtained via bootstrapping
(200 iterations). Homes are ranked from lowest to highest percentile (in terms of natural
gas savings).
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Figure 1.3: Per-Home Prediction Errors Across Performance Bins
Notes: Figure 1.3 plots average home-specific prediction errors from the machine learning
approach. Averages are stratified by percentiles of ground truth simulated performance
(horizontal axis). 95% Confidence intervals were obtained via bootstrapping (200 itera-
tions). It can be noted that errors are generally smaller than 2%.
Figure 1.4: Home-Specific Savings - Incorrect Method
Notes: Figure 1.4 presents unit-specific treatment effects according to an incorrect estima-
tion approach. Here, home-specific effects are obtained simply by aggregating predictions
of savings. The correct approach is to project savings onto observable covariates first,
following the parameterization step from equation 1.9.
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1.5 Real Data Application: Evaluation of the
Weatherization Assistance Program
Here I demonstrate the method from Section 1.2 with a real data application,
in the context of the Weatherization Assistance Program. The main objec-
tive is to recover heterogeneity of effects across homes that received different
levels of WAP spending on diverse measures. I also investigate heterogeneity
of savings across housing structure and demographics. For that purpose, I
estimate conditional average treatment effects (CATT ). The CATT param-
eters are then used for measure-specific cost-benefit analyses. XGBoost is
used for the first (predictive) step of the method. To train the (counterfac-
tual) model, I restrict the sample to all (actual) pre-treatment observations.
Further I restrict the sample to observations within a window of 2 years
before and after treatment, such that the focus is on estimating near-term
effects. In Appendix A.1 I show that XGBoost achieved high out-of-sample
(cross-validated) prediction accuracy for this real data application. I also
show that prediction errors are unlikely to be correlated with any of the
available covariates of interest.
1.5.1 Estimates of Heterogeneous Treatment Effects
To assess heterogeneity of program savings, I estimate CATT , according to
step three from my method. Specifically, after obtaining home-by-month
estimates of savings, I run the following linear regression to decompose those
savings:
bˆit = α0 +
K∑
k=1
βkC
k
it +
G∑
g=1
γgX
g
it + εit ∀ t > ti , (1.12)
where bˆit are natural gas savings (MMBtu) for home i in the post-treatment
billing cycle t > ti; α0 is a constant; X
g
it includes the following covariates:
housing structure (air sealing, blower door reading, attic R-value, floor area,
number of stories, heating unit size, and vintage); demographics (house-
hold income, householder age, and family size); natural gas and electricity
prices; and weather controls (average minimum temperature, average maxi-
mum temperature, and average precipitation). Ckit are categories of program
spending: air conditioning, air sealing, attic, baseload, doors, foundation,
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furnace, health and safety, wall insulation, water heater, windows, and other
incidentals. Variables are flexibly included via binning. Bins can vary in size,
depending on the distribution of the variable considered.
I compare the machine learning estimates with those from a fully interacted
two-way fixed effects model, similar to specification TWFE3 from the tables
in Section 1.4. That is, I regress energy consumption on home by calendar
month FE, plus month of sample by county FE, in addition to covariates
interacted with the binary treatment indicator. For this TWFE estimator,
the coefficients of interest are those associated with the interactions between
treatment and covariates (especially related to program spending).
Figures 1.5 and 1.6 present estimates of heterogeneous treatment effects
for selected upgrades or home characteristics. I focus on covariates that are
expected to be closely related to energy consumption. The graphs should
be interpreted as follows: the vertical axes represent natural gas savings
(MMBtu) attributed to WAP, while the horizontal axes represent bins of
amount spent on upgrades or other relevant home characteristics. To avoid
collinearity, for each variable it was necessary to drop one of the bins, to serve
as the omitted comparison group the estimating equation. For the spending
categories, I drop the first bin of zero amount spent. For all other cases,
I drop the bin which includes the median value along a given dimension.
The presented coefficients should be interpreted as heterogeneity in energy
savings, compared to the omitted bin. Blue triangles represent coefficients
according the ML estimator, while the red squares are those from TWFE.
First, comparing ML versus TWFE coefficients, it can be noted that they
generally trend in the same directions, and reveal strikingly similar patterns
of heterogeneity. However, ML estimates are more precise. Furthermore,
there are some notable discrepancies between the estimates. Focusing on Wall
Insulation and Attics, for example, TWFE suggest stronger treatment effects
compared to ML. That may be attributed to TWFE not accurately capturing
the temporal variation of effects. As simulation results from Section 1.4
reveal, TWFE coefficients will be overestimated in case the true underlying
effects are stronger in the months right after treatment. That scenario is
consistent with depreciation of the upgrades performed by WAP.
Focusing on interpreting the preferred ML specification, the graphs reveal
several interesting patterns of heterogeneity for this context, which had not
been previously documented in the literature. When looking at furnaces, for
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example, it can be noted that spending below $1,500 is associated with an
increase in energy usage. On the other hand, significant energy savings are
achieved with furnace spending above $1,800. Lower levels of furnace spend-
ing correspond to repair and re-tuning, which may be associated with re-
bound effects (residents using their furnaces more often), without significant
improvement in the efficiency of the furnace. However, high levels of furnace
spending correspond to installing new (likely more efficient) furnaces, thus
leading to significant reduction in energy consumption.10 That is an intuitive
result but the magnitudes or the importance of the savings from replacing
furnaces should not be understated. In section 1.5.2, I provide more insight
about the cost-effectiveness of furnace replacements versus repairs.
Graphs labelled as Attic, Wall Insulation, and Foundation collectively rep-
resent the majority of insulation measures performed by the program. As
expected, those reveal that insulation is crucial for energy savings in the
context of WAP. Virtually any level of insulation spending is associated with
some energy savings. Further, the relationship between savings and spending
on insulation seems to be mostly linear. Only high levels of spending (above
$1,200) on windows are significantly associated with some energy savings.
I also show that homes with a larger pre-treatment heating unit achieve
better energy savings. Those large units may therefore have been replaced
with smaller ones (which use less energy). Otherwise, the units’ sizes may
have been kept the same, but newer models might be more efficient in general.
That is consistent with the results fro furnace spending.
In terms of demographics, the machine learning estimates suggest U-shaped
relationships between energy consumption and family size, as well as between
energy energy consumption and householder age. Compared to the median,
both younger and older householders, as well as smaller and bigger families
consume more energy after treatment. The differences along those dimen-
sions are small, nevertheless significant. Coefficients on householder age from
TWFE differ substantially from those from machine learning. However, po-
tential sources of bias along those dimensions are unclear.
10Appendix A.3 presents the histograms for each of the WAP spending categories. It
can be noted, for example, that the distribution is bimodal for furnaces, thus suggesting a
separation between simple repair/re-tuning versus complete replacements. More specific
descriptions of measures performed in each home also corroborate that separation.
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Savings by Air Sealing Spending Savings by Attic Spending
Savings by Foundation Spending Savings by Furnace Spending
Savings by Wall Insulation Spending Savings by Windows Spending
Figure 1.5: ML Heterogeneous Treatment Effect Estimates for Program
Spending
Notes: The figures above present machine learning estimates of heterogeneous treatment
effects for selected WAP categories of spending. Negative coefficients should be inter-
preted as percent energy savings attributed to WAP treatment. ML standard errors were
bootstrapped (200 iterations). For two-way fixed effects, standard errors are clustered by
household.
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Savings by Householder Age Savings by Family Size
Savings by Heating Unit Size
Figure 1.6: ML Heterogeneous Treatment Effect Estimates for Selected
Covariates
Notes: The figures above present machine learning estimates of heteroge-
neous treatment effects for selected covariates. Negative coefficients should
be interpreted as percent energy savings attributed to WAP treatment. ML
standard errors were bootstrapped (200 iterations). For two-way fixed effects,
standard errors are clustered by household.
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1.5.2 Upgrade-Specific Cost-Benefit Analyses
In this section, I investigate if each of the categories of WAP investments are
cost-effective. Measure-specific costs were obtained from administrative data.
They incorporate both labor and materials costs. I assume that benefits
accrue through reduced energy savings only, according to the parameters
estimated in the above section.11 I focus on the measures that were associated
with significant energy savings.
For each measure and each bin of spending, I compute the monetized
benefits of energy savings. I take into account social marginal benefits, in-
corporating the social costs of carbon following the procedure as described
in Davis and Muehlegger (2010). The average citygate natural gas prices in
Illinois from 2007-2016 represent marginal private costs, to which I add the
social costs of carbon of $40 per ton. Emissions factors for natural gas were
obtained from EPA (1998). The resulting price is assumed for the first post-
treatment month, after which escalation is applied based on indices from
Rushing, Kneifel, and Lippiatt (2012).
Different measures are assumed to have different lifespans. Baseline sce-
narios follow lifespan recommendations from official WAP documentation:
25 years for insulation measures; 20 years for furnaces; 15 years for windows.
Measures are assumed to fully depreciate after those lifespans. However,
there is uncertainty regarding those lifespans, and recent recent engineering
literature suggests that they could be longer (Kono et al., 2016). Therefore,
I also consider the following alternative lifespans: 50 years for insulation;
30 years for furnaces and windows. Finally, to obtain the present value of
benefits, I use a discount rate of 3%, which is the recommended rate for eval-
uation of several governmental programs, including WAP Rushing, Kneifel,
and Lippiatt (2012).
I subtract monetized benefits from per-measure costs to obtain net benefits
for all the bins of spending.12 Results are presented in Figure 1.7. First, it
can be noted that only insulation measures, especially for attics, seem to be
associated with positive net benefits. Attic spending exhibits a clear pattern
of diminishing returns. Further, net benefits are sensitive to lifespan assump-
tions. Comparing both lifespan scenarios, the difference in net benefits can
11WAP may also be associated with indoor air quality, health, and carbon abatement
benefits. The investigation of those is left for future research.
12I use average costs within each bin.
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be up to $3,000 for attics, for example. Foundation and wall insulation seem
to be at the margin of cost-effectiveness with baseline assumptions. With
longer lifespans, those measure are therefore associated with positive net
benefits.
Furnace and windows are generally associated with negative net bene-
fits. The bimodal distribution for furnace is again clear in these cost-benefit
analyses: it seems that expensive furnace repairs ($600 - $1,800) are less
cost-effective than full furnace replacements (above $1,800). In this context,
negative net benefits do not necessarily imply that some measures should be
performed. It is important to note that WAP measures may be complemen-
tary. For example, better wall insulation can enhance the benefits from a
more efficient furnace. Analyses of complex interactions between measures
are left for future work.
The methods and results presented in this paper complement the anal-
yses in Christensen et al. (2020). That paper provides insight about the
mechanisms that can explain a wedge between ex-ante projected and ex-post
realized energy savings from WAP. Results suggest that biases in projected
savings are especially associated with systematic engineering modelling er-
rors and workmanship, while changes in consumer behavior (rebound effects)
are not significant in this setting.
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Net Benefits from Attic Net Benefits from Foundation
Net Benefits from Wall Insulation Net Benefits from Furnace
Net Benefits from Windows
Figure 1.7: Cost-Effectiveness of Main WAP Spending Categories
Notes: The figures above present results from cost-benefit analyses for the
main categories of WAP spending. Blue triangles represent net benefits with
baseline assumptions: shorter lifespans, and 3% discount rate. The red cir-
cles represent net benefits assuming longer lifespans. Standard errors were
bootstrapped (200 iterations).
36
1.6 Conclusions
I introduce a novel method to recover heterogeneous treatment effects for
event studies with staggered adoption. The method employs highly flexi-
ble machine learning algorithms to predict counterfactuals, which in turn
are used to recover treatment effects. Since the counterfactual predictions
must be accurate, this method may only be feasible for settings with rich
data availability (with many covariates and/or units of observations). Nev-
ertheless, such settings are becoming increasingly common, given the recent
advances in data collection/storage technologies, computational speed, and
information technologies in general.
With simulations, I test the accuracy and robustness of the proposed ma-
chine learning (ML) method, contrasting it with standard two-way fixed ef-
fects (TWFE) regressions. I show that, consistent with previous literature,
TWFE can be near-term biased in cases where treatment effects are dy-
namic (time-varying). On the other hand, the ML approach is unbiased and
is more efficient than TWFE. Results also suggest that the ML method can
accurately recover nuanced unit-specific effects.
I conclude with an application of the ML approach to real data from the
Weatherization Assistance Program. I am able to identify significant hetero-
geneity of program effects, which had not been empirically documented in the
literature. For example, I find that insulation measures are among the most
important drivers of energy savings. Further, I am able to provide insight
about which levels of insulation spending are most cost-effective. I also find
evidence that furnace replacements are more cost-effective than particularly
expensive furnace repairs/re-tuning. Since the ML method allows estimation
of unit-specific effects, or at least fine scale heterogeneity, it may also be
useful for an exercise to identify high-return homes, aiming to improve the
cost-effectiveness of the program.
The same machine learning method that I propose is also used in Chris-
tensen et al. (2020). That paper presents further results and policy implica-
tions from treatment effect heterogeneity in the context of WAP. I reiterate
that this approach is not only applicable to research in energy economics.
Rather, the method can be considered for recovering heterogeneity in any
event studies with staggered adoption, especially for micro-level data with a
rich data set of covariates and a large quantity of observations.
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CHAPTER 2
SOCIAL COMPARISON NUDGES
WITHOUT MONETARY INCENTIVES:
EVIDENCE FROM HOME ENERGY
REPORTS
With Erica Myers
Abstract: We explore the mechanisms driving the effectiveness
of a widely-used behavioral intervention that reduces energy con-
sumption by repeatedly mailing social comparison-based home en-
ergy reports (HERs) to households. With a randomized controlled
trial, we introduce HERs in a college residence, where tenants
do not pay energy bills. Our results indicate that HERs induced
almost no behavioral changes for heating demand, with precise
estimates that allow us to rule out thermostat changes greater
than 0.36oF. To the extent that our findings can be extrapolated to
other non-dormitory residential contexts, this suggests that behav-
ioral channels, such as competitiveness, social norms, or moral
suasion, may not motivate conservation in the absence of direct
monetary incentives.
2.1 Introduction
Governments and firms around the world are increasingly relying on policies
motivated by behavioral insights to alter consumer and worker choices in
ways that might improve welfare. Behavioral nudges or interventions such as
information provision, social comparisons, commitment devices, and others
have been shown to be effective in diverse contexts: smoking cessation, edu-
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cation, exercise and weight loss, energy and water conservation.1 Yet, often
little is understood about how and why these interventions work. Under-
standing the underlying mechanisms has important implications for welfare
effects as well as the external validity of particular nudges for other settings.
Our study focuses on understanding the mechanisms driving an espe-
cially policy relevant behavioral intervention: Home Energy Reports (HERs).
HERs provide information about a household’s own energy usage, how that
compares with neighbors’ usage, and estimated monetary savings from sev-
eral suggested conservation actions. The reports have been shown to be
remarkably cost-effective: a simple additional section to consumers’ monthly
bills produces energy savings that range from 2 to 6%.2
We introduce HERs into a new environment, college dormitories, where
tenants do not directly pay for energy. Focusing on this setting allows us to
make two contributions to our understanding of social comparison nudges.
First, our interventions solely target behavioral channels for reductions, such
as competitiveness, social norms, or moral suasion, which could operate in-
dependently from direct monetary incentives. Second, to the extent that our
subjects are representative of how other populations respond to HERs, we
can learn whether those nudges are likely to be effective when tenants make
choices about energy consumption, but landlords pay the bills. Approxi-
mately 21% of rented residential properties are under landlord-pay contracts
for energy (EIA, 2015b), and for commercial buildings that figure is close to
20% (Jessoe, Papineau, and Rapson, 2019). If tenants under these types of
contracts respond to HERs with consumption reduction, then HERs could
be an important lever to help ameliorate moral hazard for consumers who
otherwise have little incentive to conserve.
Social comparisons like HERs are becoming an increasingly important pol-
icy mechanism for addressing energy conservation, where price-based ap-
proaches are often difficult to design and implement. In some parts of the
world, such as the United States, it has been politically infeasible to im-
1See, for example impacts on smoking cessation (Volpp et al., 2009), education (Leuven,
Oosterbeek, and Klaauw, 2010; Levitt, List, and Sadoff, 2016), exercise and weight loss
(Volpp et al., 2008; Charness and Gneezy, 2009; Milkman, Minson, and Volpp, 2014; Royer,
Stehr, and Sydnor, 2015; Acland and Levy, 2015), and energy and water conservation
(Allcott, 2011; Ferraro and Price, 2013).
2See, for example: Allcott (2011), Ferraro and Price (2013), Allcott (2015), Jessoe et
al. (2017), Allcott and Kessler (2019), Jaime and Carlsson (2018), Henry, Ferraro, and
Kontoleon (2019).
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plement large-scale Pigouvan taxes or cap-and-trade programs for carbon
emissions. While energy efficiency subsidies are used more widely, they
are difficult to design optimally without knowledge of elasticities of demand
for both energy consumption and efficiency in durables.3 These difficulties
with traditional price-based approaches, combined with the remarkable cost-
effectiveness of HERs, have led to widespread use of that intervention. As
of mid-2015, leading HER provider, Opower, was working with close to 100
utility companies in 9 different countries, sending regular letters to 15 million
households (Allcott and Kessler, 2019).
A few hypotheses have been advanced as to why HERs have been success-
ful in promoting conservation: they may serve as continuous reminders of
the monetary savings opportunities (addressing consumer inattention); may
appeal to competitiveness and (above average) consumers’ desires not to feel
out of the norm (social norms, see: Be´nabou and Tirole, 2006; Levitt and
List, 2007); may increase the moral burden of being an above average user
(moral suasion, see: Ito, Ida, and Tanaka, 2018); may simply empower sub-
jects with information to act on previously established intention; or could
combine all of those and other factors.4
In order to better understand the mechanisms underlying the effects of
HERs, we conducted a randomized controlled trial (RCT) for heating and
cooling in a university undergraduate residence hall, where students do not
directly pay energy bills. As in most residences where tenants do not pay
for energy, participants in our study also could not make significant capital
investments. That implies that we can estimate the effect of HERs in a
setting where behavioral channels, rather than pecuniary motives, are the
primary mechanisms that affect energy consumption.
Previous literature has explored the effects of energy conservation nudges
in the context of campus housing. Delmas and Lessem (2014) recruited stu-
dents using an opt-in design for a study at the University of California, Los
Angeles (UCLA). Randomizing within the 4.4% of the population that opted
to participate, they show that public displays of least versus most efficient
3Designing subsidies can be even more complicated in the presence of behavioral factors
such as inattention to or biased beliefs about operating costs of energy using durables.
To design these policies optimally, governments would need knowledge of the distribu-
tion of bias in the population (Allcott, Mullainathan, and Taubinsky, 2014; Farhi and
Gabaix, 2019; Houde and Myers, 2019).
4For a review, see Andor and Fels (2018).
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consumers can reduce electricity usage by almost 20%. Another treatment
arm of that study looks at the effect of providing private energy usage in-
formation to students, along with average usage of a comparable neighbor.
However, the treatment effect for that group was not statistically distinguish-
able from zero. Further, the design of their reports differed substantially from
those provided by Opower.5
Our trials take place in an upper-division undergraduate residence hall
from the University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign. We used an opt-out
recruitment design, with a 99% participation rate.6 We randomly assigned
2/3 of subjects to receive weekly HERs via email (remaining 1/3 of subjects
were control).7 Thermostat observations were used to generate personalized
heating/cooling energy reports for treatment rooms, designed to closely repli-
cate HERs used by utilities in traditional residential contexts. Our results
reveal no statistically significant change in behavior for the treatment group
compared to control. Our estimates are precise enough to rule out reduc-
tions of the size found in traditional residential contexts. When residents
pay for energy, an estimated 45 to 67% of the 2-6% short-run savings come
through behavioral channels rather than through capital investments (Bran-
don et al., 2017).8 We can rule out thermostat changes greater than 0.36oF,
which suggests that HERs do not change behavior in our context.9
There are a few aspects about our population and our setting that differ
from the traditional residential context (homeowners from the general popu-
5Private information reports from Delmas and Lessem (2014) highlight historical bar
graphs showing a given student’s private consumption along with average consumption of
a comparable neighbor. In Opower reports, more focus is placed on graphs for the past
billing cycle only, rather than on historical consumption. Opower further presents usage
of efficient (20th percentile) neighbor, and an “efficiency standing” box with behavioral
cues that reiterate the consumer’s performance.
6Only 3 out of 476 contacted students asked to withdraw from our trials. Students were
told that their thermostat setpoints, which were already being recorded for maintenance
purposes, would be made available to our research team to assess energy consumption
patterns. To prevent “Hawthorne” or “observer” effects (Parsons, 1974), specific details
about the objectives of the study were not provided to students beforehand.
7Traditionally, home energy reports are sent via physical mail. However, there is evi-
dence that electronic (email) HERs are just as effective in promoting conservation, at least
in standard residential settings (Henry, Ferraro, and Kontoleon, 2019).
8Brandon et al. (2017) show that 33 to 55% of energy reductions persist after house-
holds move and HER treatment stops, such that those savings are attributable to capital
investments. Therefore, the remaining 45 to 67% short-run savings come through behav-
ioral channels.
9That effect is also small in energy space, as shown in back-of-the-envelope calculations
from Appendix B.1.
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lation who pay utility bills). However, we argue that our experimental setting
is a feature of our study in several ways. As discussed above, hypotheses are
that HERs nudges work either due to competitiveness, social norms, and
moral suasion (behavioral channels), or due to new information (on neigh-
bor consumption) about monetary savings opportunities, or a combination
of those factors. We reiterate that our setting eliminates the motivation to
use HER information for monetary gains. Thus, if behavioral channels are
a primary driver of HER treatment effects in the traditional residential con-
text, then our estimated null effects imply that behavioral factors are much
less effective for a student population. However, it can be argued that our
subjects tend to have “greener” preferences and place a heightened impor-
tance on peers, such that the effects of competitiveness, social norms, and
moral suasion would likely be stronger with a student population, compared
to standard residential contexts.10
Two other important differences between our setting and the traditional
residential context are that 1) we focus on thermostats (as opposed to plug
load), such that we only look at behavioral changes related to heating/cooling
demand, and 2) we deliver the HERs intervention through email. One might
worry that behavioral responses in our context are limited due to those dif-
ferences. However, we highlight that recent evaluations show that emailed
home energy reports are just as effective as physical mailed reports, at least
in standard residential settings (Henry, Ferraro, and Kontoleon, 2019). Fur-
ther, results from two additional studies, one performed in a different location
and one performed with our population, point to the important role of the
lack of financial incentives in driving our results.
First, in a study that closely mirrors ours in almost all respects, except
that the tenants do pay for energy, Bru¨lisauer et al. (2018) find strong treat-
ment effects of the HER intervention. Like our study, their randomized
controlled trial: 1) took place in a student dormitory over a short time frame
(less than one semester), 2) focused exclusively on air-conditioning usage (as
opposed to plug load), 3) used weekly e-mails to deliver HERs, 4) used an
opt-out recruitment design. In fact, their results suggest that focusing on one
10Results from our pre-intervention survey (presented in Appendix B.6.9) suggest that
our subjects have average New Ecological Paradigm scores that are higher than the na-
tional average (Dunlap et al., 2000; Pienaar, Lew, and Wallmo, 2015). Also, the psychol-
ogy literature has shown that individuals are more susceptible to changing their attitudes
during late adolescence and early adulthood (Krosnick and Alwin, 1989).
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behavioral channel (cooling) could make HERs more effective than nudges
promoting energy conservation on all fronts. It might be more effective to
increase consumers’ engagement with high-return conservation activities re-
lated to heating and cooling, rather that turning off lights or shutting off
computers, which have less energy savings potential.
While Bru¨lisauer et al. (2018) offer convincing evidence that an energy-
paying student population may respond to weekly emailed HERs focused only
on heating and cooling, it could still be the case that students in our con-
text are less attentive and responsive to emails than their population. The
Bru¨lisauer et al. (2018) study took place in Singapore, which might have
a student population that is demographically and culturally very different
from students in the United States. We therefore offer evidence from a sec-
ond randomized controlled trial in our setting, which demonstrates that our
subjects did open and read emails from our sender. Further, we demonstrate
that they knew how to reduce their thermostat settings, and were willing
to do so before leaving their rooms for an extended period of time (winter
break), even though they opted not significantly lower settings during the
HERs study period.
At the end of our HER study period, we re-randomized rooms into treat-
ment and control, and sent simpler messages to the treatment group, asking
students to turn down their thermostats to 68oF before leaving for winter
break.11 Students are unlikely to be occupying their rooms during break,
such that heating demand might be lower for all of them. Messages for this
secondary experiment came from the same sender as that from our main trial,
and arrived during finals week, a very busy time for students, when cognitive
costs may be considered higher than usual. Nevertheless, the simple nudges
prior to winter break were successful in promoting a 1.1oF setpoint reduction
for treated rooms (approximately 1.5% of the full sample average setpoint;
or 43% of the average within-room, across-time setpoint variance during the
Fall semester).
The significant treatment effect during winter break suggests that the null
11For building maintenance purposes, 68 degrees was the lowest thermostat setting al-
lowed. The RCT conducted during winter break was initially unrelated to our HER study
and therefore is not described in our pre-analysis plan. We include a brief description of
the set up and findings here because they serve as a test for subjects’ attention to our
message delivery method (emails) and help to assess mechanisms through which nudges
might affect energy consumption.
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effect from HERs during the regular semester is unlikely to have been driven
by inattention (i.e. students not opening or not reading emails from our
sender). The strong effect prior to break demonstrates that students were
still opening, reading, and reacting to emails from our sender at the end of our
HERs study period. Further, it demonstrates that students understood how
to make changes to thermostat settings for energy conservation. Therefore,
it is not the case that subjects tried to respond to the HERs but did not
understand how to do so. They were willing to make changes to thermostat
settings, at least during a period with very different energy demands. The
nudges might have worked before break because students knew that they
would not experience thermal discomfort (colder rooms) during the time
that they expected to be away.12 Post-study surveys of students are also
suggestive that they were receiving the HERs and reading them, but they
did not feel compelled to change their behavior during the semester.
To the extent that our findings can be extrapolated to other non-dormitory
residential contexts, they may have important implications for policymakers
considering HERs to promote conservation in contexts where tenants do not
pay their energy bills. We present some reasons why our results from ther-
mostat settings in college dormitories might extend to other such contexts.
First, we argue that our focus on thermostats alone was not a significant
limiting factor in terms of behavioral responses. We note the that prior lit-
erature found large behavioral responses to cooling-only HERs in dormitory
settings similar to ours in almost all respects, except that tenants did pay for
energy (Bru¨lisauer et al., 2018). In addition, our population was willing to
make substantial changes to their thermostats in response to a simple request
to conserve while they were away from their residence during winter break.
Second, if behavioral channels were a primary driver of response to HERs
in typical residential settings, then our null result would imply that college
students are particularly unresponsive to behavioral nudges. However, we
argue that this seems unlikely, given that college students tend to place a
heightened importance on peers, so that the effects of competitiveness, so-
12We ran a third set of trials during the Spring semester, which consisted of simple
weekly emails with the same message sent prior to winter break (asking students to lower
thermostats to 68). Null results from those trials suggest that it was the special circum-
stance that students would be away for 4 weeks and not the difference in the content of
the simple message, relative HERs, that caused the weekly nudges to be ineffective in our
setting. Details from this trial can be found in Appendix B.4.
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cial norms, and moral suasion would, if anything, be stronger with a student
population, compared to standard residential contexts.13
Given their low costs and ease of implementation, simple HERs nudges
may seem attractive to policymakers for changing behavior in contexts where
monetary incentives are not present, such as when tenants do not pay utility
bills. However, assuming that our findings can be extrapolated to other
non-dormitory residential contexts, they suggest that social comparisons like
those offered in HERs may not be effective at changing consumption behavior
in those environments.
The following sections provide further details about this study. In Section
2.2 we present a conceptual framework and derive testable hypotheses related
to the impact of HERs in our setting. Section 2.3 describes our research
design. Regression model specifications and results are presented in Section
2.4. We assess robustness of our findings in Section 2.5, and conclusions are
outlined in Section 2.6.
2.2 Conceptual Framework
Allcott and Kessler (2019) formalize a theoretical framework for a consumer’s
maximization problem under the HER “nudge.” As a starting point, we
restate their first order conditions for utility maximization under the standard
residential context and then adapt the model to the case in which we are
interested, where tenants do not pay for energy.
Following Allcott and Kessler (2019)’s exposition, consumers are assumed
to derive utility from a numeraire good x and from energy use e. The per-
ceived consumption utility obtained from e depends on a function fˆ(e;α, γ),
with fˆ ′ > 0, fˆ ′′ < 0. Consumer (preference) heterogeneity for energy is
captured by a taste parameter α. In our context, this can be thought
of as heterogeneity in individuals’ ideal indoor air temperature in the ab-
sence of energy costs or other constraints. Behavioral biases, inattention or
lack of information are incorporated through γ, so that the perceived con-
sumption utility may not necessarily equal the realized consumption utility
f(e, α) Additionally, consumers face a “moral utility” M = m − µe, which
13Our results from a pre-treatment survey also suggest that college students are slightly
more environmentally conscious compared to the average US population.
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is derived from social pressures or morality surrounding externalities from
energy consumption. The parameter m captures any energy-independent
(dis)utility generated from the nudges (e.g. subjects may not want to have
their mailboxes filled with energy reports). Finally, the parameter µ repre-
sents a “moral tax” which results in higher disutility as energy consumption
increases.14 Let θ = {y, pe, α, γ,m, µ} be a vector of parameters that affect
utility. Assuming utility is quasilinear in x, the consumers’ maximization
problem, for the standard residential context, can be expressed as:
max
x,e
U(θ) = x+ fˆ(e;α, γ) +m− µe
subject to: y ≥ x+ epe
where y is income, and pe is the price of energy. The optimal choice of energy,
denoted e∗, will thus be determined by the first order condition:
fˆ ′(e;α, γ) = µ+ pe (Standard residential) (2.1)
such that marginal utility should equal the moral tax plus the price of energy.
In standard residential contexts, optimal energy choice e∗ will depend on the
taste parameter α, behavioral biases γ, the moral tax µ, energy price pe, and
how those are functionally related.
Behavioral nudges implemented through home energy reports are assumed
to affect both γ and µ.15 For example, by providing suggestions on how
to save energy, or by simply making energy consumption more salient, the
reports are expected to reduce behavioral biases (γ) which stem from inatten-
tion or lack of information. Further, by presenting energy usage from average
and efficient neighbors, the reports can appeal to social norms and morality
(increasing moral tax µ). The effects of changing γ and µ on optimal energy
choice e∗, however, cannot be isolated from energy price levels pe. It is clear
that, depending on the functional form of fˆ(e;α, γ), the solution of the first
order condition (2.1) presented above will depend on interactions between all
the parameters, including pe. For example, changing γ may draw consumers’
attention to price in a way that could also affect perceptions of moral tax.
14As Allcott and Kessler (2019) note, moral utility could depend on consumption relative
to a social norm s: M = ms − µ(e− s), which would equal m− µe if m = ms.
15Nudges also affect m, but energy consumption is independent of that.
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Our research aims to shed light on the importance of behavioral parame-
ters, rather than energy prices, by conducting randomized controlled trials
with subjects that do not directly pay for energy. In our setting, residents
face a modified budget constraint y ≤ x+E, where E is a lump sum payment
for energy incurred at the beginning of the housing contract. The first order
condition will then be:
fˆ ′(e;α, γ) = µ (Tenants do not pay energy bills) (2.2)
such that, if tenants do not pay for energy, then energy prices (pe) no longer
affect their optimal energy consumption level e∗. Rather, e∗ depends only on
the taste parameter α, behavioral biases γ, the moral tax µ, and potential
interactions between those.
We assume that our reports and nudges directly affect only γ and µ. Nev-
ertheless, nudges may be more or less effective for individuals depending on
their taste parameter, α. In order to better assess the mechanisms through
which our nudges might operate, we also explore their effectiveness under
a scenario in which the energy taste parameter α is also changed: during
school breaks, when potentially all of our subjects have less demand for en-
ergy services because they are unlikely to be occupying their rooms.
2.3 Research Design
We conducted randomized controlled trials in a residence hall from the Uni-
versity of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign. The targeted building houses over
400 upper-division undergraduate students, and is equipped with “smart”
thermostats in all bedrooms.16 Some of the residents were assigned to re-
ceive weekly reports (treatment group), designed to be very similar to HERs
typically provided by utilities (Allcott, 2011; Allcott and Rogers, 2014). The
main difference is that, as student residents do not receive or pay monthly
16This study was conducted in one of the university’s newest residence halls, equipped
with “smart” thermostats in every bedroom. Thermostats were not programmable, but
transmitted the temperature setpoint readings at high-frequency (every 15 minutes) to the
university’s maintenance service division. Current (as opposed to incoming) students have
priority to live in those halls, and they have the chance to apply earlier (from October
to April) in the prior academic year. Due to more modern amenities, rental rates in the
newest halls are slightly higher, compared to traditional halls.
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energy bills, there are no monetary incentives for behavioral changes in this
context (as highlighted in Section 2.2). Thus our reports do not include any
information about monetary savings.
During Fall 2017, energy report emails were sent to the treatment group,
every Wednesday at 5pm. A sample email is presented in Figure 2.1 below.
Energy usage graphs were created based on thermostat readings from each
bedroom in the building.17 Thermostat data was available at high-frequency
(15-minute intervals). With those, we construct a model to estimate energy
usage within each room of our sample.18 The emailed reports included graphs
of a given student’s own energy usage, average neighbors’ (same bedroom
type) usage, and the 15th percentile of neighbors’ usage. The reports also
included information on students’ “efficiency standing,” which indicated if
they were “GREAT,” “GOOD,” or “BELOW AVERAGE,” and correspond-
ing “smiley faces,” based on their energy usage percentile for a given week.19
This information appeared both in the subject line of the email, and in an
“efficiency standing box,”in the body of the email. Recommendations for
adjusting thermostats for saving energy appeared in the body of the email
as well.20
17Rooms are equipped with individual fan coil units, which ventilate either hot or cold
air (depending on the thermostat setpoint) into the room. Students did not have the
option to completely turn off the HVAC system. More details about the building’s HVAC
system can be found in Appendix B.1.
18We construct a simple linear model establishing a relationship between energy usage
and the differences between outdoor temperature and thermostat setpoints. The intent
was not to accurately predict energy usage for each room, but rather to produce significant
variation in energy usage reported to our subjects, depending on their interactions with
thermostats. More details about the specification for energy estimates can be found in
Appendix B.1.
19Usage below the 15th percentile, was categorized as “GREAT,” usage below the mean
was categorized as “GOOD,” and usage above the mean was categorized as “BELOW
AVERAGE.”
20Two sets of recommendations were provided: (1) “In HOT days, turn your thermostat
UP before going to sleep or when you leave the room.”; (2) “In COLD days, turn your
thermostat DOWN before going to sleep or when you leave the rooms.”
54
Figure 2.1: Sample Fall Treatment Energy Report Email
The treatment building is constituted of 330 bedrooms,21 which are seg-
mented into suites with shared bathrooms and living rooms.22 Randomiza-
tion was done at the suite-level (rather than bedroom-level), such that every
bedroom from a same suite was assigned to one of three possible groups:
control, treatment A, or treatment B.23
For treatment arm A, we provided bedroom-level energy usage to the stu-
21Ten rooms were dropped from the study because they were either unoccupied (7), or
asked to withdraw (3).
22There are 4 types of suites: “single-bedroom” suites (33% of sample) consist of 4 single-
bedrooms; “double-bedroom” suites (55%) have 2 double-bedrooms; “mixed-bedroom”
suites (8%) include one single-bedroom and one double-bedroom; and “special units”
(3%) which are isolated single-bedrooms.
23Prior to initiating the trials, we calculated minimum detectable effects (MDEs)
through simulations of statistical power. Details about the simulations can be found
in the Appendix B.3. With 2 treatment arms, the MDEs were calculated to be around
1%, with thermostat setpoints being the outcome.
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dents, while for treatment arm B we provided information aggregated at
the suite-level. Treatment B was intended to measure whether any effects
dissipate if the information is provided for a group of several rooms rather
than for a single room. In other words, how does the level of aggregation
of the information provided impact its effectiveness for reducing energy con-
sumption? While we expect information to have the strongest effect at the
room-level, individually metering rooms is costly. Therefore, understanding
the impact of aggregation could help planners of multi-unit buildings with
their decisions about how to sub-meter (if energy conservation is a concern).
The first reports were emailed to treatment students on September 13th,
so data collected prior to that can be considered the baseline (starting at
midnight of August 28, the first day of the academic year, and ending at
5pm of September 13). The last day of this trial was December 15th, which
is when subjects received emails about a secondary winter break treatment
(which served as an attention check to our emails, described in the following
section).
Figure 2.2 provides some insight about level of thermostat variability that
exists in our data, for the 2.5 weeks prior to treatment. For building mainte-
nance purposes, 68oF is generally the lowest setpoint allowed by the system,
although in some edge cases 67oF was recorded. It can be noted that ther-
mostats were set at the lowest possible level for 20% of the pre-treatment
sample. For the remaining remaining 80%, there is a 10 degree range of vari-
ation in settings, with higher concentration around 70-73oF. That implies sig-
nificant heterogeneity in preferences for heating/cooling demand, even when
all subjects are experiencing the same weather.
The balance Table 2.1 below compares treatment and control groups in
terms of average thermostat setpoints during the baseline. Some covariate
mean comparisons are also presented. It is clear that control and treated
groups are balanced in terms of setpoints (outcome of interest) and suite
type, as well as occupants’ college affiliations, sex, and residency status.
Some slight imbalance was noted for rooms’ location: Treatment B suites
are marginally more likely to be in the 3rd floor, but less likely to be in
the 6th floor of the building. Nevertheless, those observable differences can
be controlled for in regression specifications, either by explicitly including
indicators for each characteristic, or with room fixed effects (which further
control for time-invariant unobservable differences between groups).
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Figure 2.2: Histogram of Baseline Thermostat Setpoints
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Table 2.1: Balance for the Fall Trial
Control Treat A P-value of diff. Treat B P-value of diff.
(Control-Treat A) (Control-Treat B)
Baseline Average Setpoint 71.1072 71.4619 0.2772 71.0984 0.9795
Suite Type:
Double-Bed Suite % 0.3545 0.4144 0.5716 0.5200 0.1515
Mixed-Bed Suite % 0.0364 0.1441 0.0550 0.0000 0.1601
Single-Bed Suite % 0.5818 0.4324 0.1946 0.4800 0.3878
Special Suite % 0.0273 0.0090 0.3252 0.0000 0.0935
Suite Location:
1st Floor % 0.1546 0.1622 0.9331 0.0200 0.0506
2nd Floor % 0.1546 0.1802 0.7588 0.2000 0.6177
3rd Floor % 0.2909 0.1802 0.2607 0.0600 0.0070
4th Floor % 0.1636 0.0901 0.3210 0.2600 0.3142
5th Floor % 0.1455 0.1892 0.6110 0.2000 0.5668
6th Floor % 0.0909 0.1981 0.1881 0.2599 0.0603
South Wing % 0.7727 0.6216 0.1163 0.7000 0.4405
West Wing % 0.2273 0.3784 0.1163 0.3000 0.4405
Bottom West Wing % 0.0273 0.0360 0.7880 0.0200 0.8002
Center South Wing % 0.1273 0.1441 0.8044 0.1800 0.4793
Left South Wing % 0.2636 0.2973 0.7588 0.2400 0.8296
Mid West Wing % 0.0727 0.1261 0.3638 0.1800 0.1175
Right South Wing % 0.3818 0.1802 0.0725 0.2800 0.4019
Top West Wing % 0.1273 0.2162 0.2400 0.1000 0.6718
Occupants’ College Affiliations:
Ag., Consumer & Env. Sciences % 0.0265 0.0661 0.2577 0.0400 0.5197
Applied Health Sciences % 0.0452 0.0360 0.6892 0.0350 0.6669
College of Business % 0.0701 0.0796 0.7660 0.0617 0.7682
College of Media % 0.0327 0.0225 0.6833 0.0150 0.4541
Division of General Studies % 0.2430 0.2260 0.7902 0.3083 0.2571
Education % 0.0234 0.0135 0.6436 0.0233 0.9990
Engineering % 0.1106 0.1284 0.6658 0.1183 0.8632
Fine & Applied Arts % 0.0467 0.0195 0.1884 0.0550 0.7801
Liberal Arts & Sciences % 0.3972 0.3994 0.9742 0.3433 0.4201
School of Social Work % 0.0047 0.0090 0.6692 0.0000 0.3118
Female % 0.5327 0.3559 0.0840 0.4100 0.2509
Residency Status:
In State % 0.7998 0.8251 0.6339 0.8350 0.5109
Out of State % 0.0903 0.1021 0.7605 0.0500 0.2345
International % 0.1098 0.0728 0.3505 0.1050 0.8980
Number of Suites 42 44 38
Number of Rooms 110 105 100
Notes: This table compares control and treatment groups from the Fall randomized control trial in terms
of baseline thermostat settings and covariate means. The p-values are based on standard errors clustered at
the suite level, and indicate if differences in means are significant.
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2.4 Model Specifications and Results
The effects of HERs in our context can be expected to vary significantly
depending on weather. For hotter days, the nudges would be considered ef-
fective if they lead to increases in thermostat setpoints. Conversely, HERs
are intended to promote lower thermostats in cold days. Thus, to decrease
heating or cooling demand, thermostats should be set closer to outdoor tem-
peratures. To capture behavioral changes moving in both directions, for our
main regression specifications we construct the absolute difference (Dit) be-
tween thermostat set-points (Tit) and outdoor temperature (Oit), such that:
Dit = |Tit − Oit|. With that outcome, we use the following linear regression
specification to test if our main trial (HERs) affected the students’ behavior
with respect to thermostat settings:
Dit = α + β1treati + β2Xit + εit (2.3)
where Dit is the absolute difference between thermostat setpoints and out-
door temperatures for room i at time t; α is a constant term; the indicator
treati is equal to 1 if room i was assigned to any of the treatment arms,
zero otherwise; Xit are exogenous controls which can include room physi-
cal attributes and location, weather, date and time fixed effects; and εit is
an idiosyncratic error term. Larger values of Dit represent increased heat-
ing/cooling demand. Therefore, our nudges would be considered effective if
we found β1 to be negative, indicating an effort towards energy conservation.
Given that we have about 2.5 weeks of baseline data, we can also consider
a difference-in-differences (DID) approach,24 as follows:
Dit = β1treati × Postt + γi + δt + εit (2.4)
where Postt indicates time periods after September 13th (day the first email
was sent); γi are room fixed effects; and δt are time fixed effects.
We estimate equations (2.3) and (2.4) above through Ordinary Least Squares
(OLS), with standard errors clustered at the suite level to account for any
within suite correlations among rooms and across time. A significant β1
24The DID strategy was not included in our pre-analysis plan. However, given the
availability of baseline data, we chose to report DID estimates as well. Given our random-
ization, we do not expect the DID estimates to qualitatively differ from the post-treatment
comparison, though they may improve precision.
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would indicate that occupants from treated rooms behaved differently com-
pared to the control group. Results are presented in Table 2.2. Specification
(I) includes no independent variables, other than the treatment indicator.
Specification (II) controls for room physical attributes and location (bed-
room type, floor, building wing, and window position). Specification (III)
adds hourly weather variables, such as outdoor temperature, wind speed, pre-
cipitation and relative humidity.25 Specification (IV) further controls for fine
scale (15-minute interval) time fixed effects, which capture common trends
across rooms. For specification (V), the baseline setpoint averages were added
as a control. Finally, column (VI) presents the DID coefficient obtained from
estimating equation (2.4).
Table 2.2: Treatment Effect on Absolute Difference Between Thermostat
Setpoints and Outdoor Temperature
(I) (II) (III) (IV) (V) (VI)
Treated 0.1227 0.1728 0.1778 0.1774 0.0587
(0.2135) (0.2032) (0.2064) (0.2052) (0.1328)
[-0.296 0.541] [-0.225 0.571] [-0.227 0.582] [-0.225 0.580] [-0.202 0.319]
Treated × Post Sep. 13 0.0999
(0.1309)
[-0.157 0.356]
Average Outcome (oF ) 21.86 21.86 21.86 21.86 21.86 19.92
Average Within-Room SD 14.75 14.75 14.75 14.75 14.75 14.48
Observations 2,602,592 2,602,592 2,591,389 2,602,592 2,602,592 3,102,082
Controls:
Room physical characteristics No Yes Yes Yes Yes No
Weather No No Yes No No No
Date/Time fixed effects No No No Yes Yes Yes
Avg. pre-treatment setpoint No No No No Yes No
Room fixed effects No No No No No Yes
Notes: This table presents estimates of behavior change induced by the weekly energy reports, sent to treated subjects during
Fall 2017. The outcome variable is the absolute difference between thermostat setpoints and outdoor temperature (oF). For
specifications (I) through (V), the sample is restricted to observations post Sep. 13, 5pm, until the end of the semester. The
DID specification (VI) compares baseline observations with those post Sep. 13. Standard errors (in parentheses) are clustered
by suite. 95% confidence intervals are in brackets.
All six specifications reveal that there was no significant change in behav-
ior of the treated subjects, when compared to control. Adding time fixed
effects does not significantly change points estimates (which is expected due
to the randomized design of the trial). Specifications (V) and (VI) are more
precise because they further take into account baseline setpoints. With small
standard errors (ranging from 0.1309− 0.2135, compared to the average ab-
solute temperature difference of around 20 degrees), it can be argued that
25Hourly weather data from the closest station was provided by the National Oceanic
and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA, 2018).
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the estimates are precise zeros.
The following figures summarize the results graphically. In Figure 2.3, we
plot average setpoints by date, for treatment and control groups. Within the
treatment period, there is no statistically distinguishable difference between
treatment and control groups. It can further be noted that average setpoints
for both groups were slightly increasing, ranging from 71oF to 72oF. That
contrasts with the steady decreases in outdoor temperatures observed during
that period (presented in Appendix B.5). Around November 17th there was
a sudden drop in setpoints for both groups, which can be attributed to the
start of Thanksgiving break: many students lowered the thermostats before
leaving the dorms for break, even though we did not nudge them to do so.
That could be due to pre-existing energy saving attitudes (in both groups).26
Figure 2.3: Average Setpoints by Date, for Treatment and Control Groups
26In figure 2.15 from Section 2.5 we show that control rooms also lowered their ther-
mostats during the Thanksgiving break of Fall 2016 (one year prior to our treatment).
Therefore, some students in this setting have probably already been exposed to infor-
mation about how to save energy, and engage in those behaviors even in absence of our
nudges.
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Figure 2.4 presents average setpoints by hour of the day, during the treat-
ment period. Again, we note that the setpoints are stable across both
groups groups. There is little evidence of thermostat reductions during late
night/early morning, even though our nudges promoted that as an energy-
saving behavior. Compared to control, the treatment group seems to be
setting the thermostats higher during the middle of the day. That differ-
ence is not statistically significant, and does not appear to be attributable
to our treatment, since average hourly setpoints during the baseline, pre-
intervention period already revealed that same pattern (Figure 2.5).
Figure 2.4: Average Setpoints by Hour of the Day, during treatment period
Figure 2.5: Average Setpoints by Hour of the Day, during baseline
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We also tested if effects were different for treatment arm A (room-level),
compared to treatment arm B (suite-level), by estimating equations (2.3)
and (2.4) above with separated (rather than pooled) treatment indicators.
Any statistically significant differences between estimated coefficients for each
group would indicate that information aggregation is relevant in this context.
Results are presented in Table 2.3, which again reveals precise null treatment
effects. The lower bounds of 95% confidence intervals, according to specifi-
cation (VI), allow us to rule out effects greater than 0.297oF for room-level
treatment, and 0.163oF for suite-level treatment.
Table 2.3: Treatment Effect on Absolute Difference Between Thermostat
Setpoints and Outdoor Temperature (separated by treatment arms)
(I) (II) (III) (IV) (V) (VI)
Room-level Treatment 0.1469 0.1443 0.1577 0.1583 -0.0712
(0.2561) (0.2404) (0.2444) (0.2431) (0.1630)
[-0.355 0.649] [-0.327 0.615] [-0.321 0.637] [-0.318 0.635] [-0.391 0.248]
Suite-level Treatment 0.0875 0.1781 0.1758 0.1713 0.1158
(0.2511) (0.2489) (0.2513) (0.2509) (0.1537)
[-0.405 0.580] [-0.310 0.666] [-0.317 0.668] [-0.320 .0663] [-0.185 0.417]
Room-level Treatment × Post Sep. 13 0.0218
(0.1613)
[-0.294 0.338]
Suite-level Treatment × Post Sep. 13 0.1253
(0.1459)
[-0.161 0.411]
Average Outcome (oF ) 21.86 21.86 21.86 21.86 21.86 19.92
Average Within-Room SD 14.75 14.75 14.75 14.75 14.75 14.48
Observations 2,591,687 2,591,687 2,564,891 2,591,687 2,591,687 3,090,708
Controls:
Room physical characteristics No Yes Yes Yes Yes No
Weather No No Yes No No No
Date/Time fixed effects No No No Yes Yes Yes
Avg. pre-treatment setpoint No No No No Yes No
Room fixed effects No No No No No Yes
Notes: This table presents estimates of behavior change induced by the weekly energy reports, sent to treated subjects during Fall
2017. The outcome variable is the absolute difference between thermostat setpoints and outdoor temperature (oF). Indicators for both
treatment arms were included in the regressions. For specifications (I) through (V), the sample is restricted to observations post Sep.
13, 5pm, until the end of the semester. The DID specification (VI) compares baseline observations with those post Sep. 13. Standard
errors (in parentheses) are clustered by suite. 95% confidence intervals are in brackets.
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2.5 Robustness Checks
Null results in this type of research may arise if data or contextual limitations
prevent us from observing marginal changes in behavior. In this section, we
explore potential drivers of our null results. For example, it could be that
residents do not pay attention whatsoever to energy-saving nudges provided
by emails (our method of information delivery), or do not understand how to
operate their thermostats. We rule out those hypotheses with results from
simpler conservation nudges emailed prior to winter break, which provide
evidence that subjects were willing to lower thermostats before leaving for
vacations. Further, a post-treatment survey suggests that students were not
blocking/ignoring our emails, and that they were possibly not willing to
sacrifice their thermal comfort during the regular semester.
It could also be the case that students predominantly leave temperatures
at a default level, set before they moved in. Alternatively, they may choose to
leave the thermostats at the lowest (or highest) temperature allowed by the
HVAC system. We find no evidence to support those hypotheses by looking
at the frequency of students’ weekly interactions with thermostats, which
suggests that students: believed the thermostats functioned; understood how
to use them; and regularly changed temperature settings.
Finally, there might be a concern about spillovers, in a sense that treated
and control subjects may interact and discuss the energy report. Further,
spillovers can happen if there are significant heat transfers across rooms/suites.
If a given subject reduces their thermostat (due to treatment) and makes their
room colder, the temperature in an adjacent room may also be impacted,
leading to potential behavior changes of neighboring subjects. In order to
assess this possibility, we compare average setpoints for control rooms from
a year prior to our trials. The trends in setpoints for Fall 2016 and Fall 2017
look remarkably similar and are statistically indistinguishable, suggesting
that treatment did not affect the behavior of control room residents.
2.5.1 Attention check: simple conservation nudges (winter
break trial)
Prior to winter break, we sent simple emails to subjects, asking them to lower
their thermostats down to 68 degrees. These messages were conceptualized
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after the Fall trial had already started, thus they were not included in our
pre-analysis plan.27 Nevertheless, these simple messages serve as a robustness
check, providing insight about possible mechanisms driving the results from
our main trial. They constitute a change in the timing of treatment (right
before an absence from the room during winter break, as opposed to during
the semester), as well as an attention check (to test if subjects simply ignore
energy conservation messages).
For this secondary trial, subjects were re-randomized and split into two
groups: 159 rooms were assigned to control, and 161 were assigned to treat-
ment, with randomization done at the bedroom level (rather than suite level).
The exact wording and image included in the emails can be found in the fol-
lowing Figure 2.6.
Figure 2.6: Sample Winter Break Treatment Email
Note that the energy-saving action (“lower your thermostat to 68 degrees”)
is clearly stated and highlighted. Also, the image and the last sentence of the
emails include the word “save,” to reinforce the positive/beneficial nature
of the requested action. These emails were designed to act primarily as
moral suasion, and differ greatly from the Fall reports, since subjects are
not compared to each other, neither is own usage revealed. The same set
27The winter break trial was developed in coordination with University Housing as a
separate intervention that they were interested in piloting. We had not yet analyzed any
of the results of the fall trial, meaning the winter break trial was not designed in response
to the null effect from the fall trial. However, since the results from the winter break trial
offer compelling evidence regarding the mechanisms behind the results in the fall trial, we
opted to report the findings.
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of emails was sent out three times (to make the information more salient):
12/15 (Friday), 12/18 (Monday), and 12/20 (Wednesday). The final day of
exams was 12/21, and most students were expected to have left the building
(for break) by that weekend28.
We assume that the baseline period for this winter break trial spans from
December 1st to December 15th. In Table B.2 from Appendix B.2, we assess
baseline balance. We find that rooms from the control group had slightly
higher initial setpoints, on average. Therefore, we present results from a
difference-in-differences approach as well as a simple comparison of means
to estimate the causal effect of the treatment. Groups are well balanced in
terms of room physical attributes, location, as well as occupants’ sex, college
affiliation, and residency status.
To test if the simple nudges had any effect on residents’ behavior, we can
estimate modified versions of equations (2.3) and (2.4), with the adequate
treatment indicator. For this analysis, we restrict the sample to the months
of December and January. For those months, cooling demand in Illinois is
virtually zero, while heating demand is substantial. For that reason, we
expect our nudges to have a unidirectional (negative) effect on thermostats
during that period. We can therefore use thermostat setpoints Tit as the
outcome of interest for the winter break nudges. For the DID specification,
December 15th is the cutoff that determines start of treatment, since that is
the date when the first moral suasion email was sent. We cluster standard
errors at the level of randomization (room), to account for any within room
correlations over time.
Table 2.4 presents results from the winter break trial. Specifications (I)
through (IV) suggest that the nudges promoted average thermostat reduc-
tions ranging from 1.61oF to 1.72oF. However, recall that our analysis of
balance (Table B.2) revealed that control rooms already had slightly higher
average setpoints prior to the start of this treatment. The more robust spec-
ifications (V) and (VI), which control for pre-treatment imbalance, suggest
that the average treatment effect is closer to 1.1oF. That corresponds to:
approximately 1.5% of the average thermostat setpoint in the building; or
43% of the average within-room, across time setpoint variance during the
Fall semester.
28Students are not required to leave the building during that period. Some of them may
opt to stay for short classes (“winter semester”), or for any other reason.
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Table 2.4: Average treatment effects from simple conservation messages
sent prior to winter break 2017/2018
(I) (II) (III) (IV) (V) (VI)
Winter Break Treatment -1.7209∗∗∗ -1.6127∗∗∗ -1.6240∗∗∗ -1.6216∗∗∗ -1.2520∗∗∗
(0.2572) (0.2712) (0.2721) (0.2718) (0.1872)
Winter Break Treatment × Post Dec. 15 -1.0786∗∗∗
(0.1967)
Sample Average Setpoint (oF) 70.98 70.98 70.98 70.98 70.98 71.50
Average Within-Room SD 1.27 1.27 1.27 1.27 1.27 1.50
Observations 508,506 508,506 499,665 508,506 508,506 933,850
Controls:
Room physical characteristics No Yes Yes Yes Yes No
Weather No No Yes No No No
Date/Time fixed effects No No No Yes Yes Yes
Avg. pre-treatment setpoint No No No No Yes No
Room fixed effects No No No No No Yes
Notes: This table presents estimates of behavior change induced by simple nudges asking treated students to lower
their thermostats to 68oF prior to leaving for winter break. The outcome variable is thermostat setpoints (oF). For
specifications (I) through (V), the sample is restricted to observations from Dec. 15-31. The DID specification (VI)
compares observations from Dec. 1-14, with observations from Dec. 15-31. Standard errors (in parentheses) are
clustered by room. Significance at 1% is represented by ∗∗∗.
A graphical analysis of mean comparisons by date (Figure 2.7) confirms
that result. First, it can be noted that both treatment and control groups
lower their thermostats during break.29 However, after the second round
of nudging emails, the average thermostats decreased much more sharply
for the treatment group. Around that date, students probably completed
their academic activities for the semester,30 and thus could leave for winter
vacation. Shortly after the final day of exams (12/21), the setpoints stabilize,
with the treated group averages remaining significantly lower than control.
Once the Spring semester started (January 16th), the setpoints for both
groups quickly converge back to their pre-treatment levels, indicating that
our nudges persisted only through the break period, while students were
away.
The success of these simple nudges, demonstrates that our method of in-
formation delivery (emails) did not drive null results from the Fall trial (i.e.
students do pay attention to some forms of emails). It also demonstrates that
29We are unaware of university-wide campaigns targeted at thermostat reductions. Fig-
ure 2.15 shows a pattern where control rooms also lowered their thermostats during the
Thanksgiving breaks of Fall 2017 and Fall 2016 (one year prior to our treatment). There-
fore, some students in this setting have probably already been exposed to information
about how to save energy, and engage in those attitudes even in absence of our nudges.
30Depending on class different schedules, students might have had exams earlier or later
in the week.
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Figure 2.7: Average Setpoints by Date, for Winter Break Treatment and
Control Groups
students knew how to lower their thermostats to conserve energy, so it was
not the case that they tried to react to the HERs reports but did not under-
stand how to use the technology. It also follows that, compared to the Fall
trial, significant results during the winter break could be due to differences
in: 1) design of emails; or 2) timing of treatment (right before break as op-
posed to during the semester). To provide insight about which of those 2 was
more important, we ran another randomized trial, during Spring 2018. For
the Spring semester, treated students received weekly moral suasion nudges,
similar to those sent prior to winter break. Results for the Spring trial were
null, suggesting that the timing of treatment is crucial in this context. Sub-
jects were probably more willing to lower thermostats prior to leaving for
break, since that would not cause them any thermal discomfort. During a
regular semester, however, the students may wish to use their heating more
intensively (which constitutes a higher energy taste parameter α from the
conceptual framework, Section 2.2).
2.5.2 Post-treatment survey
Towards the end of the academic year (May 2018), we sent an online post-
treatment survey to any subject who received the weekly energy reports. We
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obtained valid responses from 82 out of 336 subjects (24.4% response rate).31
Questions were meant to assess subjects’ attention to the reports and how
those affected their daily lives.
Students’ attentiveness to the energy reports was measured with the ques-
tions presented in Figures 2.8 and 2.9. The vertical red lines in the Figures
indicate the mean response. Participants reported that they rarely deleted
or blocked our emails without reading their contents. Furthermore, many of
them stated that they often opened the report emails, or at least read the
subject lines. Thus, most post-treatment survey respondents were appropri-
ately exposed to the relevant energy information.
Finally, Figure 2.10 provides suggestive evidence that students were not
willing to lower their thermostats (sacrificing thermal comfort) to promote
conservation. The post-treatment survey respondents are likely different than
non-respondents in important ways. For example, respondents may be more
attentive to emails. Therefore, while these results are supportive of the find-
ings from the winter break treatment, they are not necessarily representative
of all participants in the study.
31Responses for the post-survey were incentivized through a lottery. Participants had a
7.5% chance of winning a $25 electronic gift card.
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Figure 2.8: Did students ignore the energy report emails?
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Figure 2.9: Did students read the energy report emails?
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Figure 2.10: Potential reason why students did not lower thermostats
2.5.3 Students’ interactions with thermostats
We reiterate that if students do not 1) believe thermostats work, 2) know
how to use them, or 3) routinely interact with them, it could be difficult to
observe any behavioral changes caused by our nudges, due to small variability
in our outcome variable. To further address that concern, Figure 2.11 below
plots the average number of times that thermostat setpoints were changed
within a room, for each week of the Fall trial (solid lines are the averages,
and dashed lines represent 95% confidence intervals). For both treated and
control groups, the averages were usually close to 8 setpoint changes within
a week (except during Thanksgiving break). Most residents, therefore, knew
how to use their thermostats and routinely used them to improve comfort,
giving them many opportunities to engage in energy-saving behavior. How-
ever, they chose not to do so during the Fall semester.
We further check if prior year (Fall 2016) residents from treated and control
rooms similarly interacted with their thermostats.32 Figure 2.12 reveals that
in Fall 2016 the average number of weekly thermostat changes ranged between
32For this analysis, we restrict the sample to 128 rooms with available data in Fall 2016.
During that period, data was not being recorded for the full building.
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6 to 12, which is very similar to what we observe during our trial period (Fall
2017). The nudges, therefore, do not seem to have significantly affected
students’ engagement with temperature settings in their rooms.
Figure 2.11: Average Number of Thermostat Changes per Room
Figure 2.12: Average Number of Thermostat Changes per Room - 1 Year
Prior to Treatment (Fall 2016)
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Another concern may be that potential effect sizes of our treatment were
limited because the thermostats in the treated building could not be set
lower than 68oF. It could be the case that some subjects were willing to
set thermostats at even lower levels, but were not able to do so because of
limitations of the technology. To address that, first we look at the histogram
of setpoints during the Fall intervention period, presented in Figure 2.13
below.
For the control group, we find that thermostats were set at 68oF for close
to 17% of our room by time observations. On the other hand, for the treated
group, we observe 68oF for only 13% of observations. That indicates that,
if anything, treated subjects were less likely to set their thermostats at the
lowest possible level. However, as revealed in (Figure 2.2), that was already
true during the baseline. Comparing histograms at baseline versus during
treatment, we note that both groups were less likely to remain at 68oF during
the intervention period. That is probably driven by lower average outdoor
temperatures later in the semester.
Figure 2.13: Histogram of Thermostat Setpoints During the Fall
Intervention Period
To further test if there was an increase in the proportion of subjects setting
thermostats at 68oF, we consider a regression framework. We estimate the
same specifications as those presented in Table 2.2, but with an alternative
outcome variable: an indicator equal to one if the thermostat was set at
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68oF, and equal to zero otherwise. The estimated parameters of interest
therefore compare treated and control rooms in terms of likelihood of setting
thermostats at 68oF. For specifications (I) through (V), we restrict the sample
to observations post October 15th, after which average daily temperatures
were considered “cold,” such that the recommendation for conserving energy
was to lower thermostats.33 The DID specification (VI) compares baseline
(pre Sep. 13) with observations post Oct.15. Results for those regressions
are presented in Table 2.5 below.
For the first five specifications, estimated coefficients (although not sta-
tistically significant) indicate that, compared to control, treated rooms were
between 3% and 4.4% less likely to set thermostats at 68oF. That is in line
with visual inspection of the histograms pre and post treatment. However,
the more robust DID specification (VI), which controls for pre-treatment dif-
ferences in the outcome, reveals that HERs virtually had no effect (0.8%) on
the treated rooms’ likelihood of setting thermostats at 68oF, post Oct. 15.
Table 2.5: During the Fall trial, are treated rooms more likely to set
thermostats at 68oF?
(I) (II) (III) (IV) (V) (VI)
Treated -0.0296 -0.0443 -0.0444 -0.0441 -0.0321
(0.0307) (0.0310) (0.0310) (0.0311) (0.0269)
Treated × Post Oct. 15 0.0087
(0.0293)
Observations 1,673,865 1,673,865 1,653,975 1,673,865 1,673,865 2,172,886
Controls:
Room physical characteristics No Yes Yes Yes Yes No
Weather No No Yes No No No
Date/Time fixed effects No No No Yes Yes Yes
Avg. pre-treatment setpoint No No No No Yes No
Room fixed effects No No No No No Yes
Notes: This table presents estimates of behavior change induced by the weekly energy reports, sent to
treated subjects during Fall 2017. The outcome variable is an indicator equal to one if the thermostat
was set at 68oF, and equal to zero otherwise. For specifications (I) through (V), the sample is restricted
to observations post Oct. 15, until the end of the semester. The DID specification (VI) compares
baseline (pre Sep. 13) with observations post Oct.15. Standard errors (in parentheses) are clustered
by suite.
33The 68oF lower limit is not an issue for “warm” days, since the recommendation then
was to raise thermostat settings.
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2.5.4 Spillovers
It may be argued that treated and control subjects had opportunities to
interact about the HERs, such that the control subjects were also made
aware of the ongoing conservation efforts. If that were the case, control
rooms might also feel nudged to lower thermostats, leading to attenuation
bias in our estimates. Alternatively, heat exchanges between treated and
control rooms may have also provoked changes in behavior of the control
subjects. For example, if treated rooms were setting the thermostats lower
than normal, then adjacent control rooms may have become colder, leading
the control residents to set the thermostat higher. Note that suite-level
randomization reduces the chances of both types of spillovers: roommates
(more likely to interact) were always assigned to the same group; and there
is greater physical separation across suites, compared to across rooms.
The post-intervention survey also included questions to assess if spillovers
are likely in this context. Figure 2.14 presents the distributions of responses,
with the red vertical line indicating the mean response. Results reveal that
close to 50% of survey respondents rarely or never compared/talked about
their energy reports with roommates or other hall residents.
To test if the control rooms were significantly impacted by the trial, and
if their consumption patterns may have been affected, we use data from Fall
2016 (one year prior to our trials). That constitutes an extension of the
pre-trial period, with a caveat that data for fewer rooms were available going
further back, and residents in 2016 were different from residents in 2017.
We restrict our sample to the 72 control rooms with data available for both
academic semesters, and graphically inspect the setpoint patterns.
From Figure 2.15, it is clear that setpoints were lower for control rooms in
2017, compared to 2016. That could be due to differences in weather across
years, or simply because the rooms were occupied by different individuals.
It is important to note, however, that the setpoint gap between 2016 and
2017 remains the same throughout most dates, including during the pre-trial
period.
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Figure 2.14: Did students talk to each other about the energy reports?
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Figure 2.15: Average Setpoints by Date, for Control Rooms
We also consider the following DID specification, to estimate if control
room trends were different in Fall 2017, compared to 2016:
Tit = β1Fall17t + β2Postt + β3Fall17t × Postt + γi + εit (2.5)
where Tit are thermostat settings; Fall17t is equal to one for observations
during Fall 2017 semester, and equal to zero during Fall 2016; Postt indicates
time periods after September 13th, which is the (proxy) first day of treatment
for Fall (2016) 2017; and γi are room fixed effects. For this model, the sample
was restricted to control rooms. A significant β3 would therefore indicate if
control room residents behaved differently after the treatment date in Fall
2017, compared to the same period during Fall 2016.
Results from model specification 2.5 are presented in Table 2.6. It can
be noted that none of the coefficients are statistically significant. Therefore,
it is unlikely that control rooms in our sample were affected by our nudges
during Fall 2017.
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Table 2.6: Difference-in-differences comparing control room setpoints in Fall
2016 and 2017, pre and post-trial start date
Fall 2017 -0.4504
(0.5194)
Post Sep. 13 0.2433
(0.1691)
Fall 2017 × Post Sep. 13 0.1548
(0.2139)
Sample Average Setpoint (oF ) 71.58
Observations 1,559,540
Room FE Yes
Notes: This table presents results from a DID speci-
fication, to assess if control rooms may have been af-
fected by our nudges. The outcome variable is ther-
mostat setpoints (oF). We check if setpoint trends
are different in Fall 2017, compared to 2016, be-
fore and after the treatment start date (September
13th). Standard errors (in parentheses) are clustered
by suite.
Further analyses and some additional concerns not addressed in this Sec-
tion 2.5 are presented in Appendix B.6. First, we analyze if there were
differential behavioral responses depending on the initial (baseline) thermo-
stat setpoints in each room. The rationale is that individuals with higher
baseline setpoints may face higher moral burdens once they receive Home
Energy Reports, and thus may be more likely to change behavior. To test
for that, we run regression specifications that interact treatment indicators
with quintile rankings constructed from the average baseline thermostat set-
points. We find no significant evidence of heterogeneity of effects along that
dimension.
We then test if there were any interactive effects between the Home Energy
Reports sent during the Fall and the simple messages sent prior to winter
break. We run regression specifications that interact indicators for both tri-
als. We find that only the effects for the winter break trial remain significant,
while coefficients from any interaction terms are close to zero and statistically
insignificant.
For further robustness, we rerun our models for the main Fall trial using
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thermostat setpoints as the outcome, and restricting the sample to “cold
days” (maximum temperature below 65oF). That specification corroborates
the null results from our main trial. We then also analyze heterogeneity based
on: hour of the day; weekday; timing of treatment; suite type; “efficency
standing” categorization; subjects’ degree of environmental concern (based
on a pre-intervention survey); and duration of treatment exposure (looking at
a subsample of subjects who continued to receive HERs through the Spring
semester). We find no significant heterogeneity in treatment effects across
any of those dimensions.
Finally, in the Appendix B.7 we use a Fischer Randomization Test (FRT)
to test for heterogeneity of treatment effects. We follow the procedure de-
scribed in Ding, Feller, and Miratrix (2016). We test a sharp null hypoth-
esis of no heterogeneity in effects for any of the rooms in our sample. The
steps for that procedure, described in greater detail in Appendix B.7 are:
re-randomizing treated/control rooms; imposing a simulated treatment ef-
fect (“nuisance” parameter); running a regression to recover that treatment
effect; and comparing the residual variance of treated versus control rooms.
Those steps are performed over 200 iterations of re-randomizations, and for
11 different nuisance parameters. With that, it was possible to generate sim-
ulated distributions of F-statistics that compare residual variances. We find
that, for all cases, the F-statistic from our original randomization falls well
within the distributions of simulated F-statistics, such that we cannot reject
the sharp null of no heterogeneity in effects.
2.6 Conclusions
This paper explores the mechanisms driving the effectiveness of HERs in
reducing energy consumption. Results from our randomized control trials
suggest that HERs have no effect on behavior of university student residents
who do not pay for energy and cannot make capital investments. That con-
trasts with results from traditional residential settings, for which 45-67% of
the 2-6% energy savings from HERs potentially come through behavioral
channels (Brandon et al., 2017). In our setting, we can rule out effect sizes
larger than 0.16oF (lower bound of our preferred specification), such that the
nudge induced almost no behavioral changes. This suggests that behavioral
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channels alone (commonly discussed in the literature as to why HERs have
been successful), such as competitiveness, social norms, or moral suasion,
may not lead to conservation in our setting.
Our context differs from the traditional setting for HER interventions in
that our subjects are college students, we focus on heating and cooling rather
than total energy consumption, and we use emails to deliver the reports,
rather than traditional mail. Nevertheless, there is strong support from two
additional studies that our null results can be attributed to the absence of
monetary incentives in this context, rather than differences in our research
design or attentiveness of our population.
First, Bru¨lisauer et al. (2018) find treatment effects from HERs in a setting
that closely mirrors ours in almost every respect, except that their subjects
pay for marginal energy consumption. In a short-run college dormitory set-
ting, focused on air-conditioning usage, with weekly emailed reports, and
with opt-out selected participants who do pay their energy bills, Bru¨lisauer
et al. (2018) find a treatment effect 2-3 times larger than those found in
traditional residential settings. This suggests that our method for delivering
reports (emails), or our focus on heating/cooling behavior might not have
limited the responsiveness of our subjects.
In addition, we report results from a second randomized controlled trial in
our setting, which reveals that inattention from our population is also unlikely
to have driven the null results of the HER nudges. Our second treatment
consisted of simply asking students to turn their thermostats down to 68oF
before leaving for winter break. That nudge was successful and resulted in
setpoint reductions of 1.1oF . Thus it appears that students were still open-
ing and reading emails from our sender at the end of the HERs study period.
That was a period with potentially high cognitive costs for the students (fi-
nals week), but they also knew that they would be leaving for break soon.
Students thus were willing to change their thermostat settings before a pe-
riod with reduced energy demand and when they would not face thermal
discomfort from doing so. Robustness checks further suggest that issues of
statistical power, low variability of our outcome variable, or spillovers are
unlikely to have driven the null results from the main HER intervention.
Collectively, these results have important implications for policymakers
considering behavioral instruments for conservation. HERs may seem at-
tractive in contexts where monetary incentives do not exist, such as when
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tenants do not pay their energy bills. However, to the extent that our results
extrapolate to other non-dormitory residential settings, the social compar-
isons in HERs, alone, may not be effective at reducing energy consumption.
HERs may be effective only when pecuniary motivations exist, or for selected
populations who were already predisposed for energy conservation.
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CHAPTER 3
WHY ARE RENTED DWELLINGS LESS
ENERGY-EFFICIENT? EVIDENCE FROM
A REPRESENTATIVE SAMPLE OF THE
U.S. HOUSING STOCK
Abstract: This paper compares energy-efficient appliance adop-
tion rates across U.S. residential markets. The focus is to ex-
plore variation across tenure modes (rented or owner-occupied
residences). Bivariate probits are used to correct for endogenous
determination of tenure mode and energy efficiency outcomes.
Results suggest that, when compared to renters, homeowners are
significantly more likely to have energy-efficient appliances. The
mechanisms that could be driving those differences are also inves-
tigated. Heterogeneity analyses reveal that rented dwellings are
more likely to have efficient appliances when landlords incur util-
ity payments. Adoption rate differences are also shown to be in-
versely related to energy prices. Those findings are consistent
with a problem of asymmetric information in the housing mar-
ket, typically referred to as the “landlord-tenant problem.” This
paper is also the first to assess how tenancy duration influences
efficiency investments in this context. Results suggest that invest-
ments in rented homes are more likely to occur at later periods of
tenancy, when relations between landlords and tenants might be
better established.
3.1 Introduction
The Energy Information Agency (EIA) estimates that approximately 20.6%
of U.S. energy-related carbon emissions can be attributed to the residential
sector (EIA, 2015a). Space heating, water heating, and air conditioning col-
lectively account for almost 65% of the energy consumption in U.S. homes.
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Other appliances, electronics and lighting account for the remaining 35%
(EIA, 2009). Many engineering estimates from the late 2000s (Chandler and
Brown, 2009; EPRI, 2009; McKinsey & Co, 2009) suggest that improving
fuel and energy efficiency in homes may be cost-effective for carbon abate-
ment, since future energy savings may exceed the upfront installation costs of
new, more efficient technologies. However, recent environmental economics
literature provides evidence that those technologies are being adopted at low
or even sub-optimal rates (for reviews, see: Allcott and Greenstone, 2012;
Gillingham and Palmer, 2014). This disconnect between an optimal and the
current level of energy efficiency investments is often referred to as the energy
efficiency “gap” or “paradox”
Jaffe and Stavins (1994) recognize that the extent of that gap depends on
the definition of optimality being considered by the researcher. For example,
if the social optimum takes into account environmental externalities, then
the gap is likely to be wider. A discussion of optimality is omitted from this
paper, which rather focuses on identifying mechanisms that might be causing
energy efficiency investments to vary across U.S residences. Adoption rates
of a broad set of Energy Star1 (ES) rated appliances are compared, exploit-
ing variations in tenure mode (rented or owner-occupied residences). First,
with data from the 2011 American Housing Survey,2 linear probability mod-
els (LPM) are estimated for ES appliance adoption, controlling for degree of
urbanization, climate, household demographics, and housing amenities and
structure. Second, alternative specifications are used to identify mechanisms
that could be driving heterogeneity in technology adoption rates. Finally,
bivariate probits are estimated, in order to correct for the endogenous deter-
mination of energy efficiency outcomes and tenure mode.
Initial LPM estimates show that rented homes are less likely to have ef-
ficient room air-conditioners (−5.77%), central air conditioners (−8.77%),
dishwashers (−14.7%), refrigerators (−11.54%), electric central heating (−5.37%),
gas central heating (−7.37%), and oil central heating (−7.93%). When com-
pared to estimates from previous literature (Davis, 2012), these results sug-
1Energy Star is a voluntary program established in 1992 by the U.S. Environmental
Protection Agency (EPA). To earn a label that attests high energy efficiency, a product
must be certified by EPA-recognized third-party laboratories (EPA, 2016).
2The AHS is conducted every 2 years by the Department of Housing and Urban De-
velopment (HUD) and the U.S. Census Bureau. It comprises a nationally representative
sample of the U.S. housing stock.
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gest that the gap between rented and owner-occupied units became signifi-
cantly wider between 2005 and 2011. The linear estimates, however, might
be biased due to classic endogeneity: there might be unobserved household
preferences that simultaneously affect both tenure mode and energy efficiency
outcomes.
To attenuate that type of endogeneity, bivariate probit (or biprobit) mod-
els are estimated. Han and Vytlacil (2013) demonstrate that the nonlin-
ear nature of biprobits allows identification of systems in which a binary
variable (e.g. ownership of Energy Star appliances) is regressed on an-
other endogenous binary variable (e.g. tenure mode). Estimation for each
appliance consists of a system of two-equations: one which describes the
adoption of ES appliances, and another which describes tenure mode. The
endogeneity-corrected estimates reveal that linear models overestimate the
effects of tenure mode on energy efficiency. For example, biprobit estimates
suggest that renters are 8.43% less likely than homeowners to have Energy
Star refrigerators. That estimate was closer to 12% with a linear model.
It was also possible to identify a few mechanisms that lead to ES appli-
ance adoption heterogenenity across tenure modes. By exploiting variation
in who pays (landlord or tenant) for the utility bills of rented dwellings, it is
possible to test for the effects of split incentives (“landlord-tenant problem”),
which previous literature has explored in similar contexts (see, for example:
Myers, 2015; Gillingham, Harding, and Rapson, 2012; Levinson and Nie-
mann, 2004). Since landlords often do not pay for utility bills, they have less
incentives to invest in energy efficiency. Biprobit estimates are consistent
with that scenario, indicating that, for some appliances, the adoption gap
between homeowners and renters becomes significantly narrower when land-
lords do pay utility bills. For example, point estimates of the gap drop from
8.43% to 3.55% for refrigerators, and from 7.93% to 1.24% for dishwashers.
To explore further heterogeneity, the effects of tenancy duration3 on ES
appliance adoption are tested for, by estimating alternative LPM specifica-
tions. Even though data on ownership of Energy Star appliances are only
available for the survey year of 2011, the panel structure of the AHS al-
lows the construction of variables that identify how long a given household
has resided in the same unit. Results from regressions with those variables
3Throughout this paper, “tenancy duration” or “household duration” refers to how
long a given household has been occupying the same residential unit.
89
suggest that tenancy duration does not significantly affect homeowners’ de-
cisions to adopt small ES appliances. This is expected, since homeownership
implies no asymmetric information problem. On the other hand, saturations
of small ES appliances are significantly lower for short-duration renters, when
compared to long-duration renters (which have been in the dwelling for more
than 10 years). For large appliances (central AC and heating), the effects
are reversed: renters are unaffected by tenancy duration, but homeowners
are. It could be that homeowners choose to postpone investments in large
appliances due to liquidity constraints right after the purchase of their homes.
Finally, it was possible to assess if ES appliance adoption is heterogeneous
across U.S. census divisions. That is implicitly a test for heterogeneity across
energy prices. It can be shown that saturation differences between renters
and homeowners are smaller in areas with higher energy prices (especially
New England and Middle Atlantic). This suggests that renters in those
areas are more attentive to energy costs, thus demanding dwellings with
more energy-efficient appliances.
Overall, the gap between rented and owner-occupied units is evident. In-
centives for investments in energy efficiency are misaligned especially in the
rental markets. Therefore, it may be more cost-effective to provide energy
efficiency subsidies to renters or landlords, rather than to owner-occupants.
Policies that encourage homeownership might simultaneously address this
issue. Those findings also reinforce the importance of policies, such as appli-
ance labeling, energy consumption audits, and disclosure requirements that
address information asymmetries in rental markets.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: section 3.2 presents the
data and descriptive statistics; in section 3.3, empirical strategy and results
are presented; concluding remarks and policy recommendations are in section
3.4.
3.2 Data and Descriptive Statistics
The American Housing Survey (AHS) comprises a nationally representative
sample of the U.S. housing stock. It includes several variables which were
used as controls in the regression specifications: number of bathrooms, half
bathrooms, bedrooms, and overall rooms in the residence; year or decade
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that the unit was built; age of householder; education level; householder’s
works status; household income; number of family members; indicator for
who pays for the utility bills; year in which the household moved into the
dwelling. Available geographic information includes: broad climate classifica-
tions, based on heating degree days (HDD) and cooling degree days (CDD);4
degree of urbanization (city, suburb, small town, and rural); census division
and state (when available).5
In survey year 2011, a supplemental module of the AHS included questions
to identify if the appliances in the dwellings are rated as Energy Star.6 For
this study, the following appliances were considered: room air conditioner,
dishwasher, clothes washer, clothes dryer, refrigerator, central air condition-
ing, central electric heating, central gas heating, and central oil heating.7
That is a comprehensive list of appliances for which it is possible to identify
Energy Star rating.8 The full survey collected data for 186, 448 residences.
However, this study restricts the sample to residences that were not vacant
during the survey year of 2011, and for which it is possible to identify tenancy
(otherwise, crucial variables of interest would be lacking). The final sample
for this study therefore consists of 132, 995 housing units.
Descriptive statistics of the control variables were computed using the 2011
AHS data. Table 3.1 presents differences in means of the demographic vari-
ables for owner-occupied units, tenant-pay and landlord-pay rented units.
The p-values indicate if the differences in means are statistically significant
4Climates are identified as: Coldest (more than 7,001 HDD and less than 2,000 CDD),
Cold (5,500-7,000 HDD and less than 2,000 CDD), Cool (4,000-5,499 HDD and less than
2,000 CDD), Mild (less than 4,000 HDD and less than 2,000 CDD), Mixed (2,000-3,999
HDD and more than 2,000 CDD), and Hot (less than 2,000 HDD and more than 2,000
CDD).
5Due to confidentiality, states are not identified for some housing units in the dataset.
6Householders are first asked if the unit has a particular appliance. Then they are
asked if the appliance is Energy Star rated. Responses include ‘Yes’, ‘No’ and ‘Do not
know’.
7“Central heating” refers to large appliances intended to heat all the rooms of a
dwelling. Over 96% of the survey respondents reported using those as their main heating
equipment. The remaining 4% reported using portable or single-room heaters. Also, less
than 0.5% of the sample reported using any supplemental (secondary) heating equipment.
Water heaters (although widespread) have been omitted from this study, since the survey
does not identify the efficiency rating for those appliances
8Almost all the appliances for which it is possible to identify Energy Star rating were
used. Due to sparsity of the data, the only omitted appliances were built-in trash com-
pactors (less than 4% of sample), and heating equipment that do not use gas, electricity
or oil (less than 2% of sample).
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(based on Welch t-tests). It is clear that the groups are unbalanced in terms
of demographics. For example, compared to renters, homeowners on average
have higher income, are older, and are more likely to be white. Furthermore,
tenant-pay dwellings are in general occupied by lower income families than
landlord-pay dwellings. Table 3.2 also reveals significant imbalance, by com-
paring means for geographic and climactic variables. Owner-occupied homes
tend to be in suburban areas, while rented homes are more likely to be closer
to city centers, especially when under a tenant-pay regime.
Table 3.1: Mean comparisons for demographic variables
Difference in means Difference in means
Householder’s Characteristics (Rented) - (Owner-occupied) P-value of diff. (Tenant-pay) - (Landlord-pay) P-value of diff.
Income ($1000 per year) -44.391 0.000 -14.367 0.000
Has job 0.56% 0.042 -19.65% 0.000
Family size -0.237 0.000 -0.602 0.000
Age -10.522 0.000 8.075 0.000
Has child -0.69% 0.006 -17.25% 0.000
White -16.13% 0.000 0.22% 0.677
Black 12.95% 0.000 0.02% 0.960
Indigenous 0.67% 0.000 -0.13% 0.286
Asian 1.45% 0.000 0.08% 0.784
Other race 1.07% 0.000 -0.19% 0.246
Less than high-school 9.35% 0.000 6.94% 0.000
Completed high-school 3.47% 0.000 1.55% 0.002
Incomplete college 3.17% 0.000 -2.05% 0.000
Completed college -8.46% 0.000 -5.41% 0.000
Graduate degree -7.53% 0.000 -1.03% 0.000
Sample Size 132,995 50,574
Notes: Means calculated with the 2011 American Housing Survey. P-values of differences in means are based on Welch t-tests.
Table 3.2: Mean comparisons for geographic variables
Difference in means Difference in means
Geographic Variables (Rented) - (Owner-occupied) P-value of diff. (Tenant-pay) - (Landlord-pay) P-value of diff.
Urban 20.85% 0.000 12.27% 0.000
Suburban -13.69% 0.000 -12.31% 0.000
Small town 0.72% 0.000 1.24% 0.000
Rural -7.88% 0.000 -1.20% 0.000
Coldest Climate -0.37% 0.010 4.76% 0.000
Cold Climate -1.98% 0.000 16.41% 0.000
Cool Climate -1.13% 0.000 3.17% 0.000
Mild Climate 3.83% 0.000 -15.05% 0.000
Mixed Climate -0.35% 0.016 -4.28% 0.000
Hot Climate 0.00% 0.986 -5.01% 0.000
New England 0.57% 0.000 8.99% 0.000
Middle Atlantic 0.10% 0.513 14.07% 0.000
East North Central -2.11% 0.000 2.80% 0.000
West North Central -1.39% 0.000 0.09% 0.734
South Atlantic and East South Central -0.24% 0.127 -4.67% 0.000
West South Central -3.50% 0.000 -7.42% 0.000
Mountain and Pacific 6.57% 0.000 -13.85% 0.000
Sample Size 132,995 50,574
Notes: Means calculated with the 2011 American Housing Survey. P-values of differences in means are based on Welch t-tests.
Table 3.3 presents mean comparisons for variables related to housing ameni-
ties and structure. It can be noted that homeowners are more likely to live
in single-unit buildings (houses), with large square footage. Renters, on the
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other hand, are more likely to live in smaller apartments that have less rooms.
The variables for decade built provide evidence that older constructions are
more likely to be put up for rental.
Table 3.3: Mean comparisons for housing characteristics
Difference in means Difference in means
Housing Characteristics (Rented) - (Owner-occupied) P-value of diff. (Tenant-pay) - (Landlord-pay) P-value of diff.
Built before 1950 -0.56% 0.021 5.79% 0.000
Built in 1950s -1.44% 0.000 -0.41% 0.199
Built in 1960s 1.96% 0.000 2.49% 0.000
Built in 1970s 5.54% 0.000 6.20% 0.000
Built in 1980s 2.84% 0.000 -4.66% 0.000
Built in 1990s -3.47% 0.000 -3.78% 0.000
Built in 2000s -4.62% 0.000 -5.45% 0.000
Built in 2010s -0.25% 0.000 -0.17% 0.002
Single-unit building -57.33% 0.000 -24.55% 0.000
Apartment building 60.18% 0.000 25.18% 0.000
Mobile home -2.85% 0.000 -0.63% 0.000
Square footage -1156.638 0.000 -332.524 0.000
# Bedrooms -1.160 0.000 -0.585 0.000
# Half-bathrooms -0.284 0.000 -0.085 0.000
# Bathrooms -0.599 0.000 -0.238 0.000
# Overall rooms -2.077 0.000 -0.884 0.000
Sample Size 132,995 50,574
Notes: Means calculated with the 2011 American Housing Survey. P-values of differences in means are based on Welch
t-tests.
Figure 3.1 illustrates densities for the years in which tenants moved into
their dwellings. The graph suggests that homeowners tend to stay in the
same unit for longer, since almost 50% had moved in before the year 2000.
On the other hand, close so 40% of renters moved into their dwelling during
the survey year 2011 or 2010. Only about 10% of renters had been living in
the same unit since before the year 2000.
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Figure 3.1: Density for year in which tenant moved into the dwelling
Finally, Table 3.4 compares appliance and ES appliance saturations be-
tween owner-occupied and rented units. Rented units only have higher
saturations of standard room air-conditioners and standard electric heat-
ing, which are typically more common in apartment buildings. It can also
be noted that renters have lower saturations of all energy-efficient appli-
ances. However, ES appliance saturation differences between landlord-pay
and tenant-pay dwellings are not so straightforward, and should be better
analyzed under a regression framework.
Demographic and housing structure imbalance between renters/homeowners,
and landlord-pay/tenant-pay dwellings will be controlled for in the follow-
ing analysis section, by including all the variables from Tables 3.1-3.3 in the
regression specifications. With that, it will be possible to more rigorously
test for the mechanisms that could be driving differences in ES appliance
saturations across U.S. homes. Variation in the following factors will be
explored: tenancy modes, utility payment regimes, tenancy duration, and
finally geographic location (which implies variation in energy prices).
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Table 3.4: Appliance and ES Appliance Adoption Comparisons, Across
Tenure Modes and Utility Payment Regimes
Difference in adoption % Difference in adoption %
(Rented) - (Owner-occupied) P-value of diff. (Tenant-pay) - (Landlord-pay) P-value of diff.
Room AC 10.11% 0.000 18.06% 0.000
ES Room AC -8.70% 0.000 4.53% 0.000
Central AC -20.97% 0.000 -20.63% 0.000
ES Central AC -16.47% 0.000 -0.90% 0.144
Dishwasher -28.37% 0.000 -29.36% 0.000
ES Dishwasher -21.79% 0.000 -2.96% 0.000
Clothes Washer -43.87% 0.000 -35.07% 0.000
ES Clothes Washer -22.11% 0.000 -6.84% 0.000
Clothes Dryer -45.33% 0.000 -36.04% 0.000
ES Clothes Dryer -5.58% 0.000 -3.84% 0.000
Refrigerator -0.18% 0.000 -0.49% 0.000
ES Refrigerator -24.26% 0.000 -1.05% 0.045
Electric Central Heating 19.70% 0.000 -19.21% 0.000
ES Electric Central Heating -12.17% 0.000 0.66% 0.243
Gas Central Heating -13.02% 0.000 7.35% 0.000
ES Gas Central Heating -16.27% 0.000 -2.90% 0.000
Oil Central Heating -0.69% 0.000 11.87% 0.000
ES Oil Central Heating -12.71% 0.000 -3.83% 0.024
Sample Size 132,995 50,577
Notes: Adoption rates were calculated with the 2011 American Housing Survey. To compare adoption rates of Energy Star
appliances, the samples were first restricted to homes that have the respective appliances (in standard or ES form). P-values of
differences in means are based on Welch t-tests.
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3.3 Empirical Strategy and Results
3.3.1 Heterogeneity by tenancy modes and utility payment
regimes
Section 3.2 reveals that renters and homeowners are significantly disparate in
terms of demographic and housing characteristics, which could be correlated
with adoption of efficient appliances. A robust analysis of adoption should,
therefore, control for those variables. Furthermore, previous literature sug-
gests that rental units face a problem of split incentives (“landlord-tenant
problem”), which can translate into sub-optimal energy efficiency decisions
(Gillingham, Harding, and Rapson, 2012). It is hypothesized that, especially
when tenants pay utility bills, landlords have little incentive to invest in ef-
ficiency,9 because they are unlikely to accrue the energy savings. Efficiency
investments might not always translate into higher rents, due to information
asymmetries that limit prospective tenants’ abilities to fully compare rental
units in the market (Myers, 2015). Levinson and Niemann (2004) argue that,
even when rents are not adjusted to fully offset utility costs, it may still be
beneficial for landlords to incur utility payments when building retrofits for
apartment sub-metering are expensive, or when efficiency investments cannot
be appropriately signalled to the renters.
To formally test if split-incentives can lead to differences in adoption rates
of Energy Star appliances, the following latent variable model can be consid-
ered:
y∗i = β0 + β1[rented]i + β2[lpu]i + γXi + εi (3.1)
where y∗i is a latent variable that determines if residential unit i adopts either
a standard appliance, or an Energy Star appliance; [rented]i is an indicator
variable equal to one if the unit is rented, and equal to zero if the unit is
owner-occupied; [lpu]i is an indicator equal to one if the unit is under a
landlord-pay regime, and equal to zero otherwise; Xi is a vector including
a constant and controls; and εi is an idiosyncratic error term. Note that y
∗
i
may not be directly observable. Rather, the following indicator variable, yi,
9Depending on the appliance, efficiency investments can be substantial. Table C.2 from
Appendix C shows that the price premium for Energy Star rating can range from $50 (for
Clothes Washers), to over $2,000 (for Central AC).
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can be observed:
yi =
0, if y∗i < 01, if y∗i ≥ 0
where adoption of the ES appliance is indicated by yi = 1, and adoption of
the standard appliance is indicated by yi = 0. A linear probability model
(LPM) can be constructed by replacing y∗i by the indicator yi in equation
(3.1). Letting Z denote the vector of all covariates included in the model, and
assuming that no functional relation exists between any covariates, the coef-
ficients of interest for this research can be written as: β1 =
∂P (y = 1|Z)
∂[rented]
and
β2 =
∂P (y = 1|Z)
∂[lpu]
. The coefficient β1 compares rented and owner-occupied
units in terms of probabilities of having a given Energy Star appliance, hold-
ing all other factors fixed. Coefficient β2 captures heterogeneity of those
probabilities for when landlords, rather than tenants, pay the utility bills.
Using data from the 2011 AHS, the above model was estimated for 6
types of electric appliances and 3 types of central heating equipment. For
all the regressions throughout this paper, the samples were restricted to
only residences that have the respective appliance, either in standard form,
or rated as Energy Star. Non-adoption whatsoever of the appliances is,
therefore, out of the scope of this research.
Table 3.5 reports β1 and β2 LPM estimates for small appliances, while
table 3.6 reports estimates for large appliances. All regressions control for
the covariates presented in Tables 3.1 and 3.2: household demographics,
such as income, education, work status of householder, household size, age
of householder, if householder has children, and if householder is non-white;
degree of urbanization (city, suburb, small town, and rural); type of climate
(based on degree days); census division and state (when available). Specifica-
tions marked with a ‘b’ (second column of each appliance), report estimates
that also control for housing characteristics presented in Table 3.3: decade
built, housing structure (single-family unit, apartment unit, or mobile home),
square footage, and number of bedrooms, half-bathrooms, bathrooms, and
overall rooms. All of the control variables are flexibly (indicator variables for
each category) included in the regressions. For example, household size (hh-
size) is accounted for with one indicator for hhsize=1, another for hhsize=2,
and so on.
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The β1 estimates from specifications in Tables 3.5 and 3.6 are generally
negative and statistically significant (with the exception of ES Clothes Wash-
ers and Dryers),10 indicating that renters are less likely to have the energy-
efficient appliances. For the specifications without housing controls, the ef-
fects are particularly strong for ES dishwashers (−16.09%) and ES refrigera-
tors (−14.4%). Estimates from similar specifications from previous literature
(Davis, 2012) were only −9.5% for ES dishwashers and −6.7% for ES refriger-
ators, suggesting that the gap between rented and owner-occupied residences
may have become wider between 2005 and 2011 (Davis (2012) uses 2005 data,
while this paper uses 2011 data). For Clothes Washers, Refrigerators, Cen-
tral AC, Electric Heating, and Oil Heating, the β2 estimates for the LPMs
are statistically significant, and so there is evidence of attenuation of the gap
when landlords pay the utility bills for rented homes.
It is reasonable to expect, however, that differences in housing character-
istics might bias LPM estimates. Housing amenities could even affect tenure
mode and energy efficiency outcomes simultaneously. For example, owner-
occupied homes are more likely to have bigger rooms, and so they might
require more potent air conditioners, which in turn could encourage effi-
ciency investments. The second column for each appliance includes housing
controls, to attenuate those types of biases. After including housing controls,
β1 point estimates become less negative. For example, for refrigerators, the
estimates increased from −14.5% to −11.54%, and for Gas Heating they
increased from 10.68% to 7.37%. Most of the β2 estimates are no longer
statistically significant after including the housing controls, with the excep-
tion of ES Oil Heating. For that appliance, β2 remains significantly positive,
which indicates attenuation of the landlord-tenant problem when landlords
pay the utility bills.
As a robustness check, probit models are estimated, also accounting for
housing attributes.11 Table 3.7 reports average marginal effects analogous
10In some cases, clothes washers and dryers may be combined in the same appliance.
The AHS survey does not identify that. It is reasonable to assume, however, that clothes
washers and dryers are complement goods, such that most residents would either have
both, or none. Table C.1 from Appendix C presents regressions which pool those appliances
(sample restricted to homes that have both).
11Convergence was not achieved for probit models with flexible controls. Income, family
size, householder’s age, unit’s square footage and number of rooms were thus included as
continuous control variables for the probit models. That reduces the number of parameters
to be estimated, and facilitates convergence.
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to the β1 and β2 LPM estimates. The probit marginal effects are generally
statistically indistinguishable from the LPM point estimates. Results are
therefore robust across distributional assumptions for single equation model
specifications.
The estimates presented in this subsection also do not significantly differ
between small and large appliances, which is surprising because larger appli-
ances tend to also have longer payback periods (McKinsey & Co, 2009). The
following subsection exploits heterogeneity in tenancy duration to provide
insight about other mechanisms that could discourage investments in energy
efficiency.
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3.3.2 Heterogeneity by Tenancy Duration
Assuming that energy efficiency is a measure of residential quality, some
literature in urban economics provides insight about how tenancy dura-
tion could affect technology adoption. A dynamic optimization model from
(Sweeney, 1974), for example, shows that the quality of owner-occupied resi-
dences tends to be higher than that of rented residences, because homeowners
are more likely than landlords to engage in housing maintenance. One could
argue that landlords are discouraged to invest in maintenance because they
expect carelessness from tenants. Homeowners, on the other hand, might
engage in upkeep more often because they face high moving costs, such as
broker and legal fees, transfer taxes, lengthy search processes when trying
to buy, and risks of bearing housing costs while unable to sell (Haurin and
Gill, 2001; Montgomery, 1992; Potepan, 1989). Rather than moving out and
facing those costs, homeowners might prefer to stay longer and invest more
in a given residence. That also implies that owner-occupied units tend to
have longer tenancy duration than rented units.
Halket and Custoza (2015) show, with an equilibrium sorting model, that
expected tenancy duration is a key determinant of the quality of residences,
especially because short-duration renters (which will not stay for long in the
unit) are associated with higher search costs for landlords. Their model sug-
gests that uncertainty and asymmetric information about expected tenancy
duration can produce distortions in the rental markets, in which high-quality
residences may be underprovided. Home-ownership can resolve that problem
of asymmetric information, causing owner-occupied homes to be of higher-
quality, and more attractive to long-duration households. That produces a
separating equilibrium, in which short-duration households are more likely to
be renters, while long-duration households are more likely to be homeowners
(Figure 1 provides evidence of that for the AHS sample).
Assuming that investments in newer, more efficient appliances can essen-
tially be considered as investments in unit quality, then it is reasonable to
expect that efficiency investments will be affected by tenancy duration. It is
possible to test for that, by estimating the effects of variables that identify
the year in which tenants moved into their dwellings. The following linear
103
probability models can be estimated:
yi = β1[rented]i + α
t
1[Moved in year t]i+
αt2[rented]i × [Moved in year t]i + γXi + εi (3.2)
where yi is an indicator variable equal to one if housing unit i’s appliance
is Energy Star, and equal to zero if it is standard; [rented]i is an indicator
variable equal to one if the unit is rented, and zero if it is owner-occupied;
[lpu]i is an indicator equal to one if the unit is under a landlord-pay regime,
and zero otherwise; [Moved in year t]i is equal to one if household i moved
into the unit in year t; Xi is a vector including a constant and control variables
(full set of controls, including housing attributes); and εi is an idiosyncratic
error term.
For each appliance, equation (3.2) was estimated through Ordinary Least
Squares (OLS), using data from the 2011 AHS. Figures 3.2 through 3.10
present estimates of the effects of tenancy duration on adoption of efficient
appliances. For homeowners, the effects for having moved in year t are cap-
tured by αt1 from equation (3.2). The effects for being a renter and having
moved in year t are captured by (β1 +α
t
1 +α
t
2). Note that, for all graphs, the
omitted comparison group are homeowners who moved into their dwelling in
2011. The figures show point estimates, as well as 95% confidence intervals
(based on standard errors clustered by census division).
Results suggest that duration does not significantly affect homeowners’
investments in small ES appliances (Figures 3.2 through 3.6). That means
that recently purchased homes (short-duration) are, on average, at least as
energy-efficient as homes that were purchased a long time before 2011 (long-
duration). That might indicate that homeowners buy the small appliances
around the time that they move into the home. For renters, on the other
hand, duration has a positive effect (estimates become less negative) on adop-
tion of small ES appliances. The estimates for year 2011 are generally lower
than those for “2000 or Before.” That means that long-term rentals are more
likely to have those ES appliances. Long-duration renters may have chosen
to move into units that were already efficient to begin with, or they may have
invested in efficiency during their occupancy. Alternatively, landlords may
have felt more encouraged to invest in efficiency once they learned that the
tenants were likely to stay in the unit for longer periods. A long duration
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rental could be a sign that both the landlord and the tenant abide by con-
tracts, payments or maintenance, all of which may be reflected in the overall
quality of the residential unit.
Looking at larger appliances (Figures 3.7 through 3.10), the effects seem
to be reversed. Duration positively affects homeowners, but negatively af-
fects renters. This is especially clear when comparing Figures 3.6 and 3.7,
which reveals that long-duration homeowners are more likely to have energy-
efficient central air-conditioning, while the effects for room air-conditioners
are null. Similar patterns can be noted for electric heating or gas heating.
This could be because of liquidity constraints that discourage homeowners
to make costly improvements right after buying a home.12 The large invest-
ments may therefore be deferred to later periods of tenancy.
Figure 3.2: Estimates for
Refrigerators
Figure 3.3: Estimates for Clothes
Washers
Figure 3.4: Estimates for Clothes
Dryers
Figure 3.5: Estimates for
Dishwashers
12As shown in Table C.2 from Appendix C, the price premium for large ES appliances
is usually much higher than that for smaller appliances.
105
Figure 3.6: Estimates for Room AC
Figure 3.7: Estimates for Central
AC
Figure 3.8: Estimates for Central
Electric Heat
Figure 3.9: Estimates for Central
Oil Heat
Figure 3.10: Estimates for Central
Gas Heat
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3.3.3 Heterogeneity by Energy Prices
The American Housing Survey does not collect specific energy prices paid by
each household. However, by looking at heterogeneity of effects by census
division, it is possible to implicitly assess heterogeneity by energy prices.
In this subsection, estimates from the following regression specification are
presented:
yi = β
d
1 [rented]i × [Census Division d]i + γXi + εi (3.3)
where yi is an indicator variable equal to one if housing unit i’s appliance
is Energy Star, and equal to zero if it is standard; [rented]i is an indicator
variable equal to one if the unit is rented, and zero if it is owner-occupied;
[Census Division d]i is an indicator equal to one if the unit is in Census
Division d; Xi is a vector including a constant and control variables (full
set of controls, including housing attributes); and εi is an idiosyncratic error
term.
The coefficients βd1 capture ES appliance saturation differences between
renters and homeowners, across each of the following census divisions: New
England; Middle Atlantic; Midwest; West North Central; South Atlantic and
East South Central; West South Central; Mountain and Pacific.13
Figure 3.11 plots the estimated percentage saturation differences between
renters and homeowners, for each census division, and for a regression with
adoption of ES refrigerators as the dependent variable. The same figure
also plots population weighted average electricity prices by census division.14
Figure 3.12 is analogous to Figure 3.11, but for a regressions on ES gas
heating, and plotting average natural gas prices.15
Both plots are suggestive of an inverse relationship between the estimated
effect sizes and energy prices. Therefore, saturation differences across home-
owners and renters are smaller when energy prices are higher. The higher
prices might increase the attentiveness of renters to a home’s energy consump-
tion, which can then get translated to higher demand for efficient homes, even
in the rental market.
13Note that some census divisions are combined, since that is how they are reported
within the 2011 American Housing Survey.
14Electricity prices were obtained from (EIA, 2011a), and population estimates were
obtained from (US Census Bureau, 2011).
15Natural gas prices were obtained from (EIA, 2011b).
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Figure 3.11: Average electricity prices, and effect sizes for ES refrigerators,
by census division
Figure 3.12: Average natural gas prices, and effect sizes for ES gas heating,
by census division
3.3.4 Bivariate Probit Estimation
It is reasonable to expect unobservable preferences to be correlated both
with investments in efficiency and with tenure mode. For example, environ-
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mentally concerned households may prefer to own a residence, rather than
rent it, because ownership would give them more flexibility for retrofits and
changes that they may want to make to the home. An endowment effect
may also encourage households to invest more in residences that they own.
In any case, those unobservable factors could cause the error term (εi) from
equations (3.1) and (3.2), from previous sections, to be correlated with yi
and [rented]i. LPM or probit estimates of those equations could therefore be
biased.
As an attempt to attenuate those potential biases, bivariate probit models
were estimated. Biprobits were introduced by (Heckman, 1978) and are
now commonly used in applied economics (e.g. Bhattacharya, Goldman, and
McCaffrey, 2006; Evans and Schwab, 1995; Goldman et al., 2001; Neal, 1997)
for estimation of simultaneous equation models for latent variables. For the
context of this research, the following model is proposed:
y∗i = δ1[rented]i + γ1X1i + u1i (3.4)
[rented]∗i = γ2X2i + u2i (3.5)
where y∗i is a latent variable that determines if residence i has an Energy
Star or a standard appliance; [rented]∗i is a latent variable that determines
tenure mode; Z = (X1,X2) are vectors of exogenous control variables (which
could include the full set of controls described in the previous sections);
u = (u1, u2) are error terms with a bivariate normal distribution, assumed
to be independent of Z. The latent variables y∗i and [rented]
∗
i can be proxied
by indicators, as described in the previous subsections.
Parameters from equations (3.4) and (3.5) can be estimated simultane-
ously through maximum likelihood, which requires the construction of a log-
likelihood function. To obtain the likelihood function, the following joint is
derived:
f(y|[rented],Z)f([rented]|Z).
Note that the joint density is unchanged regardless of whether [rented] is
included as a control in equation (3.4), because construction of f(y|[rented],Z)
already requires conditioning on [rented]. That particular feature implies
that biprobits can be used to identify the parameters in equations (3.4) and
(3.5), even if equation (3.4) includes [rented] as an endogenous explanatory
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variable (Wooldridge, 2010).
Han and Vytlacil (2013) demonstrate that the nonlinear nature of the pro-
bits allows for identification in systems of the above form. They show that
if control vectors are the same for both equations (i.e. X1 = X2), then ex-
clusion restrictions are not necessary for identification. Through maximum
likelihood, the parameters from equations (3.4) and (3.5) above were esti-
mated, for 6 types electric appliances and 2 types of heating equipment.16
Using the biprobit estimates of marginal probabilities of adoption, it was
possible to construct Table 3.8 below, which reports average marginal effects
analogous to β1 =
∂P (y = 1|Z)
∂[rented]
and β2 =
∂P (y = 1|Z)
∂[lpu]
from the previous
sections. The regressions control for the variables presented in Tables 3.1-3.3.
The endogeneity-corrected estimates of the effect of renting are negative
and statistically significant for most appliances (with the exception of Room
ACs, and Clothes Dryers), again indicating that rented units are less likely
to have the ES appliances. For some of those, the biprobits produced weaker
effects than linear models (Room ACs, Dishwashers, and Refrigerators). If
the distributional assumptions of the biprobits are a good fit for the true re-
lationship between variables, then the linear models were overestimating the
effects of renting in adoption of those ES appliances. On the other hand, lin-
ear models were underestimating the effects for Central ACs, Clothes Wash-
ers, and Gas Heating. Those results attest the non-trivial direction of linear
model biases in this context. Nevertheless, the effects remain substantial
after correcting for endogeneity biases.
Biprobit estimates also indicate that utility payment regimes have a sig-
nificant effect on the adoption of some ES appliances. Average marginal
effects are positive and statistically significant for Dishwahsers, Refrigera-
tors, Central AC, and Electric Heating. Landlord-pay units are therefore
more likely, compared to tenant-pay units, to have those appliances. The
difference in saturation between those two groups could range from 6.69 per-
centage points, for the case of ES clothes washers, to 2.97 percentage points,
for ES central AC. These results are consistent with hypotheses regarding
the landlord-tenant problem (Gillingham, Harding, and Rapson, 2012; My-
ers, 2015).
16Results for ES Oil Heating are omitted, because convergence was not achieved for that
appliance.
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3.4 Conclusions
This paper has assessed the effects of tenure mode and utility payment
regimes on energy efficiency outcomes in US residences. Estimates indicate
that rented residences, compared to owner-occupied residences, are less likely
to have Energy Star rated central air conditioners, dishwashers, clothes wash-
ers, refrigerators, and heating equipment. When compared to (Davis, 2012),
updated estimates form this study suggest that the gap between owner-
occupied and rented units has become wider. For example, the preferred
specification from (Davis, 2012) (for refrigerators) produced a point estimate
of −6.7%, while estimates from this study are closer to −14.4%. Those ef-
fects are significantly attenuated when housing attributes, not considered
in (Davis, 2012), are controlled for. Nevertheless, in some cases the effects
remain strong (e.g. −11.6% for ES refrigerators, and −14.7% for ES dish-
washers). There is also evidence of attenuation of those effects (for dishwash-
ers, refrigerators, and electric heating) when landlords pay the utility bills
of rented dwellings. That is consistent with hypotheses from (Myers, 2015;
Gillingham, Harding, and Rapson, 2012), about split incentives in residential
rental markets.
Heterogeneity by energy prices is assessed, by looking at how effects vary
across US census divisions. That analysis reveals an inverse relationship be-
tween energy prices and adoption of Energy Star appliances. Residents from
regions with higher energy prices are more likely to adopt efficient appliances.
Finally, this paper is also the first to investigate if energy efficiency outcomes
are heterogeneous by tenancy duration. Results indicate that homeowners
are more likely to invest in efficiency around the time of purchase of the res-
idence, rather than at later time periods. On the other hand, investments in
rented homes occur in later periods of tenancy, when the relations between
landlords and tenants are already well established. Those results are consis-
tent with hypotheses derived from the urban economics literature: informa-
tion asymmetries with respect to tenancy duration cause under-investments
in rented units, but not in owner-occupied units.
Collectively, results from this study reinforce the importance of policies
that can encourage more adoption of efficient appliances in rented dwellings.
It seems that rented units are falling behind in terms of investments in energy
efficiency. This can be a problem especially for low-income renter families,
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which might face heavier burdens in terms of utility costs. It can be argued
that those families are also in a position of low bargaining power (compared
to their landlords), due to less access to information (about possibilities of
efficiency investments) and lower education levels. With more complex con-
tract structures (which imply adjustments to rents, for example), it may
be possible to make arrangements that are beneficial both to landlords and
tenants, such that both can share the benefits of efficiency investments. How-
ever, the short-duration nature of some rental contracts may be a barrier,
given that some efficiency investments have relatively long payback periods.
It may be more cost-effective to target educational campaigns, appliance
rebate programs or retrofit subsidies to rental markets, given that rental
dwellings tend to contain older and less efficient appliances. However, those
programs also need to take into account the well-being of renters, rather
than landlords. Energy audit and disclosure requirement policies can po-
tentially attenuate information asymmetries that exist in residential mar-
kets, empowering tenants to demand better upkeep from their landlords.
For example, Austin’s Energy Conservation Audit and Disclosure Ordinance
(ECAD) establishes clear regulation in terms of mandatory energy audits,
as well as mandatory disclosure of results. Nevertheless, the debate about
gentrification is relevant in this context, since intensive quality and efficiency
improvements to certain areas may drastically increase rental prices, which
may become prohibitive for lower-income families.
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APPENDIX A
SUPPLEMENTARY MATERIAL FOR
CHAPTER 1
A.1 Machine Learning Model Tuning and Diagnostics
The machine learning model is trained only with data that would be avail-
able prior to weatherization, namely: pre-treatment billing data, energy au-
dit information, household demographics, and weather variation. Specifi-
cally, I include the following variables: energy usage in MMBtu (outcome),
heating degree days (base 60, and 65), cooling degree days (base 75), min.
outdoor temperature, max. outdoor temperature, precipitation, floor area
(square feet), family size, number of windows, number of stories, number
of bedrooms, vintage, county indicator, building shielding class (measure of
shielding provided by structures surrounding home), pre-treatment blower
door test (CFM50), main heating system type, main heating system capac-
ity (Btu), attic R-value, household income, indicators for householder’s race,
presence of disable occupant, presence of children, presence of elderly, home
priority rank, audit date (month, year, and day), program year of audit,
month of year, year of sample, number of days in billing cycle, monthly aver-
age natural gas prices, and monthly average electricity prices. The outcome
(natural gas usage) varies by home and by month of sample (billing period).
Weather also varies by month of sample, while information collected during
WAP audit/applicaiton varies only across homes.
I supply the above variables to a machine learning algorithm called XG-
Boost, which is a computationally fast implementation of gradient boosted
trees, developed by (Chen and Guestrin, 2016). The concept of boosted
trees involves iteratively combining weak predictive trees to form an ensem-
ble. More weights are given to the trees with better predictive accuracy.
By default, the algorithm uses mean squared errors (MSE) as a measure of
accuracy. Each tree is constructed with a fraction of the provided sample,
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and considering a different set of the variables described above. With this
algorithm, a researcher can therefore be agnostic in terms of which variables
to include for prediction, as well as functional forms. It is also important
to note that regression trees automatically consider variable interactions and
binning. As the tree “depth” increases, interactions become more complex.
With more tree “branches,” I allow for more flexibility in how each variable
is included.
To increase predictive accuracy of machine learning models, it is common
practice to “tune” the (hyper)parameters that control factors such as max-
imum tree depth. The following section describes the configurations that I
considered for the model.
A.1.1 Hyperparameter Tuning
Prior to settling on a model that performs well in terms of predictions, I
perform hyperparameter tuning via 5-fold cross-validation. This was im-
plemented through the “SuperLearner” package in R (Polley et al., 2018).
Sample splits for the validation folds are random.1 I consider the variations
to following XGBoost hyperparameters:
• Number of trees/iterations: determines the total number of models of
which the ensemble XGBoost is constituted. (either 1000 or 2000)
• Maximum tree depth: correlated with the complexity of the model and
variable interactions. (either 20 or 30)
• Shrinkage/step-size/learning-rate/eta: a rate between 0 and 1, that
determines the contribution of each new tree to the ensemble. Lower
values are more conservative and prevent overfitting. (either 0.05 or
0.5)
1In panel data settings one may consider “vertical” or “horizontal” cross-validation.
For the setting in this paper, vertical CV implies stratifying sample splits by home, while
horizontal CV means splitting across time. I recommend the latter. Stratification can lead
to overfitting the model for homes that are in the training set, such that accuracy will be
lower in the validation set (constituted of completely “unseen” homes). However, for this
paper, “out-of-sample” is defined as an unseen set of dates (as opposed to homes), such
less biased prediction errors can be obtained by splitting across time. Athey et al. (2019)
provide a more complete discussion of vertical versus horizontal cross-validation.
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• Minimum observations per node: correlated with the frequency of
branch splits, which also determines the sizes of bins considered for
each variable. Smaller nodes imply more flexible models, but may also
lead to overfitting. (set at 30)
Other XGBoost hyperparameters were set at their defaults. Therefore, I
test a total of 8 hyperparameter configurations. Note that I do not necessar-
ily have to pick a single one of those configurations as our model of choice.
I can consider an ensemble of those, which has even higher predictive accu-
racy. The SuperLearner package automatically builds an ensemble, giving
higher weights (base on non-negative least squares) to the best performing
configurations. The following Table A.1 presents performance diagnostics
and weights for each hyperparameter combination.
Table A.1: Results from Hyperparameter Tuning
Model ID Num. Trees (Iterations) Max. Tree Depth Shrinkage Min. Observations per Node Mean Squared Error Ensemble Weight
1 1000 20 0.05 30 14.144 0.475
2 2000 20 0.05 30 14.232 0.000
3 1000 30 0.05 30 14.148 0.466
4 2000 30 0.05 30 14.227 0.000
5 1000 20 0.5 30 17.477 0.000
6 2000 20 0.5 30 17.477 0.057
7 1000 30 0.5 30 17.686 0.000
8 2000 30 0.5 30 17.686 0.003
Results suggest that models with lower learning rate (shrinkage = 0.05)
were generally more accurate. Further, the ensemble seems to favor less
complexity (number of trees = 1000). Note that model IDs 1 and 3 have the
highest weights and constitute 94% of the ensemble.
A.1.2 Prediction Errors - simulations
Figures A.1 and A.2 present the machine learning in-sample and cross-validated
prediction errors (residuals) for the pre-treatment simulated data. Errors are
disaggregated by bins of monthly energy consumption on the horizontal axis.
The model performs extremely well in general, with in-sample residuals gen-
erally not greater than 0.5 MMBtu. The cross validated residuals are also
small, except for months when gas usage is above 30 MMBtu. But for those
cases, errors in percentage point temrs can also be considered small. Further,
the graph also shows that those are sparse regions of the sample.
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In this setting it is also possible to analyze the ML model accuracy to
predict counterfactuals. Results for that assessement are presented in Fig-
ure A.3. That is an event study graph, with time since treatment on the
horizontal axis, and energy usage on the vertical axis. I present actual,
predicted, and simulated energy usage. Note that post-treatment (counter-
factual) predictions align well with the true usage. Further, they follow the
same non-linear paths. The distance between simulated usage and predicted
counterfactuals represents the treatment effects.
Figure A.1: In-Sample Pre-Treatment Residuals (MMBtu) - simulated data
Figure A.2: Cross-Validated Pre-Treatment Residuals (MMBtu) - simulated
data
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Figure A.3: ML Model Accuracy for Predicting Counterfacutals
A.1.3 Prediction Errors - real data
Here I note that in-sample and cross-validated prediction errors with real
data are very similar to those obtained with the simulated data. Figures A.4
and A.5 are for the full sample.
Figure A.4: In-Sample Pre-Treatment Residuals (MMBtu) - real data
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Figure A.5: Cross-Validated Pre-Treatment Residuals (MMBtu) - real data
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The following Figure A.6 also shows that prediction errors are not corre-
lated with any of the covariates that are relevant in this context. Again,
these were produced with real Weatherization Assistance Program data.
Figure A.6: Cross-Validated Pre-Treatment Residuals (MMBtu) By
Covariates
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Figure A.6 (continued): Cross-Validated Pre-Treatment Residuals
(MMBtu) By Covariates
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Figure A.6 (continued): Cross-Validated Pre-Treatment Residuals
(MMBtu) By Covariates
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A.2 Bootstrap Algorithm
For inference with the machine learning estimates, I also need to take into
account that there is uncertainty in the predictive step of the method. It is
reasonable to assume that the predictive model behaves differently depending
on the sample with which it is trained. Chernozhukov, Ferna´ndez-Val, and
Luo (2018) propose bootstrapping may be appropriate in these settings. I
employ a conservative algorithm that uses bootstrapped standard deviations
of the parameters of interest as an approximation for their standard errors.
Point estimates in the paper use the original sample, while standard errors
and confidence bands are based on the bootstrap algorithm described as
follows.
Bootstrap Algorithm: Let N be the total number of observations in the
sample. Let b = 1...B denote a bootstrap iteration. (1) Draw (ω1, ..., ωN),
which is a vector of N nonnegative bootstrap weights attributed to each obser-
vation in the sample. Once those weights are applied to the original sample,
a new bootstrapped sample is constructed. To obtain the weights, employ
stratified (by home) random sampling with replacement, such that Nb ≈ N
(i.e. bootstrap sample should be approximately the same size as the original
sample). (2) Run the machine learning predictive model with the bootstrap
sample and obtain predictions. (3) Transform the predictions (e.g. calculate
averages, run regressions), and return the parameter of interest βb (e.g. WAP
treatment effect). (4) Repeat steps 1 through 3 for total of B bootstrap iter-
ations. (5) Compute the bootstrapped standard error as σ =
∑B
b=1(βb − βˆ)2
B
(i.e. the standard deviation of the parameter of interest across bootstrap
samples). (6) Compute confidence bands around the parameter of interest as
β− = β − 1.96× σ (lower bound), and β+ = β + 1.96× σ (upper bound).
For all the machine learning estimates in this paper, I run 200 bootstrap
iterations to generate confidence intervals. Figure A.9 plots the evolution of
standard deviations (SDs) of the post-treatment (counterfactual) prediction
errors as the number of iterations increases. First, it can be noted that the
variation in SDs becomes negligible after 90 iterations. Further, the trend
seems to be decreasing, such that machine learning estimates could poten-
tially be even more precise with more iterations. In this context, however,
there is a tradeoff between compute time and precision of the estimates.
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Figure A.9: Stability of Bootstrapped Standard Deviations (for
post-treatment prediction errors)
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A.3 Summary Statistics for WAP Sample
Table A.2 presents descriptive statistics for the main variables collected
during the Weatherization Assistance Program application process and pre-
treatment home energy audits. In terms of demographics, it can be noted
that the sample of treated households is constituted primarily of low-income
families (average yearly income around $17,220). They are also mostly mid-
dle aged (∼54 years) homeowners (94%). The variables related to housing
structure reveal that very diverse homes are weatherized by the program:
there is significant variation in floor area, pre-treatment blower door tests,
number of bedrooms, and even vintage.
Figure A.10 represents the histogram of pre-teatment natural gas usage for
homes served by the program. The average usage is around 11 MMBtu, but
with significant variation. Notably, a lot of the distribution is concentrated
at lower levels, likely during summer of warmer months when natural gas is
not needed so much.
Table A.2: WAP Descriptive Statistics
Average Standard Deviation Min Max
Income($/1000) 17.32 10.33 0.00 52.48
N Occupants 2.97 1.73 1.00 9.00
Householder Age 54.83 15.54 22.00 89.00
Female Householder (%) 0.66 0.47 0.00 1.00
Renter (%) 0.06 0.23 0.00 1.00
Seniors 65+ (%) 0.39 0.49 0.00 1.00
Children Under 18 (%) 0.17 0.38 0.00 1.00
Blower Door Pre (CFM50) 3645.46 1662.58 980.00 13662.00
Heating Unit Size (kBTU) 87.10 38.56 0.00 150.00
Floor Area (sqft) 1543.70 600.28 600.00 3774.00
N Bedrooms 4.74 0.74 1.00 5.00
N Windows 16.91 5.73 2.00 26.00
Has Multiple Stories (%) 0.45 0.50 0.00 1.00
Number of Homes 34,497
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Figure A.10: Histogram of Pre-Treatment Energy Usage
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Figure A.11: Histograms for Categories of WAP Spending
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Figure A.11 (cont.): Histograms for Categories of WAP Spending
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A.4 Simulation Results Estimating Parameters in
Energy Space
This section presents simulation results for parameters estimated in energy
space, rather than percent. Results are further discussed in the main text.
Table A.3: Simulated Conditional Average Treatment Effects on the
Treated - Effects Decreasing Over Time - Outcome in Energy Space
(MMBtu)
Outcome: Monthly Energy (MMBtu) Simulated Estimated
Specification: “Ground Truth” Machine Learning TWFE 1 TWFE 2 TWFE 3
Group 1 -1.0500∗∗∗ -1.0390∗∗∗ -1.5459∗∗∗ -1.6286∗∗∗ -1.6401∗∗∗
(0.0044) (0.0297) (0.0333) (0.0292) (0.0294)
Group 2 -1.0576∗∗∗ -1.0534∗∗∗ -1.6114∗∗∗ -1.6688∗∗∗ -1.6779∗∗∗
(0.0043) (0.0280) (0.0338) (0.0296) (0.0299)
Group 3 -1.0544∗∗∗ -1.0910∗∗∗ -1.6190∗∗∗ -1.6871∗∗∗ -1.6911∗∗∗
(0.0043) (0.0274) (0.0343) (0.0300) (0.0304)
Group 4 -1.0541∗∗∗ -1.0594∗∗∗ -1.6197∗∗∗ -1.6714∗∗∗ -1.6857∗∗∗
(0.0042) (0.0301) (0.0338) (0.0294) (0.0296)
Group 5 -1.0499∗∗∗ -1.0565∗∗∗ -1.5677∗∗∗ -1.6242∗∗∗ -1.6383∗∗∗
(0.0043) (0.0310) (0.0332) (0.0287) (0.0288)
Observations 303,494† 303,494† 611,527 611,527 611,527
Controls:
Home FE NA NA Yes No No
Month of Sample FE NA NA Yes Yes No
Home by Calendar Month FE NA NA No Yes Yes
Month of Sample by County FE NA NA No No Yes
Heating and Cooling Degree Days NA NA Yes Yes Yes
Note: This table presents estimates of conditional average treatment effects on the treated (CATT), measured as
natural gas savings. I compare machine learning estimates with the simulated ground truth, and with two-way fixed
effects (TWFE) specifications. The coefficients should be interpreted as monthly natural gas savings (in MMBtu)
attributed to simulated treatment. For these simulations, the effect in the first month after treatment is assumed
to be 15%, decreasing monthly by 0.5 percentage points, down to 2.5% for the 24th month. No controls are used
for the machine learning CATT, which are identified from predicted counterfactuals. For the machine learning
estimates, standard errors (in parentheses) are bootstrapped (200 iterations). For two-way fixed effects, standard
errors are clustered by household. Significance at 1% is indicated by ∗∗∗. The number of observations for ground
truth and machine learning estimates, indicated by †, are smaller because they use the post-treatment sample only,
although the pre-treatment sample was used for building a predictive model.
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Table A.4: Simulated Conditional Average Treatment Effects on the
Treated - Effects Increasing Over Time - Outcome in Energy Space
(MMBtu)
Outcome: Monthly Energy (MMBtu) Simulated Estimated
Specification: “Ground Truth” Machine Learning TWFE 1 TWFE 2 TWFE 3
Group 1 -0.8754∗∗∗ -0.8644∗∗∗ -0.0890∗∗∗ -0.1681∗∗∗ -0.1771∗∗∗
(0.0038) (0.0293) (0.0337) (0.0291) (0.0294)
Group 2 -0.8896∗∗∗ -0.8854∗∗∗ -0.1526∗∗∗ -0.2058∗∗∗ -0.2117∗∗∗
(0.0038) (0.0283) (0.0340) (0.0295) (0.0298)
Group 3 -0.8839∗∗∗ -0.9205∗∗∗ -0.1637∗∗∗ -0.2289∗∗∗ -0.2292∗∗∗
(0.0038) (0.0273) (0.0345) (0.0299) (0.0302)
Group 4 -0.8839∗∗∗ -0.8891∗∗∗ -0.1703∗∗∗ -0.2179∗∗∗ -0.2294∗∗∗
(0.0037) (0.0300) (0.0339) (0.0291) (0.0293)
Group 5 -0.8817∗∗∗ -0.8883∗∗∗ -0.1260∗∗∗ -0.1771∗∗∗ -0.1893∗∗∗
(0.0038) (0.0315) (0.0332) (0.0284) (0.0285)
Observations 303,494† 303,494† 611,527 611,527 611,527
Controls:
Home FE NA NA Yes No No
Month of Sample FE NA NA Yes Yes No
Home by Calendar Month FE NA NA No Yes Yes
Month of Sample by County FE NA NA No No Yes
Heating and Cooling Degree Days NA NA Yes Yes Yes
Note: This table presents estimates of conditional average treatment effects on the treated (CATT), measured as
natural gas savings. I compare machine learning estimates with the simulated ground truth, and with two-way fixed
effects (TWFE) specifications. The coefficients should be interpreted as simulated monthly natural gas savings (in
MMBtu) attributed to treatment. For these simulations, the effect in the first month after treatment is assumed to
be 3.5%, increasing monthly by 0.5 percentage points, up to 16% for the 24th month. No controls are used for the
machine learning CATT, which are identified from predicted counterfactuals. For the machine learning estimates,
standard errors (in parentheses) are bootstrapped (200 iterations). For two-way fixed effects, standard errors are
clustered by household. Significance at 1% is indicated by ∗∗∗. The number of observations for ground truth and
machine learning estimates, indicated by †, are smaller because they use the post-treatment sample only, although
the pre-treatment sample was used for building a predictive model.
133
Table A.5: Simulated Conditional Average Treatment Effects on the
Treated - 5 Random Groups - Outcome in Energy Space (MMBtu)
Outcome: Monthly Energy (MMBtu) Simulated Estimated
Specification: “Ground Truth” Machine Learning TWFE 1 TWFE 2 TWFE 3
Group 1 -0.6257∗∗∗ -0.6130∗∗∗ -0.5294∗∗∗ -0.5810∗∗∗ -0.5917∗∗∗
(0.0041) (0.0298) (0.0343) (0.0294) (0.0297)
Group 2 -0.8435∗∗∗ -0.8377∗∗∗ -0.8064∗∗∗ -0.8337∗∗∗ -0.8424∗∗∗
(0.0040) (0.0283) (0.0346) (0.0300) (0.0303)
Group 3 -1.0500∗∗∗ -1.0847∗∗∗ -1.0189∗∗∗ -1.0670∗∗∗ -1.0711∗∗∗
(0.0040) (0.0272) (0.0354) (0.0306) (0.0310)
Group 4 -1.2588∗∗∗ -1.2621∗∗∗ -1.2257∗∗∗ -1.2520∗∗∗ -1.2686∗∗∗
(0.0039) (0.0296) (0.0347) (0.0298) (0.0300)
Group 5 -1.4641∗∗∗ -1.4690∗∗∗ -1.3875∗∗∗ -1.4214∗∗∗ -1.4398∗∗∗
(0.0040) (0.0306) (0.0343) (0.0294) (0.0295)
Observations 304,427† 304,427† 619,818 619,818 619,818
Controls:
Home FE NA NA Yes No No
Month of Sample FE NA NA Yes Yes No
Home by Calendar Month FE NA NA No Yes Yes
Month of Sample by County FE NA NA No No Yes
Heating and Cooling Degree Days NA NA Yes Yes Yes
Note: This table presents estimates of conditional average treatment effects on the treated (CATT), measured as
natural gas savings. I compare machine learning estimates with the simulated ground truth, and with two-way fixed
effects (TWFE) specifications. The coefficients should be interpreted as monthly natural gas savings (in MMBtu)
attributed to simulated treatment. Here, simulated effects were assumed to vary across 5 random subgroups of the
population (with effects as shown in the “Ground Truth” column). No controls are used for the machine learning
CATT, which is identified from predicted counterfactuals. For the machine learning estimates, standard errors are
bootstrapped (200 iterations). For two-way fixed effects, standard errors are clustered by household. Significance
at 1% is indicated by ∗∗∗. The number of observations for ground truth and machine learning estimates, indicated
by †, are smaller because they use the post-treatment sample only, although the pre-treatment sample was used for
building a predictive model.
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A.5 Parameter Estimates for Unit-Specific Treatment
Effects
The following table presents the parameters used in the simulations that
demonstrate unit-specific treatment effects. The first column shows the true
(simulated) effects, while the second column shows estimated effects accord-
ing to the machine learning approach.
Table A.6: Simulated Conditional Average Treatment Effects on the
Treated - effects decreasing over time plus variation depending on amount
spent on upgrades
Simulated Machine Learning
Base Treatment -0.1500∗∗∗ -0.1427∗∗∗
(0.0000) (0.0051)
Furnace (0-300) -0.0050∗∗∗ -0.0248∗∗∗
(0.0000) (0.0050)
Furnace [300-600) -0.0100∗∗∗ -0.0261∗∗∗
(0.0000) (0.0050)
Furnace [600-900) -0.0150∗∗∗ -0.0238∗∗∗
(0.0000) (0.0061)
Furnace [900-1200) -0.0250∗∗∗ -0.0341∗∗∗
(0.0000) (0.0087)
Furnace [1200-1500) -0.0250∗∗∗ 0.0006
(0.0000) (0.0151)
Furnace [1500-1800) -0.0500∗∗∗ -0.0633∗∗∗
(0.0000) (0.0103)
Furnace [1800-2100) -0.0500∗∗∗ -0.0449∗∗∗
(0.0000) (0.0083)
Furnace [2100-2400) -0.0500∗∗∗ -0.0439∗∗∗
(0.0000) (0.0061)
Furnace [2400-2700) -0.0500∗∗∗ -0.0383∗∗∗
(0.0000) (0.0052)
Furnace [2700-3000) -0.0500∗∗∗ -0.0348∗∗∗
(0.0000) (0.0053)
Furnace ≥3000 -0.0500∗∗∗ -0.0380∗∗∗
(0.0000) (0.0060)
Wall Insulation (0-300) -0.0050∗∗∗ -0.0099
(0.0000) (0.0079)
Wall Insulation [300-600) -0.0100∗∗∗ -0.0211∗
(0.0000) (0.0109)
Wall Insulation [600-900) -0.0150∗∗∗ -0.0043
(0.0000) (0.0085)
Wall Insulation [900-1200) -0.0200∗∗∗ -0.0312∗∗∗
(0.0000) (0.0109)
Wall Insulation [1200-1500) -0.0250∗∗∗ -0.0152
(0.0000) (0.0092)
Wall Insulation [1500-1800) -0.0300∗∗∗ -0.0313∗∗∗
(0.0000) (0.0081)
Wall Insulation [1800-2100) -0.0350∗∗∗ -0.0176∗∗
(0.0000) (0.0081)
Wall Insulation [2100-2400) -0.0400∗∗∗ -0.0180∗∗
(0.0000) (0.0084)
Wall Insulation [2400-2700) -0.0400∗∗∗ -0.0321∗∗∗
(0.0000) (0.0115)
Wall Insulation [2700-3000) -0.0400∗∗∗ -0.0491∗∗∗
(0.0000) (0.0136)
Wall Insulation ≥3000 -0.0400∗∗∗ -0.0395∗∗
(0.0000) (0.0158)
(Continues on next page...)
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Table A.6 (continued): Simulated Conditional Average Treatment Effects
on the Treated - effects decreasing over time plus variation depending on
amount spent on upgrades
Simulated Machine Learning
Months Since Treatment
2 0.0050∗∗∗ 0.0078∗∗∗
(0.0000) (0.0028)
3 0.0100∗∗∗ 0.0084∗∗∗
(0.0000) (0.0026)
4 0.0150∗∗∗ 0.0155∗∗∗
(0.0000) (0.0025)
5 0.0200∗∗∗ 0.0152∗∗∗
(0.0000) (0.0028)
6 0.0250∗∗∗ 0.0216∗∗∗
(0.0000) (0.0027)
7 0.0300∗∗∗ 0.0282∗∗∗
(0.0000) (0.0028)
8 0.0350∗∗∗ 0.0343∗∗∗
(0.0000) (0.0029)
9 0.0400∗∗∗ 0.0377∗∗∗
(0.0000) (0.0032)
10 0.0450∗∗∗ 0.0422∗∗∗
(0.0000) (0.0033)
11 0.0500∗∗∗ 0.0473∗∗∗
(0.0000) (0.0031)
12 0.0550∗∗∗ 0.0554∗∗∗
(0.0000) (0.0033)
13 0.0600∗∗∗ 0.0535∗∗∗
(0.0000) (0.0031)
14 0.0650∗∗∗ 0.0596∗∗∗
(0.0000) (0.0031)
15 0.0700∗∗∗ 0.0648∗∗∗
(0.0000) (0.0030)
16 0.0750∗∗∗ 0.0717∗∗∗
(0.0000) (0.0033)
17 0.0800∗∗∗ 0.0692∗∗∗
(0.0000) (0.0034)
18 0.0850∗∗∗ 0.0775∗∗∗
(0.0000) (0.0036)
19 0.0900∗∗∗ 0.0832∗∗∗
(0.0000) (0.0035)
20 0.0950∗∗∗ 0.0916∗∗∗
(0.0000) (0.0036)
21 0.1000∗∗∗ 0.0919∗∗∗
(0.0000) (0.0037)
22 0.1050∗∗∗ 0.1010∗∗∗
(0.0000) (0.0036)
23 0.1100∗∗∗ 0.1018∗∗∗
(0.0000) (0.0041)
24 0.1150∗∗∗ 0.1085∗∗∗
(0.0000) (0.0042)
Observations 302,101 293,636
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APPENDIX B
SUPPLEMENTARY MATERIAL FOR
CHAPTER 2
B.1 Estimates of Bedroom-Level Energy Usage
In this section we provide details about energy usage estimates presented
to subjects through the weekly reports. Our model was not intended to
accurately predict energy usage, but rather to produce significant variation
in the reports to subjects. With our simplified model, it is always the case
that subjects who set their thermostats at relatively lower temperatures (in
cold days) would receive reports showing lower energy usage.
Although we have access to highly detailed thermostat setpoint data, the
bedrooms selected for our randomized controlled trials were not individually
metered in terms of energy usage. Rather, energy data was available at the
building-level. The basic set-up of the HVAC system of the building can be
described as follows: each bedroom is equipped with a fan coil unit, which
uses chilled water for cooling, and steam for heating. The fan (which blows
either hot or cold air into the room) turns on or off depending on the differ-
ence between a room’s thermostat setpoint and actual indoor temperature.
For example, if the thermostat is set at 68oF, and indoor temperature is ini-
tially at 71oF, then the fan will remain turned on (blowing cold air into the
room) until indoor temperature reaches the desired level of 68oF. Conversely,
if the setpoint is at 71oF, and indoor temperature is at 68oF, then the fan will
remain on (blowing hot air into the room) until the desired setpoint of 71oF
is reached. Students do not have the option of completely shutting down this
system, or the fan.
To estimate the contribution of a single room to the overall building’s usage
of chilled water or steam, first we established a correlation between energy
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consumption and thermostat changes with the following model:
yt = α+β1[Tset−Toutdoor]it+β2[Tset−Toutdoor]it× [Double Bed]i+β3Xit+εit
(B.1)
where yt is either the building’s chilled water consumption, or steam con-
sumption at time t; α is a constant; Tset is the thermostat setpoint for room
i, at time t; Toutdoor is outdoor temperature; [Double Bed]i is equal to one for
double-bedrooms, zero otherwise; Xit are controls including percent values
(and lagged percent values) of steam and chilled water circulation intensity,
the fan voltage, outdoor dew point temperature, relative humidity, and pre-
cipitation.
Equation B.1 above was estimated with data from the academic year prior
to when our trials were conducted. Table B.1 below presents the results.
The coefficient β1 provides an estimate of how much chilled water or steam
is used depending on the difference between a single-bedroom’s thermostat
setpoint and outdoor temperature. The coefficient β2 should be added to the
estimates for double-bedrooms. Those coefficients should be interpreted for
hours by degree. So, for example, if the setpoint of a single-bedroom remains
1 degree lower than outdoor temperature for 1 hour, then the chilled water
usage within that hour would be of 0.794 BTU. Conversely, if the setpoint
for a single-bedroom remains 1 degree higher than outdoor temperature for
1 hour, then the steam usage within that hour would be of 0.454 BTU.
Note that, probably because of generation of more bodily heat, less energy
is required to heat double-bedrooms (compared to single-bedrooms) in our
sample.
Table B.1: Estimates of Chilled Water and Steam Usage, Based on
Differences Between Thermostat Setpoint and Outdoor Temperature
Chilled Water Usage (BTU) Steam Usage (BTU)
(β1, single-bedrooms) -0.794 0.454
(0.009) (0.017)
(β2, additional for double-bedrooms) -0.174 -0.090
(0.002) (0.004)
Notes: This table presents estimates of how much energy for chilled water or steam is used
if a bedroom’s setpoint temperature remains above the outdoor temperature by 1 degree, for
1 hour. Standard errors are in parentheses. All coefficients are significant at 1%.
A simplifying assumption for our energy estimates is that chilled water is
only used for cooling, and steam is only used for heating (which generally
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holds for our sample). Further, estimated parameters are heterogenous only
by bedroom types. Therefore, if 2 same-type bedrooms maintain thermostats
at the same temperatures throughout the entire sample, then their estimated
energy usage will be the same. That implies that the energy usage reported
to residents, as well as the intensity of the nudges, depend solely on the
differences between thermostat setpoints and outdoor temperatures. We are
not able to capture differences in room occupancy patterns (and how those
affect energy usage), unless they lead to changes in the thermostats within
the bedrooms.
Recall that the point estimate from Table 2.2, specification (VI), suggests
an upper bound change of 0.36oF in thermostat settings due to treatment.
We simulate how much that represents in energy space by applying the 0.36oF
reduction to control rooms, and then estimating weekly energy consumption
with parameters from Table B.1 above. Comparing energy estimates from
actual thermostats versus reduced thermostats, the energy impact is min-
imal: close to 0.15% of average weekly usage of control rooms during the
intervention period.
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B.2 Balance for the Winter Break Trial
Table B.2: Balance for the Winter Break Trial
Control Winter Break Treatment P-value of diff.
(Control-Treated)
Baseline Average Setpoint 72.4504 71.8173 0.0231
Suite Type:
Double-Bed Suite % 0.4591 0.3975 0.2662
Mixed-Bed Suite % 0.0566 0.0683 0.6655
Single-Bed Suite % 0.4717 0.5217 0.3715
Special Suite % 0.0126 0.0124 0.9900
Suite Location:
1st Floor % 0.1069 0.1242 0.6290
2nd Floor % 0.1509 0.2050 0.2068
3rd Floor % 0.2138 0.1491 0.1332
4th Floor % 0.1887 0.1491 0.3453
5th Floor % 0.1824 0.1677 0.7302
6th Floor % 0.1572 0.2050 0.2681
South Wing % 0.7044 0.6894 0.7714
West Wing % 0.2956 0.3106 0.7714
Bottom West Wing % 0.0189 0.0373 0.3194
Center South Wing % 0.1824 0.1180 0.1073
Left South Wing % 0.2453 0.2919 0.3473
Mid West Wing % 0.1006 0.1491 0.1902
Right South Wing % 0.2767 0.2795 0.9560
Top West Wing % 0.1761 0.1242 0.1946
Occupants’ College Affiliations:
Ag., Consumer & Env. Sciences % 0.0520 0.0373 0.4880
Applied Health Sciences % 0.0446 0.0331 0.5476
College of Business % 0.0743 0.0673 0.7806
College of Media % 0.0223 0.0248 0.8745
Division of General Studies % 0.2665 0.2490 0.6890
Education % 0.0149 0.0248 0.4761
Engineering % 0.1136 0.1247 0.7248
Fine & Applied Arts % 0.0435 0.0362 0.6918
Liberal Arts & Sciences % 0.3684 0.3934 0.6105
School of Social Work % 0.0000 0.0093 0.1789
Female % 0.4554 0.4099 0.4008
Residency Status:
In State % 0.8408 0.7992 0.2900
Out of State % 0.0616 0.1014 0.1517
International % 0.0945 0.0963 0.9524
Number of Rooms 159 161
Notes: This table compares control and treatment groups from the winter break trial in terms
of baseline thermostat settings and covariate means. The p-values are based on standard errors
clustered at the bedroom level, and indicate if differences in means are significant. Standard
deviations of the setpoints are presented in parentheses.
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B.3 Simulations of Statistical Power
Prior to initiating the trials, we ran simulations to assess statistical power
and minimum detectable effect (MDE) sizes. With that, it was possible to
determine the appropriate number of treatment arms and sample sizes for this
study. For the simulations, we used (high-frequency) historical data about
thermostat set-points in the treated building. Historical data were from
up to a year prior to the treatment start date, although, due to collection
issues, most available data points were for the months of January through
August 2017. It is also important to note that new residents move into the
treated building every academic year. Therefore, the consumption data used
for power calculations refers to a different set of individuals than the actual
subjects of this study. Nevertheless, residents across all years are likely to
have similar distributions in terms of demographics, year of enrollment, field
of study or other relevant covariates.
We tried simulations considering 2 treatment arms1, with 1/3 of the suites
randomly selected to be in treatment A, 1/3 to be in treatment B, and
1/3 to be in control. We then proceeded to add one degree Fahrenheit to
the thermostat set-points of the treated rooms. With varying portions of
observations that received the 1 degree change, we simulated different effect
sizes. For example, if 50% of observations from treated rooms had a 1 degree
change, then the simulated effect size would be of 0.5 degree. We then tried
to recover that effect by estimating equation (B.2), as follows:
Tit = β1AtreatAi × Postt + β1BtreatBi × Postt + γi + δt + εit (B.2)
where Tit are thermostat settings; treatA and treatB are treatment indica-
tors; Postt indicates time periods after Feb. 1st; γi are room fixed effects;
and δt are time fixed effects. For each of the effect sizes, we ran 100 iter-
ations, re-randomizing the treated suites in each iteration. We stored the
estimated coefficients β1A and β1B, as well as their standard errors (clustered
by suite). The following Figure B.1 summarizes the simulation results for
the effect sizes of 0.6, 0.65, 0.7, and 0.75. The vertical axes show the values
of recovered simulated treatment effects, while the horizontal axes indicate
1We also tried simulations with 1 and 3 treatment arms. However, for the sake of
brevity, we are only presenting results and more details about the specification with 2
treatment arms, which was the chosen design.
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the iteration number. The red horizontal lines represent the true simulated
effect (which we are trying to recover).
For the effect size of 0.75oF, we were able to recover (with a 95% confidence
interval) a treatment effect in over 80% of simulations. The simulated MDE
using pre-treatment data, therefore corresponds to approximately 1% of the
average setpoint in the building.
Figure B.1: Results from Simulations of Statistical Power
B.4 Spring 2018 Nudges
The significant effects shown in Table 2.4 could be attributed to the timing
of treatment. Since students did not not expect to occupy their rooms during
winter break, they might have been more willing to comply with the requests
of lowering thermostats.
We therefore conducted another randomized controlled trial during Spring
2018, to test if moral suasion emails would work during a regular semester.
Rooms were re-randomized, with 1/3 assigned to treatment, and 1/3 assigned
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to a control group.2 Balance for the pre-treatment setpoints, and for relevant
covariates are presented in Table B.3.
Four different email designs (shown in Figure B.2) were used during Spring
2018, to ask students to lower their thermostats. Emails were sent weekly,
either in the morning (8-10 am) or evening (5-10 pm). We varied designed
as an effort to promote more attention to the emails, and so that students
would not feel that the information was too repetitive.
Figure B.2: Simple Emails Sent During Spring 2018
2Another 1/3 of rooms were assigned to a treatment arm that continued to receive
energy report emails. Results were null, thus were omitted from this paper.
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Table B.3: Balance for the Spring Trial
Control Spring Treatment P-value of diff.
(Control-Spring Treatment)
Baseline Average Setpoint 72.2824 72.3359 0.8831
Suite Type:
Double-Bed Suite % 0.4815 0.3953 0.2301
Mixed-Bed Suite % 0.0370 0.0930 0.1247
Single-Bed Suite % 0.4722 0.5000 0.7016
Special Suite % 0.0093 0.0116 0.8732
Suite Location:
1st Floor % 0.1376 0.0698 0.1166
2nd Floor % 0.1651 0.1744 0.8646
3rd Floor % 0.1927 0.2093 0.7746
4th Floor % 0.1835 0.1977 0.8033
5th Floor % 0.1376 0.1860 0.3666
6th Floor % 0.1835 0.1628 0.7048
South Wing % 0.7156 0.6512 0.3397
West Wing % 0.2844 0.3488 0.3397
Bottom West Wing % 0.0367 0.0233 0.5811
Center South Wing % 0.2018 0.1047 0.0572
Left South Wing % 0.2569 0.2791 0.7297
Mid West Wing % 0.1284 0.1279 0.9912
Right South Wing % 0.2569 0.2674 0.8684
Top West Wing % 0.1193 0.1977 0.1416
Occupants’ College Affiliations:
Ag., Consumer & Env. Sciences % 0.0642 0.0446 0.4974
Applied Health Sciences % 0.0168 0.0640 0.0697
College of Business % 0.0719 0.0620 0.7457
College of Media % 0.0138 0.0523 0.1319
Division of General Studies % 0.2638 0.2364 0.6202
Education % 0.0260 0.0174 0.6173
Engineering % 0.1491 0.0640 0.0247
Fine & Applied Arts % 0.0398 0.0252 0.4830
Liberal Arts & Sciences % 0.3502 0.4341 0.1849
School of Social Work % 0.0046 0.0000 0.3176
Female % 0.4817 0.3953 0.2117
Residency Status:
In State % 0.8379 0.8682 0.5140
Out of State % 0.0765 0.0504 0.4028
International % 0.0810 0.0814 0.9921
Number of Rooms 108 86
Notes: This table presents covariate mean comparisons between control and treatment groups
from the Spring randomized control trial. The p-values are based on standard errors clustered at
the bedroom level, and indicate if differences in means are significant.
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Effects of the Spring 2018 simple nudges were estimated with equations
analogous to (2.3) and (2.4) from the main text. Since cooling demand is
virtually nonexistent during Spring, the treatment effect should be unidi-
rectional (negative), so we can directly use thermostat setpoints as the out-
come. Results are presented in Table B.4 below. Although the coefficients
are negative (suggesting effort to lower thermostats), they are not statisti-
cally significant. Null results for Spring, along with significant results for
winter break (Table 2.4), therefore indicate that these types of nudges may
only promote conservation for individuals who expect to vacate their rooms
for longer periods of time (e.g. during winter break). The students might
not be willing to sacrifice thermal comfort (in favor of conservation) during
the regular semester routine.
Table B.4: Spring 2018 Treatment Effects
(I) (II) (III) (IV) (V) (VI)
Spring Treatment -0.1750 -0.0553 -0.0638 -0.0616 -0.1963
(0.3793) (0.3774) (0.3798) (0.3812) (0.1511)
Spring Treatment × Post Jan. 31 -0.2403
(0.1556)
Sample Average Setpoint (oF) 72.14 72.14 72.14 72.14 72.14 72.17
Observations 1,386,111 1,386,111 1,361,355 1,386,111 1,386,111 1,677,513
Controls:
Room physical characteristics No Yes Yes Yes Yes No
Weather No No Yes No No No
Date/Time fixed effects No No No Yes Yes Yes
Avg. pre-treatment setpoint No No No No Yes No
Room fixed effects No No No No No Yes
Notes: This table presents estimates of behavior change induced by simple nudges asking treated students
to lower their thermostats to 68oF during Spring 2018. The outcome variable is thermostat setpoints.
Standard errors (in parentheses) are clustered by room.
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B.5 Outdoor Temperature During Treatment Period
This section presents the temperature patterns observed during our trials.
Weather data from the station closest to the treated building was obtained
from the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA, 2018).
The average daily outdoor temperature during the treatment period is shown
in Figure B.3. Significant variability can be noted, in contrast to the stability
in average thermostats observed in Figure 2.3 from the main text. Outdoor
temperature steadily falls after September, which seems to translate into a
slight increase in the setpoints.
Figure B.3: Average Outdoor Temperature by Date
Average outdoor temperatures by hour of the day are presented in Figure
B.4, which reveals a standard weather pattern: temperatures start to rise in
the morning (when there is sunlight), reaching a peak towards the middle,
then start to descend rapidly at night. Ideally, residents should take that
pattern into consideration to conserve energy. Students were advised to
lower setpoints at night (for cold days), lowering demand for heating, but
there is no evidence of compliance.
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Figure B.4: Average Outdoor Temperature by Hour of the Day, During
Treatment Period
B.6 Further Robustness Checks and Treatment
Heterogeneity
B.6.1 Heterogeneity of effects by average baseline setpoint
We investigate if treatment effects vary depending on average room setpoints
at baseline. This is analogous to the conditional average treatment effects
in Allcott (2011), to test if effects vary by baseline usage. In our setting,
it could be that individuals with higher baseline setpoints face higher moral
burdens once they receive reports showing that their energy consumption
is strongly above average. Alternatively, if high usage is mostly attributed
to inattention, then we could also expect to recover stronger effects from
individuals with higher baseline setpoints: it is potentially “easier” to lower
thermostats that are unreasonably high to begin with.
To test for that type of heterogeneity, first, we create indicator variables
to separate rooms into 5 quintiles, from lowest to highest, based on their
average setpoints at baseline. We then interact the quintile indicators with
the room-treatment and post-treatment indicators to run a triple-difference
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regression:
Dit =
5∑
q=2
αq[i ∈ q]i×Postt+
5∑
q=1
βq[i ∈ q]i×treati×Postt+γi+δt+εit (B.3)
where Dit is the absolute difference between outdoor temperature and ther-
mostat setpoint for room i at time t; treati indicates if room i belongs to
the treatment group; Postt indicates time periods after September 13th (day
the first email was sent); [i ∈ q]i indicates if room i belongs to the baseline
average thermostat quintile q; γi are room fixed effects; and δt are time fixed
effects. Note from the equation that control rooms during baseline are the
omitted comparison group.
Figure B.5 estimates of βq, with 95% confidence intervals based on standard
errors clustered at the suite level. The coefficients βq reveal treatment effect
heterogeneity for treated rooms in each quintile, compared to outcomes for
control rooms in those quintiles.
Figure B.5: Treatment Effects by Quintiles of Baseline Setpoint
It can be noted that only the coefficient for the second quintile (second
lowest baseline setpoints) is significant. Further, it seems that those individ-
uals may have increased their energy consumption due to treatment, which
is an effect opposite to initially hypothesized in this paper. It could be that
the reports provided a perverse incentive for those subjects, who actually
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increase consumption towards the average across all rooms. Excluding the
first quintile, the overall shape of Figure B.5 is consistent with a “boomerang
effect” (Clee and Wicklund, 1980): positive effects for low pre-treatment us-
age individuals, and negative effects for individuals with high pre-treatment
usage. Nevertheless, those effects could be spurious, since validity of our in-
ference diminishes as we look into effects for smaller subsamples. Note that
for this analysis there are 64 (320/5) rooms in each quintile, which implies
that a coefficient for a given quintile is more likely to be driven by a small
subgroup of rooms, when compared to coefficients that are obtained for the
full sample.
By further disaggregating the effects for deciles of baseline usage, we obtain
Figure B.6, which reveals that only the coefficients for decile 4 and 9 can be
considered statistically significant. Again we argue that those effects could be
spurious given the relatively small number of rooms in each decile, and since
randomization was not stratified along that dimension. In Appendix B.7
we further investigate heterogeneity of treatment effects via randomization
inference.
Figure B.6: Treatment Effects by Deciles of Baseline Setpoint
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B.6.2 Interactions between Fall and Winter Break treatments
In this subsection, we analyze if there were any interactive effects between
(Fall) home energy reports and the simpler messages sent before winter break.
With the sample collected during the months of December and January, we
run the following regression specification:
Dit = α+ β1wintertreati + β2HERi + β3wintertreati×HERi +β4Xit + εit
(B.4)
whereHERi indicates if room i had received HERs during the Fall; wintertreati
indicates rooms that received simple nudges before winter break; Xit are the
same controls as used in the main text; and εit is an error term. Note that
in this case the DID from the main text becomes a triple-differences specifi-
cation.3
The β1 coefficient estimates thermostat changes of individuals who only
received simple nudges prior to winter break, compared to a sample of “pure”
controls who were not exposed to any of the nudges. Effects of HERs com-
pared to pure controls are estimated by β2. Finally, β3 captures differential
effects for individuals who received both nudges, as opposed to only one of
them.
Results are presented in Table B.5. As in the main text, it can be noted
that simple nudges were effective i promoting thermostat reductions (of about
1oF according to our preferred specification) during the months of December
and January. Receiving HERs only during the Fall does not seem to have
affected individuals’ behavior during break (point estimates are negative, but
not significant), consistent with the null effects from the main text. Further,
coefficients on the treatment interactions are non-significant and close to zero
for our preferred specifications, such that there is no evidence that individuals
exposed to both nudges behaved any differently from those exposed to a single
one of them. Reductions during those months are therefore being driven by
the simple messages presented in Figure 2.6 from the main text.
3For brevity, we omit the equation.
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Table B.5: Testing for Interaction Effects Between HERs and Simpler
Nudges
(I) (II) (III) (IV) (V) (VI)
Winter Break Treatment -2.0189∗∗∗ -1.8696∗∗∗ -1.8785∗∗∗ -1.8787∗∗∗ -1.3399∗∗∗
(0.4368) (0.4432) (0.4425) (0.4422) (0.3217)
Fall HERs -0.2725 -0.1963 -0.1937 -0.1944 -0.2104
(0.4666) (0.4682) (0.4680) (0.4678) (0.3103)
Winter Break Treatment × Fall HERs 0.4516 0.3880 0.3842 0.3882 0.1328
(0.5391) (0.5386) (0.5388) (0.5383) (0.3828)
Winter Break Treatment × Post Dec. 15 -1.0843∗∗∗
(0.3761)
Fall HERs × Post Dec. 15 -0.2208
(0.2921)
Winter Break Treatment × 0.0099
Fall HERs × Post Dec. 15 (0.4382)
Observations 508,510 508,510 499,669 508,510 508,506 933,854
Controls:
Room physical characteristics No Yes Yes Yes Yes No
Weather No No Yes No No No
Date/Time fixed effects No No No Yes Yes Yes
Avg. pre-treatment setpoint No No No No Yes No
Room fixed effects No No No No No Yes
Notes: This table presents estimates to test if HERs interacted with the simple messages sent before winter break.
The outcome variable is the absolute difference between thermostat setpoints and outdoor temperature. Analysis
restricted to the months of December and January. Standard errors (in parentheses) are clustered by suite.
B.6.3 Thermostat setpoints as the outcome variable
Here we present regression results from specifications using thermostat set-
points as the dependent variable. Namely, we substitute Dit by Tit in equa-
tions (2.3) and (2.4) from the main text. Table B.6 pools both treatment
groups from our main Fall intervention.
It can be noted that none of the coefficients are statistically significant.
However, as highlighted within the main text, the problem with such specifi-
cation is that we expect HERs to positively impact setpoints in hot days, but
negatively impact them in cold days. Those effects could offset each other,
thus falsely resulting in statistically insignificant coefficients.
To take that into account, we run the same regressions restricting the sam-
ple to “cold days” (maximum temperature below 65oF), for which we expect
nudges to negatively affect thermostat setpoints. That sample restriction
implies that we lose our baseline observations, such that we cannot run the
differences-in-differences Specification. However, the other 5 specifications
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Table B.6: Pooled Treatment Effect on Thermostat Setpoints
(I) (II) (III) (IV) (V) (VI)
Treated 0.2320 0.2800 0.2791 0.2784 0.0993
(0.2908) (0.2842) (0.2845) (0.2849) (0.1555)
[-0.337 0.802] [-0.277 0.837] [-0.278 0.836] [-0.280 0.836] [-0.205 0.404]
Treated × Post Sep.13 0.0665
(0.1560)
[-0.239 0.372]
Average Setpoint (oF) 71.69 71.69 71.69 71.69 71.69 71.62
Average Within-Room SD 1.39 1.39 1.39 1.39 1.39 1.45
Observations 2,591,687 2,591,687 2,564,891 2,591,687 2,591,687 3,090,708
Controls:
Room physical characteristics No Yes Yes Yes Yes No
Weather No No Yes No No No
Date/Time fixed effects No No No Yes Yes Yes
Avg. pre-treatment setpoint No No No No Yes No
Room fixed effects No No No No No Yes
Notes: This table presents estimates of behavior change induced by the weekly energy reports, sent to treated subjects during
Fall 2017. The outcome variable is thermostat setpoints. Standard errors (in parentheses) are clustered by suite. Confidence
intervals are in brackets.
are still feasible. Table B.7 below presents the results. It can be noted that
all coefficients remain statistically insignificant, corroborating the findings
from our main specifications.
Table B.7: Pooled Treatment Effect on Thermostat Setpoints - sample
restricted to “cold days”
(I) (II) (III) (IV) (V)
Treated 0.2603 0.3090 0.3100 0.3089 0.1533
(0.2969) (0.2916) (0.2911) (0.2912) (0.2009)
Observations 1,336,390 1,336,390 1,324,206 1,336,390 1,336,390
Controls:
Room physical characteristics No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Weather No No Yes No No
Date/Time fixed effects No No No Yes Yes
Avg. pre-treatment setpoint No No No No Yes
Notes: This table presents estimates of behavior change induced by the weekly energy
reports, sent to treated subjects during Fall 2017. The outcome variable is thermostat
setpoints. Standard errors (in parentheses) are clustered by suite. Confidence intervals are
in brackets. The sample is restricted to days with a maximum temperature of 65oF, such
that only heating demand is expected.
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B.6.4 Treatment effects by hour of the day
In order to test if the energy reports had different effects depending on hour
of the day, we ran the following specification:
Tit = β
h
1 treati ×Hourh + β2Xit + εit (B.5)
where Tit are thermostat setpoints; treati is the treatment indicator; Hourh
indicates hour of the day; Xit are exogenous controls which include room
physical attributes and location, as well as date fixed effects. The estimated
coefficients βh1 are plotted in Figure B.7. Effects are not statistically signif-
icant across hours of the day, even though a slight reduction in thermostats
can be noted during the night/early morning.
Figure B.7: Treatment Effects by Hour of the Day
B.6.5 Treatment effects by weekday
The energy reports were sent weekly, on Wednesdays. The effect may be
expected to be stronger on that weekday, or shortly after, assuming that the
emails served as reminders about energy conservation behavior. To test for
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that, we consider the specification:
Tit = β
d
1treati ×Weekdayd + β2Xit + εit (B.6)
where Tit are thermostat setpoints; treati is the treatment indicator; Weekdayd
indicates weekdays; Xit are exogenous controls which include room physical
attributes and location, as well as time fixed effects. Results are presented
in Table B.8. No statistically significant effects emerge. The point estimate
for Mondays seem slightly higher than for other days, but the differences are
negligible.
Table B.8: Treatment Effects by Weekday
Monday 0.3017
(0.2800)
Tuesday 0.2693
(0.2818)
Wednesday 0.2644
(0.2769)
Thursday 0.2658
(0.2791)
Friday 0.2654
(0.2809)
Saturday 0.2652
(0.2777)
Sunday 0.2528
(0.2785)
Observations 3,090,537
Notes: This table presents estimates of treatment effect heterogeneity by weekday, for
the HERs sent during Fall 2017. The outcome variable is thermostat setpoints. Standard
errors (in parentheses) are clustered by suite.
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B.6.6 Treatment effects around time of treatment
Usage reports were sent to subjects on Wednesdays, at 5pm. In this section,
we assess if there are heterogenous effects close to that time. In Figure 2.4
from section 3.1, it can be noted that treated rooms have a slightly different
(although not statistically significant) pattern of behavior in terms of intra-
day thermostat settings. That is apparent even for the pre-treatment period.
In order to avoid misattributing to treatment any pre-extisitng differences,
we use the following triple-difference model:
Tih = β
h
1 treati×Hourh×Post Treat+βh2 treati×Hourh+βh3Post Treat×Hourh+
β4Post Treat× treati + β5Post Treat+ β6treati + βh7Hourh + εih (B.7)
where Tih is the setpoint for room i in hour h; treati indicates if the room was
in the treated or control group; Post Treat is equal to one after Sept. 13th
(first emails sent), zero otherwise; we restrict the sample to hours around
treatment time (30 hour bandwidths), such that Hourh indicates hours that
are close to Wednesday’s, 5pm; The coefficients of interest are βh1 , which will
reveal if there are differences in behavior (between treated and control) close
to the treatment time, taking into account pre-existing differences.
Figure B.8 plots the point estimates of βh1 obtained from equation B.7.
There is slight evidence that treatment may have induced an increase in
setpoints shortly after receipt of emails, followed by reductions 8 hours after
that (around 1am). Nevertheless, none of the coefficients are statistically
significant, and they are very small in magnitude (less than 0.15% of average
setpoint).
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Figure B.8: Treatment effects around treatment time (5pm on Wednesdays
are the omitted comparison group)
B.6.7 Treatment heterogeneity by suite type
Recall that our randomization was performed at the suite-level, and that the
experiment building contained mainly two types of suites: single-bedroom
and double-bedroom. Occupants from single-bedroom suites do not have
roommates, and therefore may have more control over the thermostat set-
tings, which in turn could imply that they are more susceptible to chang-
ing their behavior due to treatment. Conversely, roommates from double-
bedroom suites may be more likely to face effects from “moral suasion,” since
they are part of a unit in which two individuals share the same reports. In
that case, subjects may want to convey to their roommates that they are
exerting conservation efforts. It is therefore unclear if single-bedroom or
double-bedroom suites are more likely to be affected by the Home Energy
Reports.
In order to empirically test for that, we run the following regression spec-
ification:
Dit = α+β1treati+β2[Single-Bedroom]i+β3treati×[Single-Bedroom]i+β3Xit+εit
(B.8)
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where Dit is the absolute difference between thermostat setpoints and out-
door temperatures for room i at time t; α is a constant term; treati is an
indicator equal to 1 if room i was assigned to any of the treatment arms, zero
otherwise; [Single-Bedroom]i is an indicator equal to one if room i belongs to
a single-bedroom suite, and equal to zero if it belongs to a double-bedroom
suite; Xit are exogenous controls which can include room physical attributes
and location, weather, date and time fixed effects; and εit is an idiosyncratic
error term. The coefficient β1 captures the effect of Home Energy Reports
for double-bedroom suites. The coefficient β3 reveals if there were differen-
tial treatment effects for single-bedroom suites. As in the main text, we also
consider a variation of specification (B.8) above, by running a difference-
in-differences model, which adds an interaction for dates after September
13th. In that case, the specification becomes a triple-difference, to take into
account heterogeneity by suite.
Results from those regressions are presented in Table B.9 below. Interest-
ingly, the coefficient β3 is positive and significant (at 5%) for a few specifica-
tions, indicating that treated single-bedroom suites may have increased their
thermostats, compared to treated double-bedroom suites. However, that ef-
fect becomes smaller and insignificant for the specifications from columns
(V) and (VI), which control for potential pre-treatment imbalances. The
conclusion is that behavioral changes were not significantly different across
suite types.
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Table B.9: Treatment Heterogeneity by Suite Type
(I) (II) (III) (IV) (V) (VI)
Treated -0.2538 -0.2831 -0.2819 -0.2786 -0.2086
(0.2899) (0.2664) (0.2643) (0.2651) (0.2304)
Single-Bedroom -0.4161 -0.2132 -0.2396 -0.2349 0.1236
(0.3185) (0.4227) (0.4254) (0.4241) (0.3078)
Treated × Single-Bedroom 0.6458 0.7826∗∗ 0.7894∗∗ 0.7830∗∗ 0.4478
(0.4188) (0.3924) (0.3962) (0.3952) (0.2921)
Treated × Post Sep. 13 -0.1230
(0.2314)
Post Sep. 13 × Single-Bedroom -0.2125
(0.2315)
Treated × Post Sep. 13 × Single-Bedroom 0.3861
(0.2817)
Observations 2,602,592 2,602,592 2,591,389 2,602,592 2,602,592 3,102,082
Controls:
Room physical characteristics No Yes Yes Yes Yes No
Weather No No Yes No No No
Date/Time fixed effects No No No Yes Yes Yes
Avg. pre-treatment setpoint No No No No Yes No
Room fixed effects No No No No No Yes
Notes: This table presents estimates of the effects of Homer Energy Reports, with heterogeneity based on suite
type. The outcome variable is the absolute difference between thermostat setpoints and outdoor temperatures.
Coefficients on “Treated × Single-Bedroom” indicate if single-bedroom suites were affected by HERs differently,
compared to double-bedroom suites. Standard errors (in parentheses) are clustered by suite. Significance at 10%,
5%, and 1% are indicated by ∗, ∗∗, and ∗∗∗, respectively.
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B.6.8 Treatment heterogeneity based on “efficiency standing”
Recall that for the Fall 2017 trial subjects were categorized, each week, ac-
cording to their “efficiency standing” (Great, Good, or Below Average). In
order to test if those categorizations differentially affected students’ behavior,
we run the following regression model:
Tit = α1treati + α2g[Good]iw−1 + α2b[Below Average]iw−1+
α3gtreati × [Good]iw−1 + α3btreati × [Below Average]iw−1 +α4Xit + εit
(B.9)
where Tit are thermostat setpoints for room i, in time t; treati is equal to 1
if the room was assigned to treatment, zero otherwise; [Good]iw−1 indicates
if the room received a “Good” efficiency rating (consumption below average,
but above the 15th percentile) in week w − 1 (most recent previous week);
and [Below Average]iw−1 indicates if the room received a “Below Average”
efficiency rating (consumption above average) in week w − 1; Xit are ex-
ogenous controls. Negative and significant α3g and α3b would suggest that
treated subjects with the corresponding rating in week w − 1 (most recent
previous week) exerted more effort to change their behavior in (current) week
w. All coefficients should be interpreted relative to the omitted comparison
group: non-treated most efficient users from week w − 1.
Results are presented in Table B.10 below. It can be noted that the coeffi-
cient on treatment is positive, and even marginally significant for specification
(III), which includes date/time fixed effects and controls for room physical
attributes. That suggests that treated efficient residents may have increased
their thermostats (and usage) due to the nudges. That could therefore con-
stitute a “boomerang effect” (Clee and Wicklund, 1980), as noted previously
in section B.6.1, for which consumers who are doing well end up moving in
the opposite direction than what is expected from the nudges.
The coefficients on “Good Rating” and “Below Average Rating” are pos-
itive and highly significant, as expected. Those just reveal the mechanical
relationship between the rating received and actual thermostat setpoints.
It can be noted, for example, that above average consumers set their ther-
mostats, on average, 2.4oF higher than efficient consumers. The interactions
between the treatment indicator and the efficiency indicators are negative,
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but not significant. The direction of those effects suggest that subjects who
were not in the “Great” category may have exerted more effort to conserve
(by reducing thermostats). However, we cannot rule out that the effects are
null.
Table B.10: Treatment Heterogeneity by “Efficiency Standing” Rating
(I) (II) (III)
Treated 0.5841 0.5945 0.7398∗
(0.3674) (0.3993) (0.3949)
Good Rating in Previous Week 0.7398∗∗∗ 0.7532∗∗∗ 0.7429∗∗∗
(0.2558) (0.2818) (0.2818)
Below Average Rating in Previous Week 2.4090∗∗∗ 2.4551∗∗∗ 2.4017∗∗∗
(0.2586) (0.2784) (0.2830)
Treated × Good Rating in Previous Week -0.1638 -0.1460 -0.1950
(0.3148) (0.3444) (0.3357)
Treated × Below Average Rating in Previous Week -0.4426 -0.4818 -0.5740
(0.3368) (0.3575) (0.3577)
Observations 2,570,694 2,570,694 2,570,694
Controls:
Room physical characteristics No No Yes
Day of Sample fixed effects No Yes No
Date/Time fixed effects No No Yes
Notes: This table presents estimates of treatment heterogeneity for the Fall 2017 trial,
based on the “efficiency standing” ratings received by subjects. The outcome variable is
thermostat setpoints. Standard errors (in parentheses) are clustered by suite. Significance
at 10%, 5%, and 1% are indicated by ∗, ∗∗, and ∗∗∗, respectively.
Nevertheless, Allcott (2011) argues that specification (B.9) above is naive,
and does not truly recover the causal effect of the categorizations on treated
subjects’ behavior. There could be unobservable differences between resi-
dents which lead them to be above or below average consumers, and which
simultaneously affect how they respond to the nudges. For example, high
users might have higher preference for heating, thus are less willing to change
their behavior. To address this issue, we exploit the fact that the efficiency
categorizations are based on sharp cutoffs of estimated usage. We can then
implement a Regression Discontinuity (RD) design, with the assumption that
residents around the cutoff are similar in both observable and unobservable
characteristics. With the RD, it will then be possible to recover a Local Aver-
age Treatment Effect (LATE) for being above the usage cutoffs (i.e. receiving
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a ”Below Average” rating, rather than ”Good”; or receiving a ”Good” rating,
rather than ”Great”).
For the RD, we start with a graphical analysis to assess if there are any
observable discontinuities (in thermostat settings) around the usage cutoffs
that determine a subject’s category. Recall that there are 2 cutoffs to con-
sider: for the Average user, and for the Efficient (15th percentile) user. We
can therefore consider 2 sets of RDs. In the following Figures B.9 and B.10,
we normalize the (previous week’s) Average usage and the Efficient usage
to 0 for all weeks of treatment, and look at the (current week’s) thermostat
setpoints of treated subjects who were near the 0 cutoff. The red lines rep-
resent simple linear fits, between thermostat setpoints and distance from the
normalized cutoffs, estimated separately to the left and to the right. There
is no evidence of a significant discontinuity in setpoints. Further, the linear
fits even suggest an effect that is opposite of what we expect: subjects who
received bad efficiency ratings in the previous week may even do worse than
similar subjects who received a better rating.
Figure B.9: Thermostat Setpoints Around the Average Usage Cutoff, for
Treated Rooms
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Figure B.10: Thermostat Setpoints Around the Efficient Usage Cutoff, for
Treated Rooms
To provide further robustness for the RD analysis, we consider a triple-
difference framework to estimate if treated subjects above the cutoffs behave
significantly different than those below. We run, separately for each of the 2
cutoffs, the following RD specification:
Tit = αβ1treati + β2[Usage− c]iw−1 + β3Ciw−1+
β4treati × Ciw−1 + β5[Usage− c]iw−1 × Ciw−1 + β6[Usage− c]iw−1 × treati+
β7treati × [Usage− c]iw−1 × Ciw−1 + εit (B.10)
where Tit are thermostat setpoints for room i, in time t; α is a constant; treati
is equal to 1 if the room was assigned to treatment, zero otherwise; [Usage−
c]iw−1 represents subjects i usage distance from the cutoff (either Average
or Efficient), in the most recent previous week w − 1; Ciw−1 is an indicator
equal to 1 if the subject was above the cutoff, zero if below. We restrict
the regression sample to a bandwidth of 0.2 kBTU around the cutoffs. The
RD coefficient beta7 reveals if treated subjects just above the cutoff behaved
differently from treated subjects just below. We further employ triangular
kernel weighting, such that observations closer to the cutoffs receive higher
importance.
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Results are presented in Tables B.11 and B.12. The coefficients on the
triple interactions are not statistically significant. Thus we cannot infer that
treated subjects just above the cutoffs (who received worse ratings) were
differentially affected by our nudges. The signs of the coefficients (positive)
are in line with the graphical analysis, suggesting that subjects above the
cutoffs may have performed worse due to the categorization.
Table B.11: Regression Discontinuity Estimates Around the Average Usage
Cutoff
Treated 0.3520
(0.2399)
Distance from “Average Usage” Cutoff 4.1256∗∗
(1.5959)
Above “Average Usage” Cutoff 0.1277
(0.1957)
Treated × Above “Average Usage” Cutoff -0.0618
(0.2498)
Distance from “Average Usage” Cutoff × Above “Average Usage” Cutoff 6.2074∗∗
(2.9451)
Distance from “Average Usage” Cutoff × Treated -0.9139
(2.1251)
Distance from “Average Usage” Cutoff × Above “Average Usage” Cutoff × Treated 0.4272
(3.5270)
Constant 71.1014∗∗∗
(0.1928)
Observations 2,136,954
Notes: This table presents regression discontinuity estimates to assess if treated subjects just above
the “Average Usage” cutoff behaved differently from those just below. The outcome variable is
thermostat setpoints. Standard errors (in parentheses) are clustered by suite. Significance at 10%,
5%, and 1% are indicated by ∗, ∗∗, and ∗∗∗, respectively.
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Table B.12: Regression Discontinuity Estimates Around the Efficient Usage
Cutoff
Treated 0.3943
(0.2904)
Distance from “Efficient Usage” Cutoff 11.6175∗∗∗
(1.4424)
Above “Efficient Usage” Cutoff 0.0696
(0.1783)
Treatment × Above “Efficient Usage” Cutoff 0.0642
(0.2311)
Distance from “Efficient Usage” Cutoff × Above “Efficient Usage” Cutoff -10.2316∗∗∗
(2.0746)
Distance from “Efficient Usage” Cutoff × Treated -3.5467∗
(1.9083)
Distance from “Efficient Usage” Cutoff × Above “Efficient Usage” Cutoff × Treated 2.1356
(2.8610)
Constant 70.6244∗∗∗
(0.2309)
Observations 1894338
Notes: This table presents regression discontinuity estimates to assess if treated subjects just above
the “Efficient Usage” cutoff behaved differently from those just below. The outcome variable is
thermostat setpoints. Standard errors (in parentheses) are clustered by suite. Significance at 10%,
5%, and 1% are indicated by ∗, ∗∗, and ∗∗∗, respectively.
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B.6.9 Pre-treatment survey
Prior to starting the Fall trial, we sent an online survey to all residents of the
trial building. We were able to collect 98 responses, out of the 445 students
contacted (22% response rate). Analyses in this subsection are therefore only
valid for a (self-)selected subsample of residents.
The pre-intervention survey was meant to assess individuals’ degree of
concern about conservation or environmental issues in general. For that,
we used the revised version of the New Ecological Paradigm (NEP) scale
(Dunlap et al., 2000). The NEP consists of 15 statements, for which sub-
jects are asked to indicate their level of agreement, with a Likert scale from
1 (Strongly Disagree) to 5 (Strongly Agree). Agreement with the 8 odd-
numbered statements indicates pro-environmental beliefs, while carelessness
for environmental degradation is revealed by agreement with the 7 even-
numbered statements. When compiling a single score per person, values
from all responses are added to form a scale from 15-75.4 Individuals who
score above 45 are considered to lean more towards environmental conserva-
tion. The following Figure B.11 presents histograms of NEP scores from the
individuals who completed the survey, separated by treatment and control
groups.
Most respondents obtained scores above 45, with the averages ranging from
53.4 (treatment) to 57.1 (control). That is above an average of 51.3 obtained
from a representative household survey of the US population (Pienaar, Lew,
and Wallmo, 2015). Our subjects may therefore be considered more environ-
mentally concerned than typical US residents.
To test if higher concerned individuals responded more strongly to the Fall
reports, we consider the following regression model:
Tit = α1treatit + α2treatit × [NEP scale]i +α3Xit + εit (B.11)
where [NEP scale]i is a measure of the New Ecological Paradigm scale for
room i, obtained from the pre-intervention survey.5 If α2 is found to be
negative, then we would have evidence that individuals with higher NEP
scores are more likely to lower thermostats in response to the nudges. We
4The highest score for (even)odd-numbered questions is 5, when the subject ‘strongly
(dis)agrees.’
5Note that for double-bedrooms we use the average NEP of the two residents.
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Figure B.11: Histograms of NEP Scores, for treated and control groups
also consider a DID framework, for which equation B.11 above is modified to
include interactions with the indicator for the date of treatment start (Post
Sep. 14th). Results are presented in Table B.13 below. Note that the sign
on α2 is, as expected, negative in all specifications. However, those are not
statistically significant, thus the level of environmental concern is negligible
in this context.
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Table B.13: Treatment Effect Heterogeneity by NEP Scores
(I) (II) (III)
Treated 4.3648 4.3439 -
(3.0214) (3.0349)
NEP Score 0.0619 0.0618 -
(0.0402) (0.0404)
Treated × NEP Score -0.0763 -0.0759 -
(0.0524) (0.0526)
Treated × Post Sep. 13 0.3815
(2.0985)
Post Sep. 13 × NEP Score -0.0108
(0.0268)
Treated × Post Sep. 13 × NEP Score -0.0091
(0.0370)
Observations 632,880 632,880 752,415
Controls:
Date/Time fixed effects No Yes Yes
Room fixed effects No No Yes
Notes: This table presents treatment effect heterogeneity estimates,
based on New Ecological Paradigm (NEP) scores from subjects, accord-
ing to a pre-intervention survey. The outcome variable is thermostat
setpoints. Standard errors (in parentheses) are clustered by suite.
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B.6.10 Long-term effects
We test if subjects may have had a delayed response to treatment, by look-
ing at a subsample of 65 rooms that received HERs during both Fall and
subsequent Spring semesters (referred to as “Always Treated”). Those were
compared to 35 rooms that were never assigned to any of the treatments
arms (referred to as “Always Control”), other than the winter break nudges.
Again, we run regression specifications 2.3 and 2.4, with the adequate treat-
ment indicators and sample restrictions.
Results are presented in Table B.14. None of the estimated coefficients are
statistically significant, and point estimates are close to zero. A complemen-
tary graphical analysis of average setpoints by date (Figure B.12), produces
the same results: there is no evidence of significant change in behavior of sub-
jects who were continuously exposed to treatment during the whole academic
year.
Table B.14: Treatment Effects for Long-Term Exposure to HERs
(I) (II) (III) (IV) (V) (VI)
Always Treated -0.1764 -0.1815 -0.2153 -0.2196 0.0619
(0.4616) (0.4286) (0.4235) (0.4260) (0.2424)
Always Treated × Post Sep. 13 -0.1317
(0.2603)
Observations 1,654,930 1,654,930 1,633,233 1,654,910 1,654,633 1,808,961
Controls:
Room physical characteristics No Yes Yes Yes Yes No
Weather No No Yes No No No
Date/Time fixed effects No No No Yes Yes Yes
Avg. pre-treatment setpoint No No No No Yes No
Room fixed effects No No No No No Yes
Notes: This table presents estimates of treatment effects for subjects who received HERs during both
Fall and Spring semesters, compared to subjects who were never assigned to treatment. The outcome
variable is thermostat setpoints. Standard errors (in parentheses) are clustered by suite.
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Figure B.12: Average setpoints by date, comparing subjects that were
“Always Treated” with those that were “Always Control”
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B.7 Randomization Inference
We use a Fisher Randomization Test (FRT) to test for heterogeneous treat-
ment effects in this setting. Specifically, we employ the procedure described
in Ding, Feller, and Miratrix (2016). The objective of FRT is to test a sharp
null hypothesis of no heterogeneity of treatment, such as:
Hτ0 : Yi(1) = Yi(0) + τ ∀i ,
where Yi(1) are potential outcomes for rooms i that were exposed to treat-
ment; Yi(0) are potential outcomes had they not been exposed; and τ is
an unknown treatment effect (also represented by our estimated β1 in the
original randomization).
The first step of FRT is to re-randomize treated/control rooms in our
sample and compute “science tables” for all new treatment assignments:
Yi(0) = Y
obs
i if treati = 0 and newtreat
f
i = 0
Yi(1) = Y
obs
i + τ if treati = 0 and newtreat
f
i = 1
Yi(0) = Y
obs
i − τ if treati = 1 and newtreatfi = 0
Yi(1) = Y
obs
i if treati = 1 and newtreat
f
i = 1
where Y obsi is the true observed outcome in our sample; treati = 1 indicates
the original treatment assignment from our experiment; newtreatfi are new
re-randomized treatment assignments for each iteration f = [1, · · · , 200].
Since τ is unknown, we should also iterate through it.
For each value of τ and each re-randomization f , we regress our main
outcome of interest (absolute difference between thermostat and outdoor
temperatures) on the new treatment indicator plus controls, as defined in
the specification from appendix B.6.1 (since we are mainly focused on het-
erogeneity by pre-treatment settings). However, note that for this analysis
we should not interact treatment indicators with controls, in order to avoid
soaking up any heterogeneity. We then take the residuals of those regressions
and construct the variance ratio:
F˜ =
σˆ2e0
σˆ2e1
,
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which compares residual variance from the control group (σˆ2e0) versus the
treatment group (σˆ2e1). By calculating that ratio over all iterations, we
obtain the exact distribution of our test statistic of interest (Ding, Feller,
and Miratrix, 2016). The calculated ratio F from our original randomiza-
tion should then be compared to that distribution, to obtain the p-value:
p(τ) ≡ Pr(F ≥ F˜ ).
It is infeasible to iterate over an infinite number of τ . Therefore, we follow
the recommendation from Berger and Boos (1994), and pick values within
the 95% confidence interval from treatment estimates of the original trial.
The new FRT p-value should then be adjusted to pa = sup
τ ′∈CI
p(τ ′) + 0.05.
We iterate through 11 values of τ ranging from −0.22 to 0.28 (which are
the boundaries of the 95% confidence interval from the treatment effect,
according to the regression described above). All calculated p-values with
this procedure were larger than 0.45, such that we cannot reject the sharp
null of no heterogeneity in effects. Figure B.13 illustrates the results, by
presenting the distribution of variance ratios over all 200 re-randomizations,
and for two values of τ . Note that the variance ratio from the original
randomization is equal to 1.025, and is well within both presented ratio
distributions. That suggests that differences in residuals across treated and
control rooms is likely due to natural variation in thermostat settings across
groups, rather than treatment itself.
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Figure B.13: Results from Randomization Inference
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APPENDIX C
SUPPLEMENTARY MATERIAL FOR
CHAPTER 3
Table C.1: Regression Results for Clothes Washer and Dryer Combined
Regression Specification: LPM LPM Probit Biprobit
Owner-Occupied Mean Adoption [0.2508] [0.2529] [0.2529] [0.2529]
Rented (β1) -0.0249 -0.0211 -0.0189 -0.0203
(0.0197) (0.0268) (0.0251) (0.0326)
Landlord Pays Utilities (β2) 0.0266 0.0241 0.0291 0.0394
(0.0268) (0.0303) (0.0274) (0.0292)
Sample Size 67,840 60,895 60,895 60,895
Housing Controls No Yes Yes Yes
Demographic Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Geographic and Climate Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Notes: This table reports estimates of effects of tenure mode and utility pay-
ment regimes on the likelihood of having Energy Star clothes washers and
dryers combined (sample restricted to homes that have both). Regressions
include all the control variables described in Tables 1, 2, and 3. Standard er-
rors are presented in parentheses, and are clustered by census division. Means
of the dependent variable for the omitted comparison group (owner-occupied
residences) are presented in brackets. Significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% are
indicated by ∗, ∗∗, and ∗∗∗, respectively. Samples are restricted to dwellings
that have the appliance in question (either standard or rated Energy Star).
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